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Buddhist practitioners in the Zen tradition have repeatedly located the tension between : 4
'dtheory (theoria) and practice ipraxi^ when describing profound reality or the way things '?are/are becoming {yathabutani). The subjective stance is constantly challenged as not just I
a limiting but entirely mistaken perspective with which to approach reality/meaning.
Although the Buddhist practitioners and teachers considered here propose teachings 
distinctive to each other, there is consistency in emphasising the necessity of practical 
experience expressed via sûnjatà and tlie ultimate realisation of egolessnessness or no-self 
{anàtman!nairâtmjâ). Nâgârjuna's logical critique works to free the mind from conceptual 
foundationalism so that practice is effective and unfettered by delusion. Practitioners
■ 'A'within the Yogacârâ school such as Asanga recognise the powerful effectiveness of 
meditation that highlights the tension between no-self and a perfected self necessary to 
the Bodhisattva-marga. Dôgen explores the relationship between the cosmic reality of 
Buddha-nature and personal participation in seated meditation such tliat letting go of 
ego-self is tlie very manifestation of the Buddha-self. I consider these Buddhist 
approaches to reality/meaning in relation to Western phenomenology, as especially 
borne out in Martin Heidegger's work to allow for an authentic attitude in and toward 
truth event (Ereigms). Ultimately, I argue that the Buddhist approach to reality embodies 
what I term a “praxi-centric phenomenology" that encourages Western 
phenomenological reflection to remain practical but egoless.
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Introduction
This thesis will explore a particular phenomenological approach in Buddhist thought as 
found in the development of the Zen tradition from the teachings of Nâgârjuna, through 
Yogacârâ and Dôgen that I will refer to as “praxi-centric phenomenology"/ I will 
consider how Buddhist thought and teaching reflect this particular phenomenological 
approach which is similar, although not identical, to tlie course o f tliinking developed 
and labeled such in tlie West by Edmund Husserl and further reflected upon by Martin 
Heidegger. Recognizing certain phenomenological aspects o f Buddhist thought is 
certainly not unique for a number of scholars, Kasulis, Laycock, King, Stambaugh, Kopf, 
among otliers, have demonstrated phenomenological overtones witliin Buddhist 
thinking. Buddhist thinking from a phenomenological perspective continually asks 
where meaning and essence can be encountered. Although tlie Buddhist sources I 
present express and/or describe the route to the heart of tilings in their own way, there is 
continuity and agreement tliat the individual actively engage in the trutli event for tliere 
to be any encounter witli ultimate meaning. Thus, praxis, the practical engagement in the 
truth event, is central to any phenomenological reflection. Furthermore, the passivity of 
“reflection” in context of phenomenological reflection, takes on the active nature of 
practical engagement instead of mere projected analysis.
The term “phenomenology" originates in Western philosophy and has been used to 
describe whole schools o f thought; it generally describes an approach to philosophical 
investigation which is in direct contrast to positivist methods of investigation (Comte) 
and the enlightenment model (Kant). The phenomenological approach seeks to clear 
away tlie prejudices tlie subjective perspective brings to seeing/understanding experience 
so that reality, meaning, or things as they exist ‘in tlieniselves' are able to show 
themselves in an autlientic manner. Auguste Comte, as the fatlier of Positivism, set forth 
to organise and analyse the phenomenal world by scientific and measurable means. 
Because certainty lies only in tlie phenomenal realm of experience and in what is 
measurable, mystery and the undefinable are not recognised as valid and verifable
1 1 introduce the phrase, “praxi-centric phenomenology,” in order to better locate and clarify what I mean 
by ‘a particular Buddhist phenomenological approach’, being fully aware o f tlie pitfalls and limitations of 
classification and categorization. There is often tension between praxis and theoria, and, particularly in the 
West, although I locate the same in Eastern thought, theory dominates and at some points obliterates 
practice in philosophy, religion and other disciplines, including phenomenological movements. To say 
“praxi-centric” is not to dismiss theory, but to locate theory as supportive rather than the dominating 
partner when considering the profundity o f  reality.
components of phenomenal reality. The subject, as the organiser of the information 
provided in the phenomenal realm, is in turn measured by how sophisticated he/she has 
become at interpreting such reality. Further, all meaning is located in the immanent f
realm. Society, as well as the human subject, is treated as a progressive science with ever 
increasing aptitude. One problem with this approach is the zeal with which the 
phenomenal world is considered witliout allowance for a deeper understanding o f reality.
Additionally, tlie subjective stance becomes evaluator and mediator of meaning (that is, 
information) which in turn ultimately demands perfection from the subject. Limiting 
meaning to tlie measurability of the phenomenal realm as well as relying solely on the 
perception o f the subjective stance results in its trivialisation in the positivistic approach.
The phenomenological approach recognises tlie limited perspective of tlie subject and 
works to clarify how the subject is able to evaluate information. Furthermore, 
phenomenology is no mere descriptive science, concerned widi cataloguing the various 
appearances of reality. Ratlier phenomenology, as Jan Patocka states,
is about the meaning of existents and about being as tlie presupposition 
for the description carried out.^
Patocka continues to explain tliat phenomenology considers as its highest goal not
an explanation subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason ... but 
ratlier a comprehension of the tiling, tliat is, o f all that has to do witli 
meaning, in the structured richness of its nature and substance.^
With this turn in philosophical investigation, reason tliat eschews from the subject is not 
allowed to subjugate the objective field of perspective. Instead, the subject-object split is 
set aside in order to consider where and how meaning itself speaks and abides. This 
approach destabilizes tlie foundational (ontological) assumptions at the root o f most 
Western philosophical pursuits and allows for tlie possibility of movement so tliat trutli 
or meaning may emerge.
In contrast to Comte’s readiness to find tlie phenomenal realm a fully “real” situation in 
which to carry out scientific evaluation, Immanuel Kant proposed that there was a
 ^Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: 
Open Court, 1996, p. 16
2 Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: 
Open Court, 1996, p. 16
4 See for example the discussion o f Kant’s understanding o f phenomena and noumena in Melnick, Arthur’s 
“Kant on Things in Themselves,” Themes in Kant’s Metaphysics and Ethics, Washington D.C.: The Catholic 
University o f America Press, 2004, pp. 147-152
5 Kant writes, “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.” 
Quoted in Pinkard, Terry, German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 44
 ^See for example the discussions o f spontaneity, autonomy and freedom with regard to the subject in 
“Part One; Kant and the Revolution in Philosophy,” Pinkard, Terry, German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The 
Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002
;s
, ftdifference between the “phenomenal” and the “noumenal.” He considered the 
phenomenal realm to be a ‘form of intuition,’ that is a shared condition for human J
experience to take place. Both time and place are forms of intuition; they are not “real” 
in-and-of-themselves, but a priori conditions that enable people to have comparable 
experiences.''^ In fact, according to Kant, all human experience must take place in time 
and space, so tliat meaningful exchanges between different people may occur. Similarly,
Edmund Husserl (as father of phenomenology), also speaks of a shared perspective on A
tlie phenomenal so tliat meaning is possible — he eventually locates this perspective in tlie 
transcendental realm and calls tlie vantage point a transcendental subjective one. For 
Kant, the noumenal, however, is separated from the phenomenal realm as it is the M
location of essence, or the things in-and-of-tliemselves. That is, the phenomenal realm 
of experience merely allows for descriptive experience, but not a participation in the 
essence of a tiling. The noumenal realm cannot be experienced as such, but it must exist 
for the phenomenal realm to make sense. Wliere a platonic understanding o f tilings and 
their ideal forms differ from Kant’s division between the phenomenal and noumenal 
understanding of reality is tliat Plato regarded the ideal forms as constant and immutable 
— one living among the world of tilings merely sees a shadow of the ideal. Kant 
eventually allows that the subject, in his discussion of free-will, not only must manipulate 
tlie information gleaned here in the phenomenal realm, but has tlie freedom to evaluate 
the noumenal realm (in which he places God and moral law). Although it may not have 
been Kant’s intention, tliat he insists tlie subject possesses free-will allows for tlie subject 
to impose will on botli die phenomenal and noumenal realms. The subject is situated for 
a measure of will and control tliat has not been recognised in previous European 
philosophical discourse. Although Kant states in Critique of Pure Blason that he has 
allowed for faith in God through his philosophical position,^ the way Kant will be read 
by many thinkers following is through the critique of a powerful subject. Kant’s critiques 
bring to the forefront the capabilities and fundamental makeup o f the subject oriented 
around categories of knowledge.*^ Kant never suggested that the subject has knowledge
8of God, however, his allowance for free-will opens the door to the noumenal for the 
reasoning subject.
Distinctive from Kant’s liberation of the subject to apply reason and all faculties of the 
mind to reality, phenomenological investigation places reason in a complementary role 
with praxis and discovery, and tlie limitation of the subjective perspective is emphasised. 
Sokolowski discriminates between tlie role of reason and the role of phenomenological 
reflection without denigrating one for die otiier, recognising the value each brings to the 
odier. Reason, he states, is “the disclosure and the confirmation of what things are”; and 
diat furthermore, “reason is ordered toward the truth of tilings.”  ^ Reason is the tool by 
which we analyse and interpret die natural world and our experiences within it.
Phenomenological reflection is also deeply concerned with trudi, but approaches trudi
from a reflective stance that allows aspects of truth that may have been otiierwise hidden 
or unrecognisable from the empirical standpoint of reason to show fordi. He states that:
Phenomenology is the science that ... stands back from our rational 
involvement widi tilings and marvels at die fact that there is disclosure, 
that things do appear, that the world can be understood, and that we in 
our life of thinking serve as datives for die manifestation o f things.
Phenomenology also examines the limitations of truth: die inescapable
“other sides” that keep things from ever being fully disclosed, the errors
and vagueness diat accompany evidence, and the sedimentation that 
makes it necessary for us always to remember again the things we already 
know. Phenomenology acknowledges these disturbances of trudi, but it 
does not let them drive it to despair. ... It insists tiiat along widi these 
shadows, truth and evidence are achieved, and that reason finds its 
perfection in letting tilings come to light.®
The phenomenological approach also recognises that meaning and truth are more often 
illusive to die identifying mechanisms that mediodologies depend on for revelation. The 
attitude o f allowing meaning and trudi “come to light” is contradistinctive to the 
subjectivistic attitudes of discovery in the enlightenment or positivistic models. Letting 
truth arise recognises die necessary movement involved in seeing or ascertaining 
truth/meaning. Furdiermore, die subjective stance, rather dian controlling or willing the 
event to take place, is participant in die activity of a trudi or meaningful event. Despite 
die possibility for movement and the emergence of meaning within the
 ^Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 185 
® Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 185-6
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'I9 sphenomenological approach, typically. Western philosophical investigation, even within g
the phenomenological tradition, slips back toward ontological grounding or subjectivistic 
prioritising. In chapter four, when discussing Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, I will 
address the breaktlirough thinking of Edmund Husserl, fatlier of phenomenology, and 
the subsequent reverting to a subject oriented system. Even Heidegger struggles with 
tendencies towards an ontological rendering of reality that grounds movement.
Lester Embree sees within the phenomenological movement four “tendencies” which tS
have marked the projection of phenomenological thinking unto the present. He calls 
these threads o f phenomenological thought: ‘realistic phenomenology,’ which
concentrates on the descriptive science of investigation; ‘constitutive phenomenolog)^,’ 
which delves into the consciousness to account for objects in the phenomenal world;
‘existential phenomenology,’ which brings human existence and experience to the L' -V'lforefront; and ‘hermeneutical phenomenology,’ which sees interpretation as key to the ‘A
subject’s relation to tlie world.^ All these “tendencies,” however, clearly find their roots 
in Husserl and the developments of Heidegger. Witli a praxi-centric focus to the 
phenomenological approach of certain Buddhist practitioners, I am suggesting that in 
contrast to tlie direction most phenomenological tliought has developed in tlie West, 
there is a particular emphasis on practice tliat informs certain Buddhist thought and 
which ought to inform phenomenological thought. This emphasis on practice/praxis is 
often up against the overbearing emphasis that theory/theoria can claim in religious as 
well as philosophical thought. Repeatedly even in the history o f Buddhist thought, 
certain doctrinal teachings take precedent and restrict effective practice. Wlien a praxi- 
centric approach is reinstated, as tiiese practitioners describe, then there is opening, 
opportunity and movement that allows for the release that Buddhism teaches. The 
religious emphasis to Buddhist tliought is a defining factor to its development. Buddhist 
thought, particularly in the practitioners considered here, insists that religion is simply tlie 
authentic practice that opens for the practitioner an autlientic participation in profound 
reality — an experience that defies description. This “description” o f authenticity is 
remarkably complementary to the phenomenological approach H eide^er exemplifies in 
his philosophical thought. That Heidegger is careful to avoid tlie religious discourse and 
terminology of his Christian tradition belies a deep mistrust in the ability o f this tradition
 ^Craig, Edward, general editor, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London/New York: Routledge Press, 
1998, p. 334
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to communicate his thought. However, Heidegger must use words and terminology to 
convey his thought and he chooses Greek metaphysical terminology and occasionally a 
mystical concept from Meister Eckhart to convey his meaning. Because of this reticence 
to use religious dialogue, but a clear indication that he wanted to speak of profound 
reality, or matters of ultimate concern,^” I have called him a ‘reluctant priest’ in the 
Heidegger chapter. Heidegger himself has allowed tliat the course o f his thinking is in 
great debt to his early religious training,^^ and it can be seen tliat his desire as a ‘thinker’ 
was to lead students along a path of reflection that would transform their perspectives 
and create openings for truth and meaning.
As Martin Heidegger was dispensing of tlie term “phenomenology” itself as 
institutionalised and tliereby unusable, Buddhist philosophers such as NiSHIDA Kitaro 
were expressing an affinity for what the European “phenomenologists” were trying to 
achieve, although any real exchange between tlie two was mitigated at best.^^ NiSHIDA 
penned his own philosophical appraisal of living autlientically that he called “acting 
intuition” {kdiUki chokkan) based on a rich history of Buddhist phenomenological 
thought, albeit not named as such. In the subsequent chapters I will show how this 
phenomenological bent embedded in Buddhist thought has informed and shaped the 
development of the Zen tradition and its roots^®, in particular Nâgârjuna’s interpretation 
o f mnyata and his “two truths” teaching which pose a radical relativism making possible 
Buddhist practice, the Yôgacârin “conversion o f the basis” {àsrajaparàvrtti) which 
generates movement between the ultimate and the subjective and again facilitates
See Tillich, Paul, “religion is ultimate concern,” from “Religion & Secular Culture,” 1946, cited in Paul 
Tillich: theologian of the bomidaties, ed. Mark Kline Taylor, London: Collins, 1987, p. 123 
II Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to 
Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 10
O h a s h i  Ryosuke asserts that NiSHIDA did read Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, pubUshed when N ish id a  was 
already 57 years old, but was not greatly impressed by the work. See ]apan und Heide^er: Gedenkschrift 
derStadt Mepkirch c^ um hundertsten GeburtstagMattin Heideggers, Hartmut Buchner (Hg.), Jan Thorbecke Verlag 
Sigmaringen, 1989, p. 33-34. YUASA Yasuo suggests that NISHIDA’s student M iki Kiyoshi, who did read 
Heidegger, may have influenced NISHIDA to a lesser extent. See, YuASA, Yasuo, The Bocpi: Toward an 
Eastern Mind-Bocpi Theory, ed. T.P. Kasulis, translated by N a g a t o m o  Shigenori and T.P. Kasulis, SUNY  
Press, 1987, p. 53. Heidegger is said to have read D.T. Suzuki’s Zen philosophy (see Barrett, William, 
“Zen for the West,” in Zen Buddhism, Selected Writings of D.T. Sucyuki, edited by William Barrett, New York: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xi in which Heidegger reportedly comments that what Suzuki is 
saying, he has been trying to express his whole life) which is strongly influenced by Chinese thought 
including Taoism, and continumg his interest in Chinese thought he even attempted a joint translation o f  
the text o f the Tao Te Ching with a Chinese scholar. This project did not meet with much success as 
Heidegger never moved beyond the first couple stanzas.
Dumoulin, Hemrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, India and China, New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Company 1988, p. 10, 34-35. Although Madhyamaka and Yogacara are not Zen, they are regarded as part 
o f the Zen tradition by Zen Buddhists through the link o f  patriarchy.
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Buddhist practice, and Dogen’s datsuraku-datmrakuf a ‘letting go o f letting go’, as a 
personal expression o f enlightenment via a “trans-descendence” '^' in which only Buddhist 
practice in the mundane sense reflects the true activity of the Buddha body.
Trends in current practical philosophy:
Pragmatism and practical philosophy, as understood from an American perspective^® 
through Thoreau and Dewey, is the realigning of philosophical inquiry to tlae immediate 
concerns o f an individual living in the world in a specific political and social context. 
The individual, tlirough philosophical inquiry and practice, is asked to evaluate the better 
course o f action given societal pressures and demands and to face hardship over 
compromising values that exceed individual preference. This tradition has generally 
attempted to avoid the apparent metaphysical quagmires of continental philosophy and 
focused on living properly, uprightly, according to the best potential o f tire human. 
Current descendents o f such pragmatic thought include Richard Shusterman and Lou 
Marin off.
However, the pragmatic strain of current philosophy, although centering on experience 
and existential Imowledge, tends also toward a humanistic idolatry and egocentric 
understanding of the world, Marinoff writes tlrat tire highest virtue a human may exhibit 
is ahmya, non-violence^^ for ultimately, in MarinofPs view, practical philosophy is applied 
etlrics.^^ And, Marino ff argues, the methods for cultivating human ethical behaviour are 
varied, including yoga, martial arts, biofeedback, etc.,^ ® for a quiescent mind generates the 
inclination toward etlrical behaviour: “active insights ... rise from the deptlrs o f inactive 
clarity.”^^ Marino ff envisions this pragmatic etlrical practice starting at a personal level
The tenn “trans-desceiidence” is suggested by T a KEUCHI Yoshinori in deference to NISHIDA's 
“immanent transcendence” (see NISHIDA, Kitaro, “A n Inquiry into the Good, Trans. Masao Abe & 
Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, originally published by Iwanami Shoten, 
Tokyo, 1921), p. xvii ), however, 1 beheve a fuller understanding o f die concept can be found much earlier 
with Dogen's “datsuraku dasturaku."
1^  Both Shusterman and Marino ff  see pragmatism as a specifically American contribution to philosophy. 
See Shusterman, Richard, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and Philosophical Life, New York: Routiedge, 1997 
and Marino ff  Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 44. Alternatively, Sukale 
suggests that tire pragmatism o f Dewey and the phenomenological existentialism of Heidegger are more hr 
line philosophically than has been recognised, see Michael Sukale, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, 
Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, pp. 121-151 
Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 35, note 12
47 Marhioff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 48
48 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 63
4^  Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 63
s12 3
20 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 67 
24 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 129 
22 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 170
2^  Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold 1. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 107
with active and inactive meditation techniques and moving outward in a “concentric”^  
manner to philosophical counselling o f another, group philosophy (e.g. using the 
Nelsonian Socratic dialogue^^), and finally tlie “summit” of practice, that of 
“organizational consulting.”^^  His vision is that o f a philosophical revolution starting 
small and working its way into tiie most powerful social institutions, corporate and 
governmental etc., and who could disagree that tliese institutions would benefit from 
ethical training. However, an emphasis that relies solely on social paradigms and human 
achievement (even if it is ethical achievement) is still not enough to impart or draw out 
some kind o f meaning for human existence itself. Wliat it encourages, subtly, is the 3
valorising of the human and tlie human capability for improvement and achievement — in 
other words, it makes an idol o f the human and grounds the ego in the “concentric” 
middle of the world.
Pierre Hadot suggests to Western philosophers tlie significance in taking up an existential 
approach to philosophical enquiry and, as reflected in tlie title o f his book. Philosophy as a 
Way of Life, he understands philosophy to be trans formatively active. His indepth study 
of the ancient Greek and Latin philosophical texts provide Hadot a relief upon which to 
compare the modern attitude to philosophy and living, which has been heavily influenced 
by Scholastic segregating of spiritual matters to Christianity (i.e. religion) and theoretical 
matters to philosophy, and tlience the structural and systematic efforts of 17''' tlirough 
19''' century philosophy.^® Although Hadot does not suggest a return to tlie ancient
- 4philosophical worldview of the Stoics and Epicureans per se, he values their 
understanding of a philosophical approach that must necessarily bring out meaning and 
transformation in the human condition by seeking wisdom. Hadot claims that in fact, 
wisdom, as tlie ancients perceived it, is the “natural state” of humanity, that
... wisdom is notliing more than the vision of tilings as they are, the 
vision o f the cosmos as it is in tlie light of reason, and wisdom is also 
nothing more than tlie mode of being and living that should correspond 
to this vision. But tlie philosopher also knows that this wisdom is an 
ideal state, almost inaccessible. For such a man, daily life ... must 
necessarily appear abnormal, like a state of madness ... nonetheless he 
must live this life every day, in this world in which he feels himself a
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Stranger ... And it is precisely in this daily life that he m ust seek to attain 
that way o f life which is utterly foreign to the everyday world/**
Hadot claims that although difficult, it is nevertlieless possible to be a “practitioner of 
the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.” ®^ How does one practice philosophy? Most ancient 
Greek schools of philosophy agree that human desire and fear^  ^ are the root of poor 
decisions and behaviour, bad living and that philosophy aims to change one’s “mode of 
seeing and being” by bringing tlie individual back to living in the present moment, not 
the past or future/^ The exercises utilised by the ancient Greek schools are varied, e.g. 
meditational writing as exemplified by Marcus Aurelius or Socratic dialogue eitlier with 
another or oneself, and Hadot does not view the specific means as pertinent, but ratlier 
concentrates on the intended results: the attainment of wisdom.^® Philosophy lived as “a 
way of life” is marked by effort and spiritual exercise for tlie attainment of wisdom, not 
tliat humans can “know” things better, but the attainment of wisdom so tliat humans can 
“be” in a different way. Specifically, as understood by the ancient Greeks, wisdom gives 
(1) peace of mind, as philosophical inquiry is a “therapeutic” to address human 
“anguish,” (2) inner freedom so that tlie “ego depends only on itself,” and (3) cosmic 
consciousness, such that tlie finite nature of humanity is balanced witliin tlie infinite 
nature of the c o sm o s .T h u s , we learn from tlie ancient philosophers that philosophy ‘as 
a way o f life’ is “living out” logic, physics and etliics instead of merely discussing tliem, 
that is, speaking and thinking well, contemplating tlie cosmos, and acting in a morally 
and just manner toward o tlie rs .F in a lly , wisdom offers the equilibrium between peace 
and passion necessary for living in tliis world properly: as Hadot claims, “inner peace is 
indispensable for efficacious actions.”®^
Thus, it is evident that the current trend in practical philosophy regards hum an activity as 
best filtered through a quiescent mind, emphasises living in the present (not the past or 
future), sees the philosophical attitude as a way o f life (not an academic subject o f
24 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 58
25 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Wcy of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 211
2*^ Notably, Buddhist scriptures also identify “desire” as one o f the most significant problems in die human |
condition that relegates humanity to the sphere o f sa/£A sâra, see SanLlyutta Nikàya v. 421-2. And “fear” is 
another human condition that is overcome, especially via meditation; see DlghaNikaya 11.156, “the 
fearless, calm and self-controlled state o f meditation.”
27 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 83
28 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 265
2^  Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 266
8° Pladot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 267
34 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 274
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32 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 211
33 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold 1. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 108
34 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 59
33 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 60
investigation), and realises that proper philosophy transforms the way people see the 
world around them. In this regard, current trends in practical philosophy remain 
phenomenologically attuned. However, some of tlie pragmatically minded philosophical 
thought would continue to invest the ego with substantive qualities, including a centering 
ground. For although Hadot criticises Foucault’s “techniques o f the self’ as far too 
focused on self cultivation and self concern, his corrective is to reorient the focus 
outward, an “exteriorization”: “In this way, one identifies oneself with an “Other”:
nature, or universal reason, as it is present within each individual. This implies a radical 
transformation of perspective, and contains a universalist, cosmic dimension 
Fladot’s transformation o f perspective, dependent upon the universalising of the 
personal or individual, is grounded in a totalising universal reason which, if ‘tapped into’ 
invigorates tlie individual to a sage-like being-in-tlie-world. Thus, although Hadot argues 
that each human must live those “trutlis whose meaning will never be exhausted by the 
generations of man”®® — that meaning is born in the existential moment and runs through J;
the course of human existence but certainly cannot be captured and hardly categorised — 
he is still bound to the ego-centric attitude that characterises much of Western 
philosophy. Therefore, Hadot, in his claim that the pursuit of wisdom calls the human 
out of a mundane and meaningless attitude toward the world, still retains tlie canopy of 
the human mind and holds tightly to reason as a guiding principle and cannot enter the 
Buddhist concept of emptiness or no-self, and perhaps not even Heidegger’s living into 
tlie void. Hadot clearly draws distinction between a Buddhist understanding of 
meditation, which he characterises as a “corporeal attitude” and what he means by 
meditation, which he calls an “excersice of reason.”®'' And though he does not regard 
theory as an end in itself, but tlie avenue to “nature and life itself,”®® unlike Nâgârjuna he 
does not use rational excercises to move the mind beyond itself.
What is Zen?
The American Academy of Religion meeting in Washington D.C. in 1993 provided one 
of the first venues in the English-spealting academy for the voicing of “Critical 
Buddhism,” recent Japanese scholarship critical of certain Japanese Buddhist teachings, 
particularly Zen Buddhist teachings. The text, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, published in 1997 in
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response to the AAR forum, begins with the chapter, “Wliy They Say Zen is N ot 
Buddhism.”®® Critical Buddhism was coined by H a ic a y a m a ®^ Noriaki who, with 
additional support from colleague M a TSUMOTO Shiro, penned a number of papers 
reviewing Buddhism from a critical standpoint.®® According to Jamie Hubbard and Paul 
Swanson, Critical Buddhism addresses the following; on a sectarian level, the hongaku 
(original enlightenment) issue that has engendered certain discriminatory tliinking; on a 
Buddhalogical level, that hongaku tliinking attaches more weight to an enlightenment 
experience than an intellectual standpoint and favours an authoritarian standpoint; on a 
social critical level, that certain Buddhist thought has been aligned with Nationalistic 
tendencies; and SuEK i Fumihiko adds a fourth level, the philosophical, whereby Critical 
Buddhism has aligned itself with the critical approach in contradistinction to the topical 
itopos)?'  ^ As SUEKI points out, the “critical” attitude of Critical Buddhism is one that 
corresponds more with modern rationalism than “pre-modern irrational approaches” or 
“post-modern criticism”''® and ultimately, the objective of Critical Buddhism is to 
determine which doctrines are truly Buddhist ones (i.e. praUtya-samuipadd) and which 
doctrines are clearly non-Buddhist (i.e. hongaku or tathâgata-garbhà). SUEKl finds both 
constructive and disturbing aspects in the aims of Critical Buddhism as he says:
One of the great achievements of Critical Buddism is that it has 
challenged the tradition o f objective, value-free, positivistic Buddhist 
studies. The main concern o f religion is not with objective facts o f the 
outside world but witli a way o f life. Critical Buddhism is right to have 
insisted on this point, but it is inconsistent to turn around then and insist 
on the objectivity of their historical and doctrinal claims widiout falling 
into the very objectivism they set out to criticise.'"
Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, 
Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997
37 All Japanese surnames will be presented in small caps to avoid confusion between given and family 
names.
38 See SUEICI, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over 
Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Flonolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 
1997, and Heine, Steven, ““Critical Buddhism” (Hihan Bukkjo) and the Debate Concerning the 75-fascicle 
and 12-fascicle Shôbogencyô Ttn\%P ]apanese Journal of Religious Studies, 1994 21/1
35 SUEICl, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical 
Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, pp. 
324-326
4° SUEICi, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical 
Buddhism, edited by Jamie Flubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 
325
44 SUEICI, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical 
Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f  Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 
334
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With this debate currently underway, one might ask in earnest, ‘what is Zen?’ — an 
offshoot of Buddhism? a school of Buddhism? its own religion? SUEKl’S suggestion 
that Buddhism be approached as a “method”''^  rather tlian a set of doctrine or religious 
institution is certainly helpful. As a method, Buddhism is repeatedly brought back to its 
praxi-centric roots, and Zen falls squarely into this same praxi-centric phenomenological 
tradition.
Respected scholar and historian of Zen Buddhism Heinrich Dumoulin begins his two 
volume work, Zeti Buddhism: A  Histoty with the following description of Zen:
Zen (Chin., Ch’an, an abbreviation of ch’an-m, which transliterates the 
Sanskrit term dhydna or its Pâli cognate jhâna, terms meaning 
“meditation”) is the name of a Mahâyâna Buddhist school of meditation 
originating in China and characterized by tlie practice o f meditation in the 
lotus position 0pn., Chin., tso-ch^ mi) and die use of the koan (Chin.,
-ad), as well as by tlie enlightenment experience of satorif
Dumoulin goes on to state that as much as Zen is rooted in Buddhist teachings 
originating with Gautama (or Sakyamuni, as favoured by the Zen tradition), Zen has also 
richly enhanced Buddhism — that, in fact, “Zen represents one o f the purest 
manifestations of tlie religious essence of Buddhism; it is die fruit and flower of that 
larger tree.”'''' Dumoulin spealcs of Zen as a historical sect within Chinese Mahâyâna 
Buddhism with its own set of original religious characteristics, the significance of which 
rivals the tradition from which it sprung. Dumoulin’s historical approach to describing 
Zen is useful, but lacks a critical edge that is necessary for die fuller elucidation of Zen 
practice.
Daisetz T. SUZUKI is m ost credited with introducing Zen to die W est and he writes,
The basic principle ... underlying the whole fabric of Zen is directed
towards the growdi or self-maturing of die inner experience.
42 suElCl, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f  Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical 
Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu; University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 
334
43 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, India and China, trans. James W. Fleisig and Paul Knitter, 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xvii
44 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, India and China, trans. James W. Heisig and Paul Knitter, 
New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xvii
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He also maintains that as much as we would like to describe Zen objectively as 
philosophers, this is no way to have “an effective and all-satisfying understanding” which 
is only possible by living within the tradition itself/® He further writes that
Zen defies all ... designations ... there is no object in Zen upon which to
fix tlie thought. Zen is a wafting cloud in tlie sky. No screw fastens it,
no string holds it . . f
This mystical rendering o f Zen places it outside philosophical categories, and spurns a 
collective religious description of experience or knowledge. Ironically, however, tlie 
focus here must return to the subjective self to whom the unique revelation o f ‘self is
made and which individual experience confirms.
Joan Tollifson provides tliis description o f the experience within Zen meditation and 
how the experience works to adjust reason:
Flower, carhorn, rain, contractions, headache, person, word, tliought, 
wheelchair. What is it? Zen invited me to listen to each moment and 
wonder. The mind divides and evaluates. It provides answers. It 
imagines bondage and liberation, desirable and undesirable. In sitting 
quietly and listening without explanation or ideas, I discovered tliat there 
is no body. If tliere is just listening and experiencing, what is tlie body?
Wliere is it? Wliere does it begin and end? Meditation reveals that the 
body is just a painting tliat appears and disappears in imagination. It 
seems solid when we tliink about it, or if we look into a mirror (and 
tliink), but in quiet sitting we can actually experience the body as 
permeable, borderless, empty space. And we can experience how nothing 
is separate from this space.''’
Tollifson’s experience in breaking down tlie barriers between one’s own body and tlie 
objective space of otlier bodies and reality is one o f tlie first steps towards realising tlie 
Buddhist ‘no self where tlie subjective ego lets go o f not only the barriers o f the physical 
realm but also of the psychological and social. Her emphasis on meditation is in line 
with the classical description of meditation levels in which subject-object boundaries are 
among the first to dissipate. From this stage, one looks to achieve also tlie great
43 Su z u k i , Daisetz T., The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, edited and forward by Bernard Phillips, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1962, p. 26
4<^ as quoted in Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, India and China, translated by James W. Heisig 
and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xix
47 Tollifson, Joan, “Enjoying the Perfection o f  Imperfection,” in Being Bodies: Buddhist Women on the Paradox 
of Embodiment, edited by Lenore Friedman and Susan Moon, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997 p. 20
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experience of transcendent association such tliat compassion radiates outward and ones’ 
experience is no longer singular but corporate or connected.
Zen master YasuTANI Hakuun, in a recently translated commentary of Dogen’s 
Genjokdmi, criticises those who study Dogen’s work — and by extension, Zen — 
conceptually, calling such a pursuit idiotic for, “philosophy and die Buddha way are as 
different as the moon and a snapping turtle,” and “thought and reality are as different as 
clouds and mud.” In laying out what the Zen life or Buddha way means, he writes.
For philosophy it may be all right to miss the point, but as for the 
Buddha way, it’s meaningless. In the end [philosophical pursuits] are 
conceptual amusements and not guideposts for practising die Buddha 
way, for experiencing great enlightenment, or for daily life.''®
YASUTANI re-emphasises here the connection between daily life and enlightenment: the 
commingling o f imm anent and transcendent.
For A be  Masao, prominent Japanese Zen philosopher of what is known as tlie Kyoto 
School of Philosophy and respected Dôgen scholar, Zen botli is and isn’t a form of 
Buddhism. ABE deems what he terms “traditional Zen” a particular school of Buddhism 
in diat it has developed its own doctrines and methods. However, he also speaks of Zen 
as tlie “root-source” of all Buddhism, for Zen cannot be contained in doctrine but 
“directly points to one’s mind as the universal Buddha Mind” and tlierefore is 
independent of any particular siitra or doctrinal teaching.'"’ A be quotes the famous verse 
attributed to Bodhidharma, the Zen patriarch credited witli bringing Buddhist scriptures 
to China, to back-up this assertion;
N ot relying on words or letters,
An independent self-transmitting apart from any teaching;
Directly pointing to tlie human Mind,
Awakening one’s Original Nature, tliereby actualizing Buddhahood.
A be explains that in remaining independent of scriptural fundamentalism, Zen does not 
ignore tlie sutras but seeks to “return to tlie source” of the sûtras. In other words, in the 
likeness o f Sakyamuni’s self-awalcening, Zen seeks to “transmit tliis Mind of self-
48 YASUTANI, Elakuun, F/omrsFall: A  Commentary on Dogen’s Cenjôkôan, translated by Paul Jaffe, Boston & 
London; Shambhala Press, 1996, p. 12
45 Abe, Masao, Zen and Comparative Studies, edited by Steven Heine, Honolulu; University o f Hawai’i Press, 
1997, p. xiii
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awakening from person to person, from generation to generation.”®® Abe  argues that 
this special transmission “outside” tlie teachings actually points to the inner essence of 
the teachings, that is, religious realisation. Thus, that Zen may appear heretical at times 
should not be threatening to Buddhism, ratlier the Zen way is meant to pierce the 
dogmatism and philosophical speculation clouding the real essence of tlie religion.
T. P. Kasulis relates the following conversation at tlie beginning o f his book, Zen 
Action! Zg/7 Person:
“You have asked permission to practice Zen meditation in this temple, but 
tell me: Wliat is Zen?”
After some hesitation and embarrassed smiling, I said something about Zen’s 
being away of life rather than a set o f dogmas.
Laughter filled the tatami-matted reception room. “Everyone comes here to 
study Zen, but none o f them knows what Zen is. Zen is ... Imowing thyself.
You are a Western philosopher and you know of Socrates’ quest. Did you 
assume Zen would be something different?”®'
Wliat the Zen master in tlie conversation above means by “Imowing tliyself ’ is indeed 
the crucial question. But this story also illustrates both the fascination and naïveté that 
surrounds Zen. Aspects of Zen which have reached Western hearers and sparked a 
searching response include ideas of mystical oneness, of enigmatic koan sayings which 
drive students to frustrated silence, and esoteric wisdom not found in Western 
philosophy or religion. Kasulis works from tliis introductory statement on Zen, stressing 
the integration of tlie transformative activity of gcrgen and tliis activity’s ultimate 
transformation of ‘self,’ which in Buddhist terminology is rendered ‘no self.’ The activity 
of tjasyen is transformative of both perception and experience of the perception.
In addition to those like Kasulis who describes Zen experience as the “prereflective 
experience” at die ground of all experience,®^ NISHIDA, Kitaro, founder o f die Kyoto 
School of Philosophy, speaks of the [Zen] Buddhist worldview as an “immanent 
transcendence” in which the individual encounters the absolute by
35 Abe, Masao, Zen and Comparative Studies, edited by Steven Eleine, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 
1997, p. 19
34 KasuHs, T.P., Zen Action/Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Elawai’i Press, 1981, p. ix 
32 Kasulis, T.P., Zen Action/Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1981, p. 146
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transcending tlie self inwardly, in the temporal direction — in the direction 
o f the absolute’s subjectivity/®
N ish id a ’s description seeks to arrest the inclination to desire transcendence from 
temporality to an atemporal or eternal realm.
In tliese brief descriptions, Zen is spoken of in historical, mystical-religious, 
philosophical, existential and phenomenological terms. That tliere are certain core 
Buddhist teachings such as dependent origination ipratîtya-samutpâdà) and no-self 
{anàtmmî) that Zen is also characterised by, the authors cited above would recognise. 
Similarly, Zen can certainly be characterized as a sect of Mahâyâna Buddhism as Zen 
shares specific Mahâyâna teachings such as expedient means [upâyà) and Buddha nature 
(pussshd) in all sentient beings (although interpretations within Mahâyâna vary). And Zen 
itself is marked by its own teachings, such as the direct transmission of Buddha-mind 
from teacher to student. And yet, this Idnd of categorising does little to fully elucidate 
Zen. By investigating tlie formative background teachers and schools to Zen, including a 
comparison chapter on Heidegger, I intend to show that viewing Zen as tlie ‘root and 
marrow’ of Buddhism or critisising Zen as not a valid form of Buddhism at all, is 
eventually transcended by just Zen, itself; that is,
Western and Buddhist approaches to phenomenology:
How, then, does introducing the philosophical category of ‘phenomenology’ assist in 
clearing away designations of sect and parameters o f orthodoxy that would obscure tlie 
promise of liberation that Gautama Buddha taught? As I will elucidate in tlie chapters to 
follow. Buddhism is rooted firmly in daily experiential existence with all o f its fears and 
joys, pain and pleasure, while simultaneously promising liberation from the attachment to 
any o f tliese fleeting emotions and experiences, tliat is, ultimate bliss and rest. From the 
founder of Buddhism, Gautama Buddha, through some of the seminal Buddhist teachers 
and schools, certain means are proposed by which seekers of this liberation may attain 
their goal. The means presented here, when understood and lived into, strike a chord 
with the Western school or method of phenomenological investigation. Out of a strong 
metaphysical and ontological tradition within Western philosophy, the phenomenological 
approach comes closest to challenging the foundational tendencies exhibited along the
33 N is h id a , Kitaro, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religions Worldmew, translated and introduction by 
David Dilwortli, Honolulu: University o f  Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 99
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"Atrajectory of Western thinking. Although it may appear as if Buddhism, a religion, and 
phenomenology, a philosophical approach, are categorically different, it has well been 
noted that Eastern thinking is less concerned with categorical classification than with the 
elucidation of truth so tliat philosophy and religion, science and spirituality, are merely
different vantage points pointing to the ‘way things are/are becoming’ iyathabfitani). ■y
Nâgârjuna’s philosophical style and logical approach to religious truth is a clear example |"a:;
of how one may use a tradition such as philosophy to direct the individual to ultimate
concerns. In a complementary way, phenomenology has worked in the Western tradition AAto destabilize foundational thinking so that when encountering a thinker such as f
Heidegger, the staid avenues of religious discourse are abandoned completely and yet, 
one encounters an undeniable awe and profundity in his philosophical musing that is 
generally associated with religious experience. This is to say that, investigating
■■'îBuddhism, or the Zen tradition, through a strict categorical system would hardly be 
fruitful, and yet allowing a method to announce itself, moreover one which has similar 
aspects to a particular strain of Western investigation, suggests an approach to reality or 
truth tliat may be useful.
We will see in the discussion outlined in the chapters to follow that a praxi-centric 
phenomenology that bridges Buddhist and Western traditions shares a number of 
common concerns with the Western philosophers discussed here in terms of striking at 
the heart o f meaning, where such meaning cannot be forced into view by pure reason 
alone. Botli Western and Buddhist phenomenological methods are orientated to 
consider reality in a way that does not “negate the hidden or absent qualities” as 
Sokolowski has described of die phenomenological practice of ‘reduction’ and ‘epoche’ 
which considers die ‘object’ from its natural state and seeks to not negate die hidden or 
absent qualities encountered. Botii Western and Buddhist phenomenological approaches 
critique the positivistic, purely logical, solely subjective methods of analysis when 
approaching meaning and profound reality. However, while in West it is the 
philosophical tools o f reduction and epoche which work to recognize die hidden or 
obscured elements of reality, Buddhist practice ultimately turns to meditation, in
which practice embraces the ineffable reality instead of describing or analysing it and 
through such embrace claims to actually experience die indescribable. Thus, bodi 
Western and Buddhist phenomenological mediods emphasize a natural or intuitive 
approach to the phenomenal world in order to find authenticity, although it may be
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argued that the Buddhist approach, with its unapologetic religious agenda, will embrace f
the ineffable mystical aspects of arrival more readily than will the Western philosophers.
Heidegger fights the term “mystical” because o f its non-philosophic or unserious 
connotations, however, in the same way tliat Heidegger abandons traditional religious 
discourse but speaks of experience best described as “religious,” he also spurns the label 
“mystical” but effectively argues for what can be described as a “mystical” experience.
34 Heidegger, Martin, Der Satt  ^vom Grund, 4. Auflage. PfulHngen: Giinther Neske, 1971, p. 68, cited by 
Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., 
Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 238.
33 Sokolowski, Robert,, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 15 
33 A n  exception may be a portion o f N ish id a ’s writings and others from the modern Kyoto School o f  
Philosophy in which the political climate o f  WWII surrounding their philosophical writing encouraged an 
historical interpretation not reflected in Nâgârjuna, the Yogacâra school or Dôgen. Once Buddhist 
phenomenological methods meet the twentieth century and the advent o f the Kyoto School o f  Philosophy, 
tliere is clear indication that historicity is a more significant factor.
A-
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When finally encountering meaning or ultimate truth, the Buddhist approach criticizes A |
the West for reifying meaning and thus robbing it o f its efficacy. NiSHIDA asserts that 
pure experience has “no meaning,” which is not to claim its insignificance, but to liberate 
the pre-reflective ineffable Imowledge/experience from the confines of language and 
conceptual categories. Heidegger, incidentally, agrees as he claims that the authentic 
occurs because it occurs, and he quotes from the mystic poet Angelus Silesius to support 
this claim: “The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms”.®"'
In otlier areas tliere will be complementary concerns but different emphasis. Botli 
Western phenomenologists and Buddhist practitioners recognize the unique and essential 
role of time. Sokolowski describes within a phenomenological understanding of time, 
the “internal time consciousness” which provides the clearing or opening for meaning or 
truth {alethid) so that one relies neither solely on the subject (which would indicate a lapse 
into the psychological) nor the object (a lapse into worldly processes or 
phenomenalism).®® Both Husserl and Heidegger recognise that temporality is part of 
how meaning intersects with tlie human life, that time and being are inextricably 
connected, and yet unlike the Western thrust, in the Buddhist pursuit tliere is generally 
not the same emphasis on historicity or import of the historical moment.®® Interestingly, 
despite a mutual recognition o f tlie import of time, the Buddhist approach criticizes tlie 
West for undervaluing or ignoring altogether the role place (bashâ) plays. WaTSUJI’s Ameditations on basho and climate in Fudo highlight the import of place as a necessary
Finally, as Husserl and Heidegger perhaps only began to explore, a Buddhist praxi-centric 
phenomenological approach will see meaning expressed in tlie existential-onto- 
phenomenological rather than in a transcendental subjectivistic ego-consciousness which 
perceives reality as existing dualistically in the phenomenal world. The Buddhist 
phenomenological approach will take a more radical approach to the Husserlian 
'Lebetwvelt, an approach in which praxis is the transcendent noumenal reality, and only 
here can tlie duality o f two worlds disappear. In broad generalities. Western philosophy 
presupposes the subject, the ego, and wonders how to reconcile that subject to the lived 
world and any other transcendent reality such as God or “the good’' or “the beautiful.” 
After Descartes, transcendence is claimed for the subject, the ego, but the problem of
W aTSUJI Tetsuro, Fiido (Climate and Culture), 1935, as cited in Japanese Philosophy by H. Gene Blocker 
and Christopher L. Starling, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 2001, p. 128 
As Y u a sa  states, “Nishida’s basho vis-à-vis nothing is the basho that can be reached by letting ego- 
consciousness disappear.” YUASA, Yasuo, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-bodp Theoy, edited by Thomas 
P. Kasulis, translated by N a g a TOMO Shigenori and Thomas P. KasuHs, Albany: State University o f New  
York, 1987, p. 61
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component in understanding the relation between human existence and the lived world.^^
The necessity of place is also implicitly important in Dôgen’s reflections and NiSHIDA
later develops the concept of place and meaning when he writes of mu no basho or the |
“basho [place or top os] vis-à-vis nothing.” ®^ 'iIFurther, in common with Husserl and Heidegger, Buddhist praxi-centric phenomenology si
accepts human existence as a given. However, tliere is strict warning against cultivating ■ .:iy.an ego-self so that Buddhists will reject the Western model of mitigating meaning 
through a transcendental ego-self. Husserl, and even to a certain degree Heidegger, was 
determined to recover the transcendental subject. Husserl tried to clear away or suspend 
the filtering impurities which obscure subject and object participating in the same reality, 
and eventually proposed a transcendental subject much in the same vein as Kant did
before him. Heidegger tried to find the ground in which subject returns to itself, |
authentically, and found that the object has always already been there, at die origin o f die 
subject bound togedier widi the unity of beitig. But Buddhist phenomenology will deny 
the subject-object split fundamentally, for die ultimate expression of a self is the 
realisation o f anàtta “no-self’ by means o f sünyatà or emptiness at the basis of every 
assertion. Dôgen’s discussion o f tiji or “being-time” exemplifies this non-dual rendering 
of being and time.
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reconciling tlie now transcendent subject to tlie lived world and any “otlier” in it is no 
nearer a resolution. Furthermore, altliough Husserl and Heidegger return to tlie 
phenomenal realm in search for authentic meaning, they still presuppose die ego, either 
in die form of the transcendental subject, or in Da-sein who finds itself “dirown” into 
this world of beings.
Generally speaking, Buddhist thought recognises the subject-object split as 'y
fundamentally mistaken. NiSHIDA attempts to explain how die subject (ego) recognises
the structure of reality in which prior to the problematic assertion of the ego there is
unity, and tiius effects the disappearance o f the ego. In this way, die Western movement
to “transcend” or cross back over the boundary or gap between subject and object is
described by Eastern thinkers from die opposite perspective, as a trans-descendence
prior to any possible split between a supposed subject and object.
Chapter Outiine
In Chapter One I address Nâgârjuna’s criticism of the Abhidharma scholars to present 
“an inventory o f objects as they appear to our pre-reflective consciousness 
(phenomenology)” but which later became a way to talk ontologically about the way 
things really are/exist.^® Nagarjuna’s critique is levelled against any kind of 
foundationalism whetiier it is external and ontological in nature or internal and 
psychological in nature. Ontological investigations, such as exhibited by the Abhidharma 
scholars, as well as a psychologised internalisation of reality, a criticism levied against the 
Yogâcâra school, will according to Nagarjuna’s critique ultimately dead-end in tiieir 
attempts to lay a foundation for Buddhist practice. Obviously neither the Abhidharma 
scholars nor the Yogacara school intended to institute any form o f foundationalism, 
however Nagarjuna’s critique forces the trajectory of each approach in order to show a 
propensity within each toward a foundationalism that was never present in the original 
message o f Buddhism. Nâgârjuna claimed to have offered no new doctrine and no new 
interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings, ratiier he sought to strike to the heart o f the 
Buddha’s message with a deconstructive dialectic and radical emptiness {smyata) that 
intends to ultimately free one to Buddhist practice, the activities carried out in the 
mundane sphere which provide movement to realise the supramundane or ultimate.




Despite the critical appraisal of Nâgârjuna against what appears to be psychological
':,y.ontologising by tlie Yogâcâra school, in Chapter Two I critically examine thinkers witliin ''
tlie Yogacârâ tradition, such as Asanga and to a degree Vasubhandhu, who offer a view 
of meditative practice which again pushes die practitioner beyond the psychologically- 
essentialist parameters of the mind via a phenomenological approach which moves tlie 
practitioner to a breakthrough in which not only is there no actor nor other acted upon, 
but there is “no mind that knows.” Only “direct cognition” (Jtîdnâ) or an intuitive 
behaviour can move to this point beyond (or before) cognition.
In Chapter Three I show how Dogen moves the philosophical discussion from the y
anonymity o f paradigms to the personal narrative by means of koan and another ri
rendering o f radical emptiness {mnyata) that involves letting go or casting off {datsuraku- 
datsurakü) the ego-self so that a “traceless enlightenment” is manifest eternally. For 
Dogen, praxis is the participation o f the individual in tlie cosmic revealing of Buddha- 
nature. Time and place, for Dogen, reflect the law of pratltya-samutpàda (conditioned 
arising or co-dependent origination); but ratlier tliaii transcend tlie world or arising and 
passing away, Dôgen’s practice is located there purposefully in order that Buddha- 
dharma is manifest.
Given tlie criticisms Buddhist thinkers assert against Western phenomenologists, many 
have turned to Martin Heidegger, a philosopher who began his career under Edmund 
Husserl, founder and father of the phenomenological method, and who publicly “gave 
up” the descriptor “phenomenology” but who continued to operate along the 
phenomenological vein o f investigation. I consider Heidegger’s thought and methods in 
Chapter Four as well as the parallels o f his thought to Buddhist thinkers in the Zen 
tradition whom I consider to exhibit a particular phenomenological emphasis in their f
approach to profound reality.
Chapter 1.
Nâgârjuna and the Working of Emptiness
In this chapter I will explore the way in which Nâgârjuna’s logical critique o f smbhava or 
self-nature and his introduction of tlie concept of “two-truths” work to challenge 
substantialist thought and a strict ontological concern that is not evident in the original 
teachings of Gautama. Specifically, Nâgârjuna engaged in debate a contingent of 
abhidharma scholars whose dharma matrices reflect a move from identifying and working 
out its cessation in a process of dhyànic meditation to tlie strictly ontological concern of 
identifying dharma elements. This indicates a move by tlie abhidharma scholars towards a 
metaphysical tiiinking which concentrates on tlie cultivation process o f good dharma in 
contrast to the more mystical emphasis of quieting die mind and bringing discursive 
thought (prapancd) to an end. Nâgârjuna proposes as the only effective possibility for 
Buddhist practice a radical relativism couched in paradoxical language, for language is 
necessarily derivative and always problematic. Wliat Nâgârjuna effectively questions is 
whether one may realise no-self iandtmart) doctrinally or solely through praxis. He 
ultimately argues tliat liberation (realising no-self) can only be experienced as a result of 
Buddhist practice; once tlie doctrine has been heard, a Buddhist practitioner must learn 
how to effectively internalise the truth therein, and dispense with the structure which 
would bind die mind anew. As widi what I term Buddhist praxi-centric phenomenology, 
Nâgârjuna’s critique aims to discourage and disengage the grasping mind so that practice 
is meaningful and effective. Nâgârjuna’s signature tools for accomplishing such critique 
are (1) a radical employment of sUnyatd such that not only external objects in the 
phenomenal world are accepted as empty, but self, the perceiving subject, is also 
emptied, and (2) the two-truths teaching in which Nâgârjuna collapses the understanding 
of transcendental trudi and mundane reality such that the practitioner is freed to 
participate meaningfully in die Buddhist activities of release.
Named among the patriarchs of a number of later Buddhist schools, including the Zen 
sect’s tradition of Dharma lineage, Nâgârjuna is championed as one of Buddhism’s 
philosophers par excellence^  and has undeniably shaped the Mahâyana strain of Buddhism 
tiirough to die modern era.^° Nâgârjuna lived and taught at some point between the first
Heinrich Dumoulin emphasises Nagarjuna’s important place within the Zen tradition in Xm Buddhism: A  
History, India and China, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1988, p. 10, 34-35,
Garfield, Jay L., trails and commentary. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nâgârjuna's 
MûlamadbyamakakârikâsfDMosà University Press: Oxford/New York 1995
2^ Ruegg names five “minor” works after the MMK, the Yuktisaastika, the Èùnyatâsaptati, the Waidalya- 
‘Satra\ the Vigrahayydvartam and the Ratndvalt, in Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of 
Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981. Lindtner considers the following works “authentic” to 
Nâgârjuna: MMK, Èùnyatâsaptati (SS), Vigrahayavartanî (flY), Vaidalyaprakara{ia (VP), *Vyavahàrasiddhi (VS), 
Yuktpa^fka (YÇ), Catuhstava (CS), Èatnâvalï (RÀ), Pratîtyasamutpâdahydayakârikâ (PK), Sütrasamuccaya (SS), 
Bodhicittamaraya (BV), Suhflekha (SL), '^Bodhisambhâra\kâ[ (BS), in Lindtner, Chr., Nagafuniana: Studies in the 
Writings andPhiksophy ofNâgâtjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag Press, 1982, p. 11.
Although it is noted that he does not use the term “Madhyamaka” in any o f his writings.
Prasafiga is the Sanskrit term for the logic which leads to reductio ad absurdum. The Indian school o f  logic 
that bears the name Prdsangika reflects their usage o f  this particular logic. See Sources of Indian Tradition, Vol. 
1, Gen. Ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, p.156 
Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 
1981, p. 35. Tucci agrees, stating in regard to the Hymns o f  the Catuh-stava that there can be “htde 
doubt” as to Nâgârjuna’s authorship, Tucci, Guiseppe, “Two Hymns o f the Catuh-stava o f  Nâgârjuna,” 
International Loyal Asiatic Society, 1932, p. 309.
Nagarjuna engaged in a thorough deconstruction o f the prevalent ontological arguments championed by 
such non-Buddhist schools as the Nyâya and similar tendencies towards forms o f foundationalism in some 
Buddhist schools, namely those scholars enmeshed in the Abhidharma literature and tlie emerging doctrine 
o f the Yogâcâra school.
:
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3and third century CE, and is arguably best known for writing the Mitlamadhyamakakànkàs 
(translated Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle W ayf abbreviated hereafter as MMK)'^^ the y
contribution o f which helped establish what has become known as Madhyamaka 
tliought. Altliough scholars are not in agreement over how many of the other treatises 
and hymns may be reliably attributed to him, there is no convincing reason for why a 
greater corpus of writing, including the hymns of praise, may not also be considered 
valid. Ruegg argues that the strictly philosophical prasangf'^ arguments in the MMK and 
Vigrahaiyàvartanî do not necessarily preclude the possibility o f Nâgârjuna using other 
genres o f writing, including the more cataphatic approach found in the hymns, and thus 
genre alone should not dictate tlie authenticity of Nâgârjuna’s authorship.®^ Ï argue that 
that Nâgârjuna’s deconstructive or prasatiga type writing, such as exhibited in tlie MMK, 
is only validated within the larger context of Buddhist practice. Otherwise, without the 
element of practice, and purely as an exercise in logic, the MMK may be justifiably 
accused of attempting to totally annihilate the precepts of tlie Buddha. Wliat Nâgârjuna 
does attempt witii the MMK is a refutation of the tiieoretical and philosophical 
grounding that he sees supplanting true Buddhist practice.
Nâgârjuna sought to rekindle the essence of the Buddha’s message with his radical 
criticism o f any theory o f “self-nature” {svabhâvà)F His critique deconstructs tlie 
conventional descriptors of subject and object insisting that the law of dependent 
origination (pratitya-samutpdda) makes for radical relativism. No respecter of dogma,
Nagarjuna subjects tlie very tenets of tlie Buddhist doctrine to his deconstruction process
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*5'^ from MMK as quoted by Herman, A. L., A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A  Philosophic History of Indian 
Buddhism, Lanham: University Press o f  America, Inc., 1983, p.289
68 "Here, O Sariputra, aU dharmas are marked with emptiness; they are not produced or stopped, not 
defiled or immaculate, not deficient or complete.” The Heart Sutra in Buddhist Scriptures, selected and 
translated by Edward Conze, London: Penguin Books, 1959, p. 163
see Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, “Mystische Erfahrmig und logische Kfitik bei Nâgârjuna,” Kedgiose Etfahrung 
und theologische Reflexion: Festschrift fur Heinrich Ddring, Armin Kreiner and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Hg.), 
Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1993, p. 386; and Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A  Philosophical Investigation of 
Yogâcâra Bttddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Roudedge Curzon, 2002, p. 232
in order to reveal tlie original intention of the Buddha o f a complete liberation, re-cast by 
Nâgârjuna in his verse of dedication to Buddha as “no birth nor death; no annihilation 
nor persistence; no unity nor plurality; no coming in nor going out.”®^ One might note 
the similarity o f Nâgârjuna’s verse to the later well-known verse from the Heart Sutra 
(Prajnàpâramitra Hrdqya Sütrà) that dharmas are empty of own-being, witliout marks, 
neither produced nor stopped.®® Nâgârjuna insists on the absence of any kind of self­
nature or essence isvabhâvà), even within the dharmas tliemselves. All existents are empt)?- 
o f such essence, for all are completely co-dependent and radically relative. Nâgârjuna 
intends to lead his adherents tiirough a logical process of release that parallels the yogins’ 
steps to a deep formless state of meditation.®^ In tliis way, as Nâgârjuna also insists, 
there is no ultimate position or argument, not even the Buddha’s “teaching,” as such. 
Practice is beyond any mundane doctrinal teaching, beyond and much more profound 
than the metaphysical and logical explanations for how tlie transitory ego-consciousness 
can make sense of the nature of tilings; and yet true Buddhist practice takes place 
nowhere else tlian among die skandhas and in a transitory world, just as described in the 
scriptures. Nâgârjuna’s purpose is to remind his followers of the true “essence” o f the 
Buddha’s message by driving them away from the apparent safety of a bordered 
knowledge o f the true path to tlie ultimate freedom and release that has no proper 
description but which is experienced as siva, “blissful”. He operates by laying out tliese 
tenets of the Buddha for re-interpretation in order to preserve them, ultimately, from 
reification and the perils of foundationalism. In order to contextually situate Nâgârjuna’s 
praxi-centric paradigm shift, it is necessary to review the praxiological instantiation of tlie 
Buddhist teaching within tlie Four Noble Trutlis.
Background: establishment o f key Buddhist teachings 
Four Noble Trutlis
Wliat has been called Gautama Buddha’s “enlightenment” can accentuate the 
epistemological breaktlirough to the detriment of recognising what was the Buddha’s
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profound experience o f release. In a similar vein Nagarjuna has been viewed as one of 
Buddhism’s greatest philosophers, but this has also tlie possibility for gravely 
misunderstanding his purpose in engaging in debate, what in Buddhist terminology 
would be called the skilful means by which he engages in teaching. What both tliese 
teachers, Buddha and later Nâgârjuna as reviver of the spirit of his teaching, sought to 
deliver was a way of living into true reality such that the experience of living is 
completely transformed. The Buddha’s teaching of die four noble truths and eight-fold 
noble path was aimed at identifying what was problematic about life and setting out the 
prescription for the transformation. He never intended tiiat these instructions become 
the basis for a religious/philosophical system. That Nâgârjuna subjects these hallowed 
teachings to rigorous critique is his condemnation not of die Buddhist patii itself but of 
how the path has been corrupted by the constructing thrust o f the ego-consciousness. 
With this in mind it would be beneficial to revisit the Buddha’s teachings before 
considering Nâgârjuna’s critique.
The Buddha’s first sermon at Benares, die setting out of the four noble truths, and his 
teaching o f the “law” o f dependent origination ipmtîtya-samutpàdà), was based on 
Gautama’s individual experience of universal trutlis. Gautama’s long journey to 
enlightenment came via saturation in die world, examining die limits o f pleasure and 
pain, comfort and extreme denial, and his eventual penetrating insight was borne out of 
what trutlis were presented to him during a prolonged session of meditation. His 
understanding did not come from outside the world itself nor from beyond his personal 
experience in and o f this world. The nature of things, how things really are/are 
becoming {yathâbütamf'^  was revealed to him in the moment o f his enlightenment 
experience.
The first noble truth, he taught, is that people experience duhkha in their daily life.
This is die noble trutii of suffering {dukkhap birth is suffering {dukkha), 
ageing is suffering (dukkha), sickness is suffering (dukkha), dying is 
suffering {dukkha), sorrow, grief, pain, unhappiness, and unease are 
suffering {dukkhap, being united witii what is not liked is suffering 
{dukkha), separation from what is liked is suffering {dukkhap, not to get
see Herman, A. L., An Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A  Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: 
University Press o f America, Inc., 1983, p. 55
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what one wants is suffering {dukkhap, in short, the five aggregates of 
grasping are suffering {dukkha) f
''D ukkhd' {duhkhd) is pain or dissatisfaction; human life is fraught with the existential 
angst of uncertainty during good times, and the pain of sickness and death during the 
worst times. A person must come to an existential awareness of duJokha before any kind 
of religious understanding makes sense. Driven by the angst of duhkha, humans reach 
out for stability in eitlier the physical or metaphysical realm but what is grasped in tliese 
efforts merely leads back to duhkha again for the act of grasping itself is what binds the 
human to this desperate cycle of pain {samara), not the object “grasped.” It ought to be 
noted, however, tliat tlie experience o f duhkha is universal to human life and thus works 
simultaneously to position humans for liberation from tlie experience duhkha.
The second noble truth identifies the origin o f duhkha, that it arises directly out of the 
individual, specifically tlie desires or thirst {tanhâ) of that individual
This is the noble trutii of the origin of suffering {dukkhap. the tiiirst for 
repeated existence which, associated witii delight and greed, delights in 
tiiis and that, namely the tiiirst for tlie objects of sense desire, the thirst 
for existence, and tlie thirst for non-existence.^^
Humans tend to grasp onto (this is what is meant by “thirst”) what looks stable and 
satisfying, to desire pleasing things and feelings and to avoid the unpleasant aspects of 
life. Humans tend to look eitlier for tlie comforts of eternity, that human existence may 
transcend death and dying, or humans tend to grasp and tiiirst for annihilation to cancel 
the experience of duhkha. Both these extremes, tliat of eternity and annihilation, are 
objects or states o f being/non-being that seduce human grasping but neither are 
ultimately obtainable for the trutii that the Buddha discovered lies in the relinquishing o f 
all grasping. Any “grasping” after objects or states of being is tlie activity of denial and 
cannot lead to release.
However, as noted already, duhkha, or existential angst can act as the sigial in human 
experience which points out the limitations of tlie world (“lived world”, Lebensm/i), and
Santyutta Nikqya v. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60
Samyutta N ikdjav. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60
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tliereby suggests the possibility of rest, of satisfaction, of letting go o f the activity of 
grasping and thirsting. The third noble truth assures diat there is a release from duhkha, 
called elsewhere nirvana, literally “expiration:”
This is tlie noble truth of the cessation of suffering {dukkhap the 
complete fading away and cessation of this very thirst — its abandoning, 
relinquishing, releasing, letting go.
Finally, the forth noble truth details the way in which an individual masters desire so that 
nirvana may be experienced. As such, tlie fourth truth, which is the noble eight-fold patli, 
is tlie way of practising and living which can quiet and eventually put out the fires of 
desire and passion which give rise to the thoughts and actions which manifest themselves 
in the world as duhkha. The noble eight-fold path is taken and applied to the life 
dedicated to finding release from the cycle of duhkha -laden existence. This path is 
described as a list o f beneficial activities, both psychological and ethical behaviour, which 
would address the problems of duhkha. By training oneself to see where the paths o f 
pain and release are charted in life’s experiences and activities, one embarks on the path 
to liberation. The aspects o f duhkha and liberation are classified as dharmas by 
practitioners. Are tlie thoughts and actions tliemselves dharmas} Once monks began to 
identify thoughts and actions as dharmas, as existents separated from the cyclical reality of 
life {samara), the thrust o f the Buddha’s teaching is dramatically changed. This very 
change was borne out in the proliferation of abhidharma literature which will be 
addressed later in this chapter.
Dependent Origination (pratitya-samutpadd). No Self {anâtmaiî). Emptiness {sttnyata)
In addition to the Buddha’s sermon at Benares, his teaching of the “law” o f dependent 
origination {pratltya-samutpâdà), also translated 'conditioned causality,’ ‘conditioned arising’ 
or ‘co-dependent origination,’ is essential to Buddhist practice. The Buddha’s experience 
in die world underscores the relativity of phenomena, including thoughts, actions and- 
matter. Wlien Nâgârjuna reinforces the importance of seeing phenomena as radically 
relative, instead o f working witli what had become a reified conceptual model, the “law 
o f dependent origination”, he recasts tlie argument in terms of sfmyatd. First, a look at 
the original teaching and context out of which Nâgârjuna’s sünyatà teaching arose.
SamyuUa Nikdya v. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60
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Dependent origination denies tlie substantial/eternal existence o f anything and is 
abstractly stated in tlie Sanyutta Mikdja (II .28): “That being, tliis comes to be; from die 
arising of that, this arises; that being absent, this is not, from die cessation o f that, diis 
ceases.” '^^  The first noble trudi underscores die transitoriness of all diings, good and evil, 
formed or unformed. N ot only does die life cycle in botany and biology reflect this 
“law” but even what appears static, like mountains and a concept o f “se lf , conform to 
dependent origination.’^
The Buddha teaches that diis “se lf  is actually a conglomerate of five groupings 
{skandhas)'. form, feeling, cognition, character aspects, and consciousness.’® What we call 
“s e lf  is merely a conventional use of language, and indicates nodiing beyond the 
everchanging skandhas. According to the earliest Buddhist teachings, skandhas are 
characterised by impermanence {anityà), which effectively undermines a sense of stability 
and permanence. Vratttya-samuipdda indicates diat there is nodiing which can be said to 
originate of itself; all is bound to give rise to furdier phenomena.
Part o f the teaching behind die four noble truths is that the human conglomerate of 
skandha delivers pain and suffering duhkha and any pleasure or happiness one perceives is 
always only “fleeting” {anityd). The psycho-corporeal entity tiiat is conveniently called a 
“s e lf  cannot deliver itself eidier into eternal existence or non-existence — die eternalising 
or annihilation of tiiis grouping of skandhas is not witiiin the “control” o f a so-called 
acting subject. With this in mind, die Buddha advocates letting go (cease grasping) the 
ego-self as it can never ultimately be grasped. The effort to do so is misspent and futile.
Instead of a centring immutable essence, the Buddha taught that die human, like any 
other existent, is simply a composite of skandha, or aggregates that have arisen and come 
together in accordance with die karmic direction of previous skandha. The five
as cited in Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University 
o f Cambridge Press, 1990, p. 54.
'^ 5 Dogen brings this out in his writing when he speaks o f mountains walking and proclaiming Buddha- 
nature in the Sansuigyo Fascicle o f  the Shôhôgent .^ See Master Dogen’s Shobogentio: Book 1, translated by Gudo 
Wafu NishijimA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, pp. 167-179 
Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Bttddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University o f  
Cambridge Press, 1990, pp. 49-50
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As Hiraicawa points out, this is the meaning o f nlpam  the early texts; however, later in the Àgamas, 
rilpa comes to refer to all material things, and a distinction is drawn between impermanent phenomena, 
called “conditioned dharmas” {samskrta dharma, p. sankhata dhammd), and the unchanging or eternal existents 
{asamskrta dharma, p. assankhata-dhammà), in HlRAl<CAWA, Akira, A  History of Indian Buddhism from Sakyamuni 
to Early Mahâyâna, translated and edited by Paul Groner, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1990, p. 
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Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University of  
Cambridge Press, 1990, pp. 49-50
Majjhima-Nikdya 22, The Collection of The Middle Length Sayings Çvlajjhima- Nikdya), Vol. I: The First Fifty 
Discourses (Mtllapanndsa), trans, I. B. Homer, M.A., London: Pali Text Society, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 
1954, p. 178
Chdiidogya UpaniyadYlll, X ll, 1, cited in Klostermaier, Klaus, H  S urney of Hinduism, Albany: State 
University o f New York, 1989, p. 195.
Ruegg makes the following clarifying note with regard to the usage o f siinya, sunyatva and sfmyatd: “Sû/tyais 
an epithet o f  all dharmas, and sûnyatd designates emptiness as the quality characterizing all dharmas. Èûnyatva 
on the other hand is the fact, or truth, o f the emptiness o f all dharmas. Thus the words sûnya and sunyatva 
pertain to the conventional surface level o f  samvtyir, while sUnyatdh used to indicate or point to the level o f  
ultimate reality (paramdrthd) (to the extent that this is at all possible in temis o f language and
aggregates that compose a human are form or material shape {rtlpd)f feeling (vedand), 
cognition which includes recognition and interpretation {samjna, p. sanna), constructing 
activities for the character {samskdra, p. sankhdrd), and discriminative consciousness 
(vijndna, p. vinndnd)?  ^ These skandha are constantly being formed and unformed, and 
cannot be said to construct a reliable “self” As recorded in the Majjhlmanikdya'.
■:y
Wlierefore, monks, whatever is material shape, past, future, present, 
subjective or objective, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, whether it is 
far or near — all material shape should be seen thus by perfect intuitive 
wisdom as it really is: This is not mine, tliis am I not, this is not myself.
Whatever is feeling ... whatever is perception ... whatever are the A
habitual tendencies ... whatever is consciousness ... ail ... should be seen 
thus by perfect intuitive wisdom as it really is: This is not mine, this am I 
not, This is not myself.’^
3
Altliough clearly based on tlie Buddha’s early teaching of the mutable, changeable nature 
o f skandha tliat compose a so-called “self,” the Buddhist doctrine of no-self [andtmati) can 
easily become antitlietical to the Hindu self {dtmaf) and lose the flexibility and relativity 
o f tlie Buddha’s original teaching. Buddhism taught andtman against the ‘fallacy’ o f tlie 
Hindu dtman prevalent in scriptures such as the Chdttdogya Upanisad:
Verily, tliis body (sarlra) is mortal. It has been appropriated by Deatli.
But it is the standing ground of the deathless, bodiless Self (atman).®”
Thus, it becomes clear that Nâgârjuna has not introduced a new term when he speaks of 
sünyatà but has revived and in some senses radicalised one of tlie Buddha’s original 
teachings. The term mnyati^ can be traced back to tlie Nikayas in connection with the
I
discut'sivity).”Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: 
Wiesbaden 1981, p. 3
Omatowski, Gregory K., “Transformations o f “Emptiness”: On die Idea o f sünyatà and the Thought o f  
Abe and the Kyoto School oiPhH o^ofhyf Journal of Ecumenical Studies, (34:1, 1997), p. 94 
Nanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought, Kandy Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 
1976, p. 101
Nanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thottght, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy Sri Lanka, 
1976, p. 92
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idea of no-self {andtman) and denotes the impermanent nature of all phenomena.®^ In tlie 
Sarrpyiitta Nikdya, (S.N. IV 54), die Buddha explains, “Because the world is void \sünyà\ of 
the self, Ananda, or o f what belongs to the self, therefore, it is said: ‘Void is the world.”’®^
In the Majjhima Nikdya {Cfila Sunnata Suita), the Buddha describes to Ananda what he 
means by “abiding in the void {smiyat^' and encourages Ananda diat a monk may also 
abide there. He describes a detachment in which a monk may gradually let go of die 
sense perceptions of “village” and “people,” etcetera, to eventually find himself 
concentrating only on die “signless.” The monk may then reflect that “This 
concentration of mind diat is signless, is effected and thought out. But whatever is 
effected and thought out, that is impermanent and liable to cease.” And die Buddha 
sumarises that, other than the “disturbances” which indicate that the monk is still alive, 
diis practice is “the true, unperverted, pure and supreme descent into voidness.”®'^  That 
is, sfmyatd is tied to an experience and is described most adequately in this passage as an y
experience resulting from a deep form of meditation. Here, exhibited in the earliest 
literature, is a connection between sUnyatd and andtman, which is likewise expanded to all 
dharma — the world of form and cognition — thus implying pratltya-samutpdda. Further, 
sfmyatd is tied to the specific practice of deep meditation in which one practices going 
beyond die distinctions diat inform everyday life to the “signless” — to “seeing” or 
perceiving that what seems to exist in separation, in a duality of being and non-being, is 
not so. And it is clearly not sufficient to remain here, for still the mind is at work making 
observations and analysing diis new stage. The monk realises that all the work o f the 
analytical mind is, like the dharma of the world, “impermanent and liable to cease”. Thus, 
only when die practitioner can get beyond an analytical mind to an intuitive or pre- 
cognitive mind can he/she experience die “true” or “pure” sense of sfmyatd. Different 
Buddhist schools take this experience and recommend alternative modes of activity or 
interpretation for how it impacts daily life. In Nâgârjuna’s case, he chooses to see this as 
preparation for re-entering die mundane world of “people” and “villages”, as is taught in 
the Boddhisattva-ideal — at least for diose who are qualified to teach. It may be that this 
was the impetus for Nâgârjuna himself to become a teacher. For, in addition to the
3
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See Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: 
Wiesbaden 1981, p. 32 and Tucci, Guiseppe, “Two Hymns o f the Catuh-stava o f Nâgârjuna,” International 
Rjtyal Asiatic Society, (1932) p. 309.
Streiig, Frederick,}., Emptiness: A  Study in Religions Meaning Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, 
p. 11,156
Ornatowski, Gregory K., “Transformations o f “Emptiness”: On tlie Idea o f sünyatà and the Thought o f  
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highly sophisticated arguments in the MMK, there are also the orthodox hymns o f the A
'■1'Catuh-stava considered an authentic document of Nagarjuna’s by David S. Ruegg and 
Giuseppe Tucci®  ^ as well as the Buddhist treatises addressed to the regional king,
Gautamiputra, To A  Good Friend (Suhrlekha) and Precious Garland (Ratnavali). How does 
this fit with the sophisticated and challenging deconstructive methods o f the MMK? The 
Buddha’s teaching of skilful means {upayd), a technique or teaching device highly praised |
■"fin the Mahâyana schools that was developed more fully after Nâgârjuna, however must 
have been recognised during Nâgârjuna’s time, may offer the appropriate link to explain 
such divergence in one teacher’s approach. Or, as demonstrated later in this chapter, one I
may view Nâgârjuna’s choice to adopt both the apophatic and cataphatic methods o f 
teaching as indication diat he believed that living into the extreme of emptiness yields 
simply the practice of orthodox Buddhism which is the heart of praxi-centric 
phenomenology.
In addition to “emptiness”, smyata has been translated as “relativity,” 
“undifferentiatedness,” and “non-duality” in addition to “nothingness” and “voidness.”®®
Part of die difficulty In translating this term is the way the term has been given different 
emphasis throughout various Buddhist literature and traditions. And, depending on the y
intention of the Mahayanist, the term will certainly be nuanced. Nâgârjuna’s use and 
development of sUnyatd emphasises reladvity, empiness of own-nature {svabhdvd), and 
undifferentiatedness, somedmes in surprising ways as evidenced in die way he 
characterises both satnsdra?iX\à nirvdnaNFF sünyatà.
After its introduction in die Nikayas, die next radical interpretation of sûnyatd is found in 
the Prajndpdramitd (usually translated, “The Perfection of Wisdom”) literature where die
idea of the non-substantive or “empty” character o f self and phenomena 
came to be extended to include everything, including die dharmas, the 
causal factors o f existence diat the Abhidharma school viewed as 
substantive.®’
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Although clearly found in the earlier literature (as discussed above), this concept of 
emptiness extended to all dharmas is now given emphasis and status from which it will 
influence not only Nâgârjuna’s tliought but tlie development of the greater Mahâyâna 
school of thought. Ruegg comments that Nâgârjuna is tlie first to
give a systematic scholastic exposition of tlie tlieory o f emptiness 
(sünyatà) and non-substantiality (nihsvabhâvatâ) not only of the self 
(âtman) or individual (pudgala) but also of all factors of existence 
(dharma), one of the most fundamental ideas o f the Maliâyânasütras.®®
And Ruegg connects Nâgârjuna’s emphasis on emptiness of all dharmas to that same 
overarching theme of emptiness in the Prajnâpâramitàsütras as he asserts that Nâgârjuna 
“is indeed credited with having rescued parts of them from oblivion.”®^ Lindtner 
describes tlie tenets of the Prcynâpâramità literature tlius:
Their view of the ivorld is that fundamentally all phenomena {dharma) are 
void of substance, i.e. illusory or empty. Their view of the individual is tliat 
as a bodhisattva gradually recognizing this fact one should, accordingly, 
live in the equanimity of universal emptiness, and, at tha same time, 
through compassion, devote oneself to the task of liberating all other 
beings without scorning any means for the achievement o f that ideal 
{tipâyakausalyà) f
There are echoes o f tlie Prajndpdramitd literature in Nâgârjuna’s work as he compels his 
listeners to reject the categorical and difference-bound language o f description and 
embrace instead reality wholly defined by sfmyatd. Moreover, as Battacharya points out, 
Nâgârjuna uses terminology in, for example, his Vigrahaiydvartani which clearly originate 
from the Prajndpdramitd literature.’  ^ It is this development of sfmyatd that Nâgârjuna 
chooses to further when he uses sunyatd'^ .s a synonym for the Buddha’s pratitya-samutpdda. 
In effect, Nâgârjuna is asserting tliat what the Buddha really meant by his teachings of 
pratîtya-samutpdda and anitya can be understood through Nâgârjuna’s use of sfmyatd?'^
Abhidharma response
f
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Before engaging fully in Nâgârjuna’s arguments, it is necessary to introduce the doctrine 
contained in the abhidharma literature, for it is in response to this literature that 
Nâgârjuna levies some of his severest critique. Several hundred years after the Buddha’s 
death, the first Buddhist literature was recorded and collected into three groupings or 
“baskets” ipitaka)\ the rules for tlie Buddhist monastic communities {Vinaya-pitaka), tlie 
discourses o f the Buddha (the sUtras), and the systematised doctrines o f the Buddha 
(Abhidharma-pitakâ). Altliough originally tlie abhidharma literature was created out of 
what can be called a phenomenological concern — to “provide an accurate account of the 
way objects appear to our pre-reflective consciousness” that would aid in memorisation 
and meditation practice — by the 3'"'^  century BCE the AF\FFF2,sm2i~pitaka was an 
elaborate collection of dbamm lists systematically categorised according to distinctive 
characteristics.’® Wliat the Buddha taught his disciples in terms o f an existential 
approach to tlie liberation from duhkha becomes in the approach of the abhidharmacists 
a systematic and dogmatic approach to categorising dharma elements. This re-orientation 
to tlie Buddha’s teaching meant for Buddhist practitioners such as Nâgârjuna, tlie 
compromise of the very essence of the truth to which the Buddha had awakened. 
Systematic doctrinisation of tlie Buddha’s message moved the emphasis from lived 
practice and internalisation of the values and behaviours suggested in tlie eight-fold path 
to the ontological concern of dharma-as objects to keep or reject. The phenomenal world 
gains an essence quality, doctrinal teaching and ideas are reified, and behaviour is 
externalised to levy the necessary dharma elements.
Dharma
“Dharma,” indicates (1) the Buddha’s teachings or (2) phenomena, mental and physical, 
that constitute the elements o f existence as tliey are perceived. Dharma (Pali dhammâ), has 
the root “dhr,” meaning “to hold or keep.” In early Indian culture the term dharma 
meant “tliat which does not change” and was used to describe certain customs and duties 
that upheld the social and moral order based on such crucial ideas as the good, what is
Herman, A. L,, A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A  Philosophic Histoy of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: 
University Press o f America, Inc., 1983 p. 81 
King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 
1999, p. 84
King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n  Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 
1999, p. 85.
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virtue, and trutii.’® Thus, the Buddha teaches the true Dharma, tlie eternal trutii or 
insight into the way things really are. When Buddhism began to employ the term dharma 
in tlieir teachings, the term was broadened in two ways: (1) to include even defilements 
{klesa-dharmd) and evils (pâpakà-akusald-dharmàB), and (2) dharma became associated with 
an element of existence {bhdvdjf In the metaphysical system of the Ahhidharma-pitaka, 
mental and physical phenomena are considered to be composed of certain dharma. The 
five aggregates (skafidhd) that make up an individual are themselves dharma components, 
and each individual aggregate can be divided into further groups of dharma until the 
elemental dharma is ascertained. At tliis point, die Abhidharma scholars considered die 
elemental dharma the lowest denominator, and attributed to diat dharma characteristics 
whereby it might be classified. The material world is also said to be composed o f five 
categories: forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects, all of which may again be 
broken into dharma components. The Buddhist practitioner who studied the 
Abhidharma matrices hoped to approach reality widi die discernment of one who can 
see dirough the confusing mass of conglomerates to the very base building blocks of 
reality in order to see die true order and nature of diose building blocks. Such 
discernment would allow the practitioner to concentrate on the cultivadon of the path, 
that is right views, right speech etc, and through such culdvation cool die passions which 
cause the accumulation of karma, which in its turn causes the advent of furdier rebirth.’® 
The practitioner wished to reverse diis build-up of karma to die moment in which all 
such proliferation comes to a stop and die equanimity of nirudna is experienced. 
Vasubandhu recorded in the Abhidharmakosa (translated Treasury of Metaphysics) die 
emphasis o f such investigation:
Apart from close investigation of existents \dharmas\ diere is no means of 
pacifying die passions; and it is because of passions diat the world
H ir a KAWA points to the Dhammapada for evidence o f  this understanding o f dharmcr. “Enmity is not 
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wanders in this ocean of being. Hence, they say that the teacher spoke 
this [text].”
The commentary accompanying the verse reads:
Because there is no means of pacifying the passions witliout close 
investigation of existents, and because it is tlie passions that cause tlie 
world to wander in tlie great ocean of transmigration, therefore tliey say 
that the teacher — which means the Buddha — spoke tiiis metaphysical 
system aimed at tlie close examination o f existents. For a student is not 
able to closely investigate existents without teaching in metaphysics.^”
Teachings such as these indicate a shift away from tlie phenomenological emphasis on 
clarity of perceptions for meditation purposes, to the ontological task o f identifying and 
classifying dharmas. Focusing on dharmas themselves, as elements of reality, externalises 
the activity of meditation and encourages the practitioner to see reality in a dualistic 
manner. This externalisation undermines the purpose of meditation as exemplified by 
the Buddha whereby meditation is an exercise that gives tlie practitioner an ever-clearer 
understanding of tlie mutability of existence. Externalising one’s understanding of reality 
tiirough the categorisation of dharma elements emphasises the activity of an ego-self and 
establishes tlie duality o f release and bondage. Nâgârjuna will address this issue when he 
deconstructs the fundamentalist or essentialist view.
The strong adherence to the teaching of “no self’, as provided in the Buddha’s early 
teaching, was part o f the impetus of die Abhidharma scholars for creating dieir 
m atrices.H ow ever, in their turn toward an ontological categorising o f dharma elements, 
they in fact worked out a system by which to locate die fundamental elements diat make 
up that very “no self’ and in diis way undermined the teaching. This gravitation towards 
explanation and categorisation exhibits the tendency of “grasping” pointed out in the 
four noble truths which binds instead of working toward a “letting go.”
As quoted in Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindkss: Buddhist Meditation and theMind-body Problem, La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1986, p. 49.
1°° As quoted in Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and theMind-body Problem, La Salle, 
Illinois: Open Court, 1986, p. 49.
Sutton, Florin Giripescu, Existence and Enlightenment in the Eankàvatâra-Sutra, Albany: State University o f  
New York Press, 1991, p.97
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Importantly, although the Abhidharma scholars did not consider dharmas themselves 
substantial or eternal (for dharmas clearly arise through dependent co-origination), still 
their use of dharma matrices suggested an element of truth. Talceuchi writes tliat dharma
carried the sense of a conceptual unity, permanently maintaining its own 
essential provisions in a self-identical way, these essential provisions in 
turn serving as a norm to make otlier things (phenomenal existence) 
intelligible. Accordingly, even though the fact of impermanence is 
accepted and thus all phenomena subject to tlie law of impermanence are 
transient and liable to change, tlie law o f impermanence itself is taken as 
eternal, unperishing, and constant.^”
This being the case, as the Abhidharma scholars systematically broke existents down into 
the dharma-elements to ascertain their quality of help or hindrance along tlie path to 
perfection, tlie very teaching of anitya and praULya-samuipada is compromised. Lindtner 
also points to this shift:
become thoroughly conversant witli those dharmas to be developed and 
those to be abandoned.^’®
The dharma elements are given far more attention than aspects of the path such as right 
samàdhif^ The metaphysical speculation into the make-up o f dharma-elements for the 
destruction of hindrances pursued witli the best intentions to find and cultivate tlie noble 
eightfold patli undermines the very teaching of the Buddha in establishing such a path. 
Identification is no longer helpful when concentration is directed solely towards the 
externalising activity o f cultivating “good” dharma instead of toward the liberating activity 
o f letting go. The Buddha’s teaching of the four noble truths, eight-fold noble patli, and 
dependent origination aimed at the practical realisation of no-self icmdtmafi) tiirough the 
ceasing of grasping and Nâgârjuna’s reinterpretation via sUnyatd hold the same goal of 
liberation. What they both promote is abandoning the misguided notion o f finding and 
ultimately grasping after an essential self.
T a k e u c h i ,  Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism: In Search of the Timeless Spirit of Primitive Buddhism, edited aiid 
translated by James W. Heisig, New York: Crossroad, 1991, p. 71
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The term svabhâva can be translated “self-nature” or “self-essence.” As Paul Williams 
describes of the Abhidharmic texts, there svabhâva is the defining characteristic which 
differentiates the category of primary existents from that of secondary existents. Primary 
existents (or dharmas) are said to possess self-nature which marks these entities as 
fundamental in contradistinction to secondary existents which may be conglomerates of 
primary existents or even non-existents (or as Williams puts it, quasi-nonexistents).^’® 
However, this characteristic o f self-nature in dharmas did not effect a change in 
ontological status in the primary existent, for the fundamental law of impermanence still 
applied, so tliat determining whetiier or not the primary existent could be located in tlie 
present time and space was not a question o f it being primary, but instead a question of 
whether or not it had a function.^’® Witliout a “function” tlie dharma still “exists” just not 
in time and space. As Williams points out, the categorising o f the dharmas into primary 
and secondary existents was a critical process o f clarification for a religious community 
which concentrated on contemplative ratlier than physical activity.^”  For, as already 
noted, Abhidharma matrices aided in the memorisation of the early Buddhist teachings 
and served as “headings” for meditational reflection.^”  Further, and most interestingly, 
Williams explains tliat for Samghabhadra, who made an effort to better explain the 
Sarvastivadin position “that all exists,” ”^  the categorisation into primary and secondary 
existents was to be conducted under the general umbrella of existence {sai) and “the 
distinction between primary and secondary existence corresponds to that between 
ultimate and conventional truth {paramdrthasatya And samvrtisatyâ)M '^^
A few things emerge from this analysis. First, it appears that the analysis o f existence or 
reality is in fact three-fold: primary or ultimate, which is usually understood to be 
ineffable; conventional or relative, generally taken to be unenlightened or samjdiic 
existence; and finally, the descriptive category of “existence” which claims to speak to 
botli the ultimate and conventional realities. In a similar vein, Stcherbatsky explains 
svabhdva (“own existence, essence”) as understood in Indian philosophical and 
philological terms:
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One thing, e.g., simsapâ, is said to be the “own existence” of the other, 
e.g., “tree”, when it contains the latter in its intention (comprehension, 
connotation) and is itself contained under the latter’s extension, being 
subaltern (vyapya) to the latter. Both are tlien said to be “existentially 
identical” (tadâtman) and become subject and predicate of an analytical 
judgement, e.g. “Asoka is a tree” . According to tlie Buddhist conception 
it is not a judgement or a proposition with two terms, but an inference 
with three terms, since a point-instant o f reality, a localisation in time- 
space, must be added, or understood, in order to make it a real cognition, 
or a cognition of Reality.
It is interesting to note that Husserl’s investigation of time yielded a triad as well, for how A
better to reconcile the subject/object split but with a defining or grounding third?
Similarly, tlie Yogacârâ system also suggests a nebulous “source” although there are no 
grounds for assuming tliat this “source” has ontological or idealistic aspects (see next 
section). Nâgârjuna also will refer to the distinction between ultimate and conventional 
truth, but instead of finding an ontological ground for tlie two (that of existence), he will 
apply sfmyatd, emptiness, to botli.
I '
Second, the association of primary existents, those existents which can be said to possess 
svabhdva, with the ultimate (paramdrthd) truth has implications for the perception and /or f
conception of such existents. If  ultimate truth is ineffable, then the nature o f the dhamms y
(those existents witli svabhdvd) would be beyond conception and/or perception in the 
realm of conventional truth. And yet, according to the above, secondary existents are 
often conglomerates of dharmas. Nâgârjuna will argue in his Mulamadhyamikakdrikds that 
the endeavour to identify discreet primary existents, either ontologically or 
epistemologically, results in the establishment of false or empty metaphysical categories.
Once embarked upon tliis line of thinking, there is no satisfactory answer, but an infinite 
regression precisely because o f the nature o f reified language and thought: it cannot hold A
ultimate truth and is not a promising way to approach ultimate truth or enlightenment.
Moving from the Abhidharma analysis to tlie Mâdhyamika critique, Huntington finds 
two different but related uses of tlie term svabhdva in Mâdhyamika texts; svabhdva as





“intrinsic being” and smbhava as “intrinsic nature”. W h e n  the morally and spiritually (Ineutral concept of “relative being”, a description in everyday reality o f “being as opposed h
to nonbeing/’^ ^^  is reified or abstracted so that it becomes a ' ‘^ metaconcept’' and thus is 1
used to re-interpret the everyday reality from which it was taken, it can be called
%“intrinsic being,” It is this use o î svabhâva as “intrinsic being” which y
operates as the unexamined presupposition behind idealist and rationalist 
philosophies and, drawing on the power o f the natural interpretation at 
its core, it serves as a filter for all of everyday experience, exerting a 
profoundly detrimental influence on both the individual and society.^'^
A very similar propensity among Western philosophers who presumed “being” without 
examination prompted Heidegger to begin his philosophical meditations on “being”. 
But where Heidegger would initially like to recapture the meaning of “being,” 
Nagarjuna’s critique aims at isolating tiiat assumption logically and then destroying it.
The second connotation for svabhâva in Mâdhyamika writings is that of “intrinsic nature” 
which is simply another way of expressing the idea of “relative being.”^^® In other words, 
that phenomena are to be found in tlie world points to their existence as it is “manifest 
through tlieir participation in the nexus of cause and effect” or the Buddhist concept of 
dependent origination. Common to botli connotations of svabhâva is a “fundamental 
natural interpretation that finds expression in both the conception and the perception of 
individuality.”^^® Svabhâva is identified as the defining characteristic o f a dhama, as its 
essence, as that which gives the dharma its individuality. The abhidharmists’ dependence 
on dharma and its svabhâva betrays a dualistic view o f reality where svabhâva is used to 
ground Buddhist doctrine and practice and is as such the very undermining of botli 
doctrine and practice.
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Nâgârjuna’s critique
I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha,
The best of teachers, who taught tliat
Wliatever is dependently arisen \pratftya-samutpâdd[ is
Unceasing, unborn.
Unannihilated, not permanent.
N ot coming, not going.
Without distinction, witliout identity.
And free from conceptual construction ^rapcûcd^W
Nâgârjuna critiqued the ontological basis of the Abhidharma investigation by showing 
that what tliose scholars perceived as distinctions between the dharma was logically 
impossible given tlie “law” of dependent origination (pratîtya-samutpâdà). Nâgârjuna is 
indiscriminate in his application of this teaching and whereas the Buddha’s teaching may 
be seen as existentially founded and fully practical, Nâgârjuna drives the teaching to its 
extreme logical conclusion. By doing so, however, Nâgârjuna is intent on recovering tliat 
very existential and practical nature of Buddhist practice. In Nâgârjuna’s thesis, nothing 
has foundation, all is empty {sünyâ)\ all is radically relative so as to malce any strict 
ontological investigation ultimately futile. The “law” of dependent origination (pratltya- 
samuîpâdà) points directly to tlie fact that ever^Tliing is empty (jünyà) of any possibility of 
stability or static self-nature. Nâgârjuna subjects the most revered Buddhist tenets to his 
critique, including tlie idea o f no-self {andtta}, nirvana and the holy Dhamta, or true 
teaching o f the Buddha. He insists that the Buddha’s intention does not lie in 
dismantling the self in a way that it can be re-built differently. The Buddha’s teaching of 
no-self is aimed at encouraging his followers, steeped in tlie Hindu doctrine of an 
immutable transmigratory “self’ to let go of this additional fetter and prepare instead for 
the great liberation. The Abhidharmists furthered this line of thought by attempting to 
drive backward toward the very source material for the complicated activities and 
composition tliat makes up what appears to be a person. Nâgârjuna saw, however, in the 
Abhidharma language tlie pursuit of a ground of being, tlie stable element that might be 
reversed and stopped through diligence in meditation and cultivation o f the virtues. This 
Idnd of thinking, Nagarjuna argues, is no better than tlie non-Buddhist idea of an 
immutable self, which as Nâgârjuna points out via a reductio ad absurdum, is absolutely 
unworkable.
The Vundamentd Wisdom of the Middle Way.Ndgarjunds Mülamadhjamakakàrka, translated by Jay Garfield, 
O xford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 2
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Nagarjuna’s use of the tetralemma {catuhskoti) 4
■Nagarjuna, working out of the environment o f logical and philosophical argument, y|
utilises the tetralemma {catuhjkotî), botli positive and negative, with purpose. The 
tetralemma, a common Indian logic tool, recalls the early dialogues with tlie Buddha '
himself, famously the account o f the poisoned arrow. In Majjhimanikdya 63, a monk is 
dissatisfied with having accepted the Buddhist patli after he realises tliat the Buddha 
never bothered to explain to him a number of “speculative views,” namely, whether tlie 
world is eternal or not and whether the Tatliagata lives after dying or not. The Buddha 
responds by telling a parable of a man pierced by a poisoned arrow who will not take it 
out until he is told who shot him: a tall or short man, a black, brown or golden man? Or 
he demands to know what kind o f arrow or shaft from which it was shot: spring-bow or 
cross-bow, swallow-wort, reed, sinew or hemp? The man might die before all these 
questions are answered satisfactorily. The Buddha returns to the questions at hand and
declares (using the form of a tetralemma) that there are a number of things he has not f
explained, for example whether after dying the Tatliagata (“thus-gone one” or 
enlightened being) is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not. Why haven’t these 
tilings been explained? The pursuit o f such knowledge and information is not connected 
in any way to the goals of the Buddhist path. The Buddha declares that what he has 
taught and explained are tlie Four Noble Truths, for it is embarking on the Buddhist 
path that is related to an awakening and the attainment of nirud'iia. The tetralemma 




Botli (A) and (Not A)
Neither (A) nor (Not A)
The purpose of using the devise conveys tliat tlie monk is searching for tliorough 
knowledge, but more importantly, that the monk’s search is fundamentally misguided.
The monk is concerned with questions and information tliat are completely irrelevant to 
knowledge tliat will ultimately ‘save’ him from the poisoned arrow already lodged in him.
The four-fold negation exhibits tlie path of linear logic, and in the Majjhlmanikdya this
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framework is juxtaposed against the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths which culminate in the 
Eight-fold Noble path of release that is aimed at a wisdom gained through purposeful 
practice. Thorough but linear knowledge is not sufficient or even applicable to what is of 
ultimate meaning, that is, what triggers tlie calming and quieting of the mind tliat allows 
for significant understanding and wisdom which allows for an awakening and realisation 
of nirvmia.
Just like the Buddha, Nâgârjuna also makes use of the tetralemma to reveal what is 
essential and ultimately meaningful as opposed to what is misguided searching. 
However, as Garfield notes, Nâgârjuna draws a distinction between the “positive 
tetralemma” and “negative tetralemma” and the effective utilisation of each.^ ^® 
Nâgârjuna will actually assert tlie knowability of conventional reality utilising a “positive 
tetralemma”, but when it comes to ultimate reality Nâgârjuna will employ a “negative 
tetralemma.” Garfield cites MMK 18:8 for an example of a “positive tetralemma,” in 
which Nâgârjuna claims that “Everything is real and is not real, /B oth real and not real, 
/N either real nor not real. /This is the Lord Buddha’s teaching.” ”^  According to 
Garfield, Nâgârjuna intends to assert a level of analysis of tlie conventional realm from 
the conventional perspective:
(1) Everytliing is conventionally real. (2) Everything is ultimately not real.
(3) Everything is botli conventionally real and ultimately not real. (4)
Everything is neitlier ultimately real nor completely unreal.^”
When regarding reality from an ultimate perspective, however, all manner of assertions 
are misguided for the ultimate perspective cannot be described or otherwise analysed by 
conventional tliinldng. Garfield cites as example of a “negative tetralemma” MMK 22:11 
in which emptiness is regarded in context o f the nature of Buddahood;
“Empty” should not be asserted.
“Non-empty” should not be asserted.
Neither both nor neither should be asserted.
They are only used nominally. (MK 22:11)^^^
*1® Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophj and Cross-Cultural Interprétation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 57
1*^  Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 57
*20 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cidtural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 57
*21 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 57
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Here, as Garfield argues, Nâgârjuna strongly cautions against making assertions for 
conventional wisdom is deficient in describing an ultimate perspective. The form of tlie 
negative tetralemma then is:
N ot (A)
N ot {Not A}
N ot (Both A and (Not A)}
N ot (Neitlier A nor (Not A)}
Garfield notes that
. . . Nâgârjuna is drawing a logical distinction between two
epistemological standpoints; as long as we remain within the 
conventional standpoint, we can, providing that we are careful, say many 
things, mundane and philosophical. But once we transcend that 
standpoint, no matter what we try to say, and no matter how carefully we 
hew to a via negativa, we can say nothing at all consistent with the via media 
Nâgârjuna is determined to limn. This will provide a valuable clue to the 
sense in which Madhyamaka philosophy requires us to regard emptiness 
not as an entity, and to relinquish all views when we understand 
emptiness.
As Garfield reads Nâgârjuna’s use of the negative tetralemma, it is meant to push one 
beyond the realm of discursive identity, beyond the mundane view of the world in which 
statements of any kind are useful.
Radical Relativity
Nâgârjuna begins the MMK in chapter one. A n  Analysis of Conditioning Causes (pratyaya), 
with an argument aimed at shaking the foundational thinking of tliose who had taken the 
Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination ipratîtya-samutpâdà) as a descriptive analysis of 
tlie origin of duhkha whereby one could see the development and locate tlie causal 
factors. Nâgârjuna’s thesis statement for tlie chapter utilises the tetralemma {catuhskoti) 
and sets his premise for the remaining chapters o f tlie MMK that nothing, no element or 
activity, no sensation or holy teaching stands independent and self-sufficient, can be 
defined, described or isolated apart from the relative web of what surrounds it: all is 
radically relative. Indeed, all is empty, including empiness itself.
*22 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 57-8
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Garfield argues that Nâgârjuna, in beginning tire MMK with an argument against 
efficient causes but in defence o f dependent origination, is setting in place tlie argument 
for the whole of the MMK, to culminate in in chapter 24:18 (“Wliatever is dependently 
co-arisen,/That is explained to be emptiness./That, being a dependent designation,/Is 
itself the middle way.”). Garfield calls this Nâgârjuna’s “doctrine o f the emptiness of 
causation.”^^  ^ Nâgârjuna begins the MMK widi the following two verses:
Neither from itself nor from anotlier,
N or from botli.
N or without a cause.
Does anytliing whatever, anywhere arise.
There are four conditions: efficient condition;
Percept-object condition; immediate condition;
Dominant condition, just so.
There is no fifth condition.
Nâgârjuna draws distinction between an efficient cause (described in verse 1) and a 
condition (described in verse 2). Garfield suggests drat when Nâgârjuna speaks o f “a 
cause,” he means an efficient cause which possesses a self-nature and the power to bring 
about an effect; however, when he speaks of a “condition” he is describing an “event, 
state or process” that might explain anotiier event, state or process.^^^ The former 
Nâgârjuna denies as logically possible, and the latter Nâgârjuna supports as the correct 
understanding o f dependent origination (praUtya-samuîpâdà). Nâgârjuna denies die 
operation of efficient causes — diey themselves cannot have conditioning causes for tiiat 
would contradict the definition o f “efficient”: for an efficient cause to support a 
conditioning cause it is tiien correctiy defined as a conditioning cause. In fact, an 
“efficient cause” can not be located, and one is lost in a reductio ad absurdum. This 
argument is developed in die following chapter addressing movement and indeed 
diroughout the MMK. In contrast, die way Nâgârjuna describes a “condition” is in line 
with his description o f die two-fold truth. Garfield explains:
123 Garfield, Jay L., 'Empty W^ ords: Buddhist Vhihsophj and Cross-Cultural Tntetpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 26-7
Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 28
Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 27
He who rejects the emptiness 
O f dependent origination.
He rejects all 
Worldly conventions/^’
As Garfield explains: “Common sense holds the world to be a network o f dependently 
arisen phenomena. So common sense holds tlie world to be empty. Again, die 
standpoint o f emptiness is not at odds with the conventional standpoint, only widi a 
particular philosophical understanding of it — that which takes die conventional to be
126 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words; Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford; Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 30
127 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Phibsophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 37
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... if one views [phenomena] as having and as emerging from casual 
powers, one views them as having essences and as being connected to the 
essences of otiier phenomena. This, Nâgârjuna suggests, is ultimately 
incoherent, since it forces one at die same time to assert the inherent 
existence o f tiiese things, in virtue o f their essential identity, and to assert 
their dependence and productive character, in virtue of their causal history and 
power. But such dependence and relational character, he suggests, are 
incompatible widi their inherent existence. If, on die other hand, one 
regards things as dependent merely on conditions, one regards diem as 
merely conventionally existent. And to regard something as merely 
conventionally existent is to regard it as witiiout essence and widiout 
power. And this is to regard it as existing dependendy. This provides a 
coherent mundane understanding of phenomena as an alternative to the 
metaphyisics of reification Nâgârjuna criticizes.
And in fact, Nâgârjuna is driving toward one of the crucial arguments o f die chapter: if 
one accepts an essentialist or efficient cause, one would not be able to accept the 
foundational Buddhist teaching of dependent origination ipratttya-samutpàdâ). Nâgârjuna 
writes:
If  things did not exist 
Without essence.
The phrase, “Wlien this exists so this will be,”
Would not be acceptable.
Nâgârjuna's point here is that we are only able to make assertions and observations in an 
everyday sense if indeed all things are empty, and are not independent in and of 
themselves. Our assertions about die phenomenal world around us, and our experiences 
as well, are described as dependently arising by die Buddha and Nâgârjuna:
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more than merely conventional.”^^® Nâgârjuna is working to destroy tlie logical 
constructs which seek to show tlie ontological foundations for Buddhism such as 
suggested by the abhidharma matrixes. He sees as the outcome of such foundationalism 
a deeply dualistic view of the world which is contradictory and counter-productive the 
Buddhist goal o f liberation. Altliough the abhidharma scholar would never propose that 
one view reality in a dualistic manner, nevertlieless, as suggested above, tlie very 
externalising activity of analysing dharmas for either rejection or assimilation creates a 
dualistic stance between tlie acting subject (ego self) and his/her activities, and ultimately 
this dualistic perspective is applied to salvation and bondage. Nâgârjuna will argue 
against this ontologising of the Buddha’s message for it creates a dualistic approach tiiat 
divides and separates what cannot be taken apart (even in the extreme example of samsara 
and nirvana), and even more damaging, encourages die kind of mindset (which is to be 
examined later as prapancd) diat moves out o f meditative practice to engage in analysis, an 
activity dependent upon distinction and duality. In fact, as Nâgârjuna has stated in his 
dedicatory remarks, die truly 'dependendy arisen’ is ‘without identity’ and thus die 
activity of searching for explanation, origin and the rest of the analytical investigation will 
surely fail.
In the fifteenth chapter of the Mülamadhyamakakdrikàs, Nâgârjuna introduces the 
categories of self-existence and odier-existence to examine the ontology of being and 
nonbeing. For there to be distinctions, diere must be self-existence and otiier-existence. 
However, it is not logical that somediing with self-existence could be produced by 
something else, for then it would be not self-existent, but something produced. 
Nâgârjuna writes tiiat:
Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent 
tiling and a non-existent thing.
Do not perceive die true nature of the Buddha’s teaching.^^®
Nothing can be said to hold a discrete identity in and of itself without being relative to 
some other factor. This critique holds to phenomena, relationships, time and religious 
doctrine.
Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophj and Cross-Culturallnterpretation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002, p. 37
129 MMK 15:6, translated by Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A  Study in BsUgious Meaning, Nash ville/N ew  
York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 199
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Nâgârjuna’s use of sünyatâ
Key to understanding Nâgârjuna’s unequivicable denial o f “self-nature” and radical 
relativism is his description o f how emptiness works within the Buddhist context. One 
accusation among the contemporaries o f Nâgârjuna was that with his critique, Nâgârjuna 
has denied the existence of the four noble trutlis, tlie monastic community and the 
Buddha himself, what are known as the tliree “jewels” of Buddhism that the aspiring 
monk would take refuge in — in other words, the very foundation of tlie Buddhist 
r e l i g i o n . Nâgârjuna’s response includes at least two important aspects that must be 
understood for his general critique to hold any meaning and not be classified as an 
expression o f nihilism.
First, Nâgârjuna reinforces his argument of emptiness, and insists that the very “law” of 
dependent origination is exactly what he means by “emptiness” (v. 18).^ ®^  He states that 
(v. 19-20):
Since tliere is no whatever originating independently.
No whatever exists which is not empty.
If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction.
You must wrongly conclude tlien that the four holy trutlis do not exist.^^^
That is, dharmas, as Nâgârjuna shows, do not originate “independent” o f anotlier factor.
In other words, they have no selFnature {svabhâvà). Having no self-nature, dharmas f:
should be designated as “empty” (smiyata). Only seen thus, as originating dependently 
hence empty of self-nature, can Buddhist practice be ‘practiced’. The very act of positing '
that tlie noble truths exist as such, in fact denies tliem outright. For only when existents 
are recognised as empty of “self-nature” (tliat is, be seen as dependently originating) can 
tliey engage in the act of becoming and tliereby participate in the conventional world.
no MMK 24, translated by Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A  Study in 'ReHgiousMeaning, Nashville/New York: 
Abingdon Press; 1967, p. 213
Matilal points out that ‘‘siinya means in mathematics” thus, “To say that a concept is stlnya means 
that it is like the zero because it has no absolute value o f its own but has a value only with respect to a 
position in a system.” This rendering o f sünyatâ so well with his critique, Matilal wonders if
Nâgârjuna developed his argument around sûnyâtavfïÛi this mathematical sense in mind. Matilal, Bimal 
Krishna, Epistmology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, The Hague: Mouton, 1971, p. 152. 
D. Seyfort Ruegg denies this possibility stating that the usage o f sünyatâ for the mathematical zero place 
came later than Nâgârjuna and certainly later than the canonical literature from whence the term first 
appears. Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: 
Wiesbaden 1981, p. 3
132 MMK 25:19-20, as translated by Streng, Frederick, in Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A  Study in Religious 
Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217
133 MMK 24:36, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A  Stucty in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New  
York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 215
MMK 24:40, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A  Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New  




Nâgârjuna also insists tliat his understanding o f tlie emptiness o f existents is crucial for 
undertaking the path to enlightenment, for witiiout the movement allowed in dependent 
origination, there would be no avenue towards liberation. An essentialist or strictly 
ontological understanding of the Buddhist doctrines renders them ineffectual and A
impossible to act upon. Arguing for the concrete existence of sometliiiig delivers it into 
the realm of the absolute tliat can not be “touched” and certainly cannot, by virtue o f its 
definition as absolute and immutable, sustain the fluid activity of religious practice. The 
only way to avoid diis problem is to accept the non-foundational stance of sünjatâ tliat 
opens up tlie possibility for practice. In like manner that the Buddha sets up the 
possibility of freedom and release out of the dissatisfaction {dtth,khà) of the conventional 
world, Nâgârjuna sets up transformation (not ontologically, but practically) within tlie 
necessary condition of satnsara. Nâgârjuna states near the end of the chapter that:
You deny all mundane and customary activities
When you deny emptiness [in tlie sense of] dependent co-origination 
(praUtya-samttfpâdà)
and a few verses later:
He who perceives dependent co-origination ipraUtya-samiitpâdd)
Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction as well as tlie path 
[of release].
That is to say, the Buddha’s teaching in light of tlie non-foundational stance of hinyatà 
makes possible all of tlie activity o f the sangha, the instruction o f the noble trutlis, 
participation along tlie eight-fold noble path, and any liberation that the Buddha 
experienced. Nâgârjuna brings his followers back to the Buddha’s teaching of pratitya- 
samutpada by reinterpreting it in the light o f the radical relativism o f sünyatâ.
Nâgârjuna’s introduction of two truths
This leads directly into the second major point tliat Nâgârjuna makes to tliose accusing 
him o f denying the tliree jewels o f Buddhism. He introduces the concept o f two trutlis, 
conventional trutli {sarnvfti-sapyd) and ultimate truth (paramdrtha-satyd). He asserts that 
without conventional truth, there is no access to ultimate trutli, and of course without
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MMK 24:10, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A  Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New  
York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 213
136 MMK 24:9,as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A  Stucty in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New  
York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 213
Paramartha is translated “ultimate” as in “ultimate reality” by D. Seyfort Ruegg (The Literature of the 
Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 1981, p. 3), and “highest” as in “highest 
truth” by Frederick Streng (“The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” 
Eastern Buddhist 11(1978), p.13). The intention is to differentiate between samvrti (the limited or delimited) 
realm and paramartha (an ultimate or transcendent) realm. It is awkward to discuss Nâgârjuna’s thought in 
terms o f an “ultimate” given his injunction against such substantiahst ideas. However, even the discussion 
o f “two truths” is awkward until Nâgârjuna applies sünyatâ in order to empty both polemics. I will use the 
optional phrase “profound reality” that Streng has used to describe the Buddha’s understanding o f the 
argument (Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f  Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” 
Eastern Buddhist p.l3).
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ultimate truth it is impossible to understand nirmna}^^ The teaching o f tlie two trutlis is 
one o f the key ways in which Nâgârjuna avoids a total deconstruction of the Buddhist 
doctrine and allows for meaning within the full retinue of Buddhist teaching. Nâgârjuna 
introduces the two trutlis in order to demonstrate that his aim is not to destroy Buddhist 
practice, which is carried out in tlie realm of “mundane and customarjr activities,” but to 
re-invigorate it — free it from the ontological quagmire so as to be realised in its full 
import which carries witli it a soteriological message. Nâgârjuna’s attacks on tlie rhetoric 
o f tlie religious groups, taken within the context of the two truths, now reveals his 
motive for teaching and writing. Nâgârjuna is hopeful that those who mistakenly looked t
among dhamia matrices for die path to enlightenment will abandon such a limited 
approach and enter instead the path of releasement. J
Nâgârjuna suggests diat his detractors not only do not understand mnjatd but do not 
understand how sünyatâ “works” with the Buddha’s dharma which is as dangerous as 
grasping a snake from the wrong end (MMK 24:11). Nâgârjuna explains that in order to 
understand the “profound ‘point’” (tattvd) of the Buddha’s teaching, one must realise the f
“distribution {vibhagam) of die two kinds of trudi.” ®^^ Much scholarly discussion has 
taken place over what Nâgârjuna meant by “two truths” which seems to suggest an 
utterly dualistic understanding o f reality. Wliat Nâgârjuna is really proposing, however, is 
the participation of die Buddhist practitioner in profound reality^ ®’ through the everyday 
“mundane” activity o f die eight-fold path. The verses in MMK 24 read;
The explanation of the true nature of things by die Buddhas has recourse 
to two kinds o f truth:
The delimiting {samvrti) trudi and the highest (paramartha) truth. Those 
who do not know the distribution o f die two kinds of trudi 
Do not know the profound reality o f the Buddha’s teaching.
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The highest truth is not taught apart from conventional practice, 
And without having understood tlie highest trutli one cannot attain
This description of the two levels of truth or reality in chapter 24 of tlie MMK is 
followed by one o f Nâgârjuna’s most influential verses to tlie later schools of Mahâyâiia 
Buddhism where in chapter 25, he relates niwdna directly widi samsara;.
There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux 
(samsara) from nirvana',! KvM diere is nodiing whatever which 
differentiates nirvana from existence-in-flux/®^
Streng understands Nâgârjuna’s teaching of two truths as one o f “ultimate 
transformation”: one perceives “die highest truth [which] is the realization that all 
distinctions are “empty.” This realization requires a transformation of self-awareness. 
Streng is basically saying tiiat knowing the trutii is a state of mind. This interpretation is 
problematic, however, for it suggests a metaphysical understanding o f the subject (ego- 
self) in which the subject is privileged as master of knowledge or truth; it is a dualistic 
and subjectivitic understanding o f Nâgârjuna’s two-truths.
Shlomo Biderman, in his discussion of samsara and nirvana, suggests that we understand 
Nâgârjuna’s two-fold trudi as “‘a performance’ of a change of s t a t u s . I n  diis way, 
Biderman maintains, Nâgârjuna is addressing neidier metaphysics nor psychology in 
asserting that samsdra is no different from nirvdna. What Biderman seems to suggest by 
proposing that one understand the two-fold trudi as a change of status is that the 
relationship between the self/subject and die world changes while all other phenomena 
remain unchanged. He says, “Wlien the philosopher ceases to search for the fixed and 
stable, sanisdra remains samsdra just as before, but ceases to cause suffering.” '^*^ 
Furdiermore, and most interestingly, he calls the change of status a “performance” o f a 
change of status. Thus, Nâgârjuna encourages us to change our view of reality from one
138 MMK 24:8-10, as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in 
Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern Buddhist 11(1978), p.13
139 MMK 25:19, as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A  Stud)! in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New  
York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217
1'*° Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern 
Buddhist 11(1978), p.25
Biderman, Shlomo, “Scepticism and Religion: On the Interpretation o f Nâgârjuna,” Indian Philosophy of 
ReUgion (1989), p. 73
Biderman, Shlomo, “Scepticism and Religion: On the Interpretation o f Nâgârjuna,” Indian Philosophy of 
Religion (1989), p. 73
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Iof svabbava to one of sünyatâ and this “transition” comes about via a kind of 
“performance.” One thinks of performing the usual Buddhist activities, studying sutras, A
meditating, cultivating aspects of the patii, as what is meant here by “performance” so 
that the mundane activities of tlie Buddhist practitioner can, via such performance, be 
transformed into the perfected activities o f a Buddha or Boddhisattva. This is a closer 
description of what is meant in die meeting/merging of practice and profound 
reality/ truth.
NAGAO, Gadjiii M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri 
Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 13
follower o f Nâgârjuna and founder o f the Mâdhyamika school o f the Prasangika 
disciple o f Vasubhandhu
146 NAGAO, Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. KAWAMURA, Delhi: Sri 
Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 21
147 NAGAO, Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. KAWAMURA, Delhi: Sri 
Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 19
NAGAO Gadjin addresses Buddhist practice in his analysis of Nagarjuna’s two truths and 
endeavours to bring out the importance of motion or movement in Nâgârjuna’s
understanding of how mundane or samsàric practice interacts with profound reality or A
âjnirvana. Aldiough certain aspects are fascinating, N a g a o ’s analysis is not without 
problems. In addressing the two-fold trudi construct, NAGAO analyses the term, samvrti, 
in contrast with paramartha and shows the gradual development of paradoxical meaning 
surrounding die term samvrti. Samvrti usually “refers to being conventional, mundane, 
profane, worldly,” in contrast to 'paramartha, which means being super-worldly, super­
mundane, absolute.”^^® NAGAO shows diat one root of the term samvpti, vrt, can mean to 
come into being, manifesting or clarifying trudi, while in contrast the root, vr, indicates a 
covering or darkening of die trudi. Wlien tracing die term through uses of these roots,
NAGAO shows a fascinating development of the term samvfli differentiated by 
Candraklrti '^ '^  ^ and Sthiramati. '^*® NAGAO notes diat Candralurti tends to choose only the 
negative perspective o f samvfti so diat effectively, “paramârdia can never be seen: to look 
at paramartha is not to see it at all,” while on die odier hand, Sdiiramati “affirms the 
value of samvrti as die sole medium through which paramartha can manifest itself.” '^*'^
Candraklrti’s usage o f “concealment” and Sdiiramati’s usage of “manifested” are 
combined by the Chinese founder o f the Vijnânavâda School, Tz’u-en, who uses samvfti- 
satya to convey a “covering-and-manifesting truth” in his Chapter on the Two-fold Tmthf'^
According to NAGAO, the paradoxicality in “covering-manifesting” is essential to the 
Bodhisattva-mârga for it describes die compassion of die Bodhisattva who, “not abiding
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in Nirvana,” returns to diis world and “dwells in the very midst of defilement.” '^'® 
Therefore, according to NAGAO, Nâgârjuna’s achievement in his use o f mnjata, was the 
negation of this world — proving die “non-existence” of diis world. This, however, is 
only half the equation for Nagao; non-existence only achieves the “upward movement,” 
that o f transcending this world. The completion of this movement for NAGAO can be 
found in the Yogâcâra method, especially exhibited in Asanga, who speaks o f the 
“existence o f non-existence” which is the complementary “downward movement” and 
affirmation of this world. This is the completion of the Bodhisattva ideal. This is part of 
the groundwork for N a g a o ’s proposition of the “two-directional activity” in which he 
asserts that:
The identification of dependent co-origination with sünyatâ is the 
activity in the direction o f ascent, and the identification of sünyatâ widi 
designation based upon some material (which designation, I diink, is 
another name for dependent co-origination) is the activity in the direction 
of descent ... The final situation, called the “middle path,” synthesizes 
the two directions
Here one sees that sûnjatü, associated with dependent co-origination {praütyasamutpâàâ), 
contains the activity o f both ascent and descent. This is what NAGAO means when he 
asserts that dependent origination (praUtyasamutpàdd) is “die ground or basis on which 
final deliverance takes place.”'®'' I agree diat it is fruitful to consider Nâgârjuna in 
relation to the Yogâcâra school rather diaii view bodi as antidietical to each otiier. 
However, although Nâgârjuna may not state it as emphatically as the Yogâcarins, 
Nâgârjuna’s positive view o f samvrti is exhibited by die ultimately positive attitude he has 
for samsàric existence, for die Boddhisattva-;^^? ?^/^^? is directed towards this existence. The 
ultiamate response to Nâgârjuna’s negative logic is that of bodhisattva practice which 
takes place in tiiis mundane existence. Therefore, I question N a g a g ’s portrayal of 
Nâgârjuna’s sünjatà moving dependent origination only in the direction of assent. 
Furthermore, elsewhere NAGAO speaks of sünyatâ as the abstract which lacks a personal 
and practical aspect; the practical aspect is fulfilled, according to NAGAO, by die
4^8 N a g a o , Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri 
Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 22
449 N a g a o , Gadjin M., “Ascent and Descent: Two-directional Activity in Buddhist Thought,” in 
Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. Ka w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, 
p. 205
42° N a g a o , Gadjin M ., “Buddhist Subjectivity,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. 
Ka w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 8.
Wliat is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness.
It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the Middle 
Patl-i.'®''
421 N a g a o , Gadjin M., “Yogâcâra -  A Reappraisal,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by 
L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 221
422 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle ~Way: Nâgâfuna’s Mûlamadhyamakakârikâs, translated with 
commentary by Jay L. Garfield, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 297
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Yogâcâra teachings.'®' This is why NAGAO prefers to consider Nâgârjuna and the 
Yogâcâra school as fulfilment to each other rather tlian totally at odds theoretically; the 
Yogâcâra school balances Nâgârjuna’s negative, abstract sünjatà. Is this a valid reading of 
Nâgârjuna’s mnjatad In a strong sense, one might argue die opposite for it is Nâgârjuna’s 
sünjatà which, as an agent o f relativity, acts as a leveller and indeed elevates die practical 
purpose OÎ santsàra‘ào Ûmtpratttya-samutpàda has relevance again as Buddha’s teaching. As fwill be discussed in the following chapter on Yogacara, views are split as to where the 
Yogâcâra teachings lead, either back to a substantive view of consciousness, or furthering 
the teaching of Nâgârjuna that only a radical employment of simjatà is effective in 
providing proper preparation for praxis. I believe tiiat die latter teaching is clearly 
exhibited in the Yogâcâra school and works conjunctively with Nâgârjuna’s sünjatà. I 
find N a g a o ’s negative treatment of Nâgârjuna’s sünjatâ to call into question die 
possibility that Nâgârjuna intends a practical way to enter the living reality o f sünjatà.
Understanding Nâgârjuna’s two trudis is key to interpreting his dialectic within his 
religious intentions. In his commentary, Garfield maintains tiiat die two truths, 
conventional and ultimate, are ontically one, however, he claims diat the “ultimate trudi 
is epistemologically and soteriologically more significant than the conventional.”'®^ He 
then goes on to lay out Nâgârjuna’s argument in MMK chapter 24 to climax with vs. 18 
in which he sees Nâgârjuna.constructing a “critical diree-way relation between emptiness, 
dependent origination and verbal convention” which, according to Garfield, is itself the 
“middle way.”'®® The verse in question, from MMK 24:18 is:
'I
. I . . - ' . . . . - , , - - . .. . . . ■ ' #
In tliis relationship, conventional reality dependently arisen has no identity outside of tlie 
verbal designations made about it: it is clearly empty. Emptiness, too, has no essential 
identity and is seen to be designated dependently and is tlierefore also empty. That the 
conventional world and emptiness are “designated dependently” make tlie very 
relationship between tlie two empty -  tliis is ultimately the middle way, hanging between 
the two extremes o f essentialism/absolutism and nihilistic emptiness/nothingness. The 
problem with Garfield’s proposal that verbal convention could be a middle way between 
emptiness and dependent origination is tliat Buddhist release clearly transcends verbal 
designations. Nâgârjuna only seeks to move the practitioner beyond verbal convention 
tliat creates verbal designations (prapmlca), not to create a dependency on them. Wliat 
Nâgârjuna allows for instead is the possibility for practice. Dependent origination, 
relativised by emptiness, becomes the movement necessary for true praxi-centric 
engagement.
The apparent duality of Nâgârjuna’s two truths is ratlier the non-dual recognition that 
activity in the mundane world strikes directly at tlie so-called “transcendent” trutli. “The 
highest trutli is not taught apart from conventional practice, /A nd without having 
understood tlie highest truth one cannot attain nirvmiaP Remarkably, with tlie suggestion 
o f two truths Nâgârjuna challenges the problematic dualistic approach to reality which 
sees the mundane world and interprets the phenomena therein either just as it appears to 
the discerning conscious, which has exactly and only its self-conscious viewpoint, or as 
an image with neither substance nor meaning that the conscious must deny to remain 
honest. In other words, seeing phenomena only from the viewpoint o f samvtyi pushes the 
self-conscious to choose eitlier eternalism or nihilism. Paraphrased from the Ratnavalv.
Because he resorts to neither existence nor non-existence he who is not 
fixed in duality (advayanisrita) is released ... On tlie contrary, if one 
erroneously takes the world — which is at the same time causally 
conditioned and mirage-like (marîcipratima) — to be either existence or 
non-existence of something (like water in a mirage), one is not released.'®®
Rather, Nâgârjuna suggests approaching the phenomenal world through the lens of 
sûnyatà so tliat the undeniable reality of samvrti does not snare the conscious, but 
encourages the conscious to let go even of the idea of self-conscious. The importance
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now does not lie in tlie way the subject conceives o f phenomena, but whether the subject 
can then apply tlie understanding of sünyatâ to the conscious perceiving subject. Only 
then can phenomena be just phenomena, and tlie subject is obliged to neitlier affirm nor 
deny that reality; no judging activity is necessary. The apparent dualism of samvrti and 
paramârtha cannot be sustained if botli are characterised by sünyatâ. Likewise, and equally 
importantly, altliough this logic leaves us room to say tliat “nothing whatever ,.. 
differentiates ... [samsârâ] from nirvâtiaf trutli is not the great equaliser in terms of 
erasing distinctions. Sünyatâ allows for the kind of practical approach to the world which 
doesn’t seek to grasp but intuitively ‘touch’ tlie ineffable wonder o f profound reality. 
With tlie two truths, Nâgârjuna recalls tlie Buddha’s message within the four noble truths 
to respond to tlie duhkha, die dissatisfaction in daily life, with practical, transformational 
activity. Buddhist practice, wholly in the realm of the mundane, is the proper way by 
which one experiences ultimate transformation, realises the highest trutii. Yet, 
importantly, tliis does not entail departing from one reality into another, but letting go of 
the empty categories samvrti and paramârtha and abiding in the totally ineffable state that 
cannot be reduced to such verbal designations. ‘“All things are void’ is not a 
“proposition.” It only expresses the Inexpressible, witii the help o f the conventional 
truth Thus, Nâgârjuna is proposing with his two truths a kind o f praxi-centric
phenomenology in which clarity of vision and understanding gained through the practical 
activity of the Buddhist patii yields a transformation within the practitioner tiiat cannot 
be fully explained nor described, but which makes all the difference between continually 
wandering through sanisâric existence and full liberation.
Conceptual Diffusion iprapanca) and Bliss {siva)
One could note tiiat Nâgârjuna’s philosophical might and his use o fprâsatiga argument is 
ironic considering his desire to push tiiinkers out of disputation and into practice. It 
shows that at some level, an awareness is necessary; not of self-as-an-end, but the 
insightful knowledge (or wisdom, prqjna) that enables one to see reality for what it is — 
empty o f self, empty of own-being. It also shows tlie practical usefulness o f “argument,” 
in itself a dead end, as a means of prompting one to that understanding. In 
Buddhapâlita’s commentary on tlie MMK verses 22:15 (“Those who verbally elaborate 
the incessant Buddha who has transcended verbal elaboration Sprapancd\ — none of them, 
impaired by verbal elaboration, can see the Tathâgata”), he explains that the term
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prapanca, or “verbal elaboration” in tliis text, points to the mistaken perception of 
‘existence and non-existence,’ ‘permanence and impermanence,’ and so forth brought on |
by ‘passionate craving.’ Thus, prapanca suggests “divisive crosspurposes” {dvandvà), or 
“two things when there are really one” so that one does not see objects ‘as they are’.'®’
Candrakirti, in his commentary on MMK 18:5, states that the purpose for the sünja 
“doctrine” is to:
... Erradicate the innate tendency of conceptual tliought to construct 
reified notions of being (bhava) and nonbeing (abhava). Such reified 
notions generate philosophical positions referred to as absolutism and 
nihilism ... [Tjhese positions are representations of exactly the sort of . |
conceptual diffusion (prapanca) that lies at the root of clinging and 
antipadiy and therefore all forms o f fear and suffering.'®®
Nanananda suggests tliat prapanca.
... refers to both ontic and to epistemic diffusion — botli to the universe 
as the totality of the contents of perception and to language and 
conceptual thought. Thus, when conceptual tliought becomes confused 
and diffuse, so does the external world.'®''
That is, allowing oneself to be drawn into the activity of searching for sources, 
foundational teachings and premises, all of which characterise tlie philosopher’s mode, is 
a kind o f mental fog which produces illusions of answers and prevents the true seeker 
from seeking clarity of mind, a quieting of the mind, which properly developed yields 
liberation. It may be said that tliere is a fine line between teaching the dharma and 
engaging in “verbal elaboration” o rprcpanca. Nâgârjuna ends the MMK witli the verse:
I prostrate to Gautama 
Wlio through compassion
Taught me the true doctrine,




As Nagarjuna intimates that the true doctrine is no doctrine, Ruegg suggests that 3;.
Nâgârjuna’s approach to reality is comparable to the epoché.
according to which only silence — a philosophically motivated refraining 
from the conceptualization and verbalization that belong to the discursive 
level of relativity and transactional usage — is considered to correspond in 
the last analysis to the paramârtlia, which is as such inconceivable and 
inexpressible in terms of discursivity. Wliile no doubt related to 
apophaticism this latter approach goes beyond negative or positive 
tlieory; and in Madhyamaka it is distinguishable from both.'^'
Thus, when Nâgârjuna makes the statement that “no dharma was ever taught by Buddha 
to anybody anywhere” (MMK 25:24) or makes the assertion that on tlie level o f absolute 
reality (paramartha), “designata and discursive development have come to a stop,”"'  ^ he 
approaches the sceptic’s epoché. Gomez rightfully cautions against such a privileged 
stance which as a “classical religious maneuver of claiming iiieffability for foundational 
beliefs” results in a shift of autliority from tlie public domain to the “hidden, protected 
realm o f unquestioned authority” whereby the “ârya’s silence” is truly “aryan 
authoritative ... hense unassailable.”'^ ® Instead of viewing the ineffable nature o f the 
ultimate truth Nâgârjuna points to as an authoritarian manoeuvre of exclusivity, Gomez 
affirms Nâgârjuna’s dialectic which he argues “creates space for the unsayable that will 
carry in its train tlie vast and complex retinue of Buddhist doctrines, practices and 
institutions.”' '^' So that, despite the ineffable nature of ultimate truth, Nâgârjuna’s 
teaching reclaims, in a way, the mundane “public domain” in which Buddhist practice 
occurs and as such, works against elitist foundational authority.
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It has been recorded that after tlie Buddha’s enlightenment, he sat in meditation another 
49 days contemplating what he had gained in his moment of penetrating insight/^® As 
canonical records indicate, what motivated tlie Buddha to return to the “lived world” 
instead of departing fully into nirvmia was his feeling of loving-kindness, or compassion, 
toward all suffering individuals whom he desired should also experience this same 
liberation (moksa). In other words, the Buddha was compelled to attempt to teach tlie 
Dhamm, tlie saving truth, to others in order tliat his experience would be emulated and all 
who seek release from duhkha would at the very least have a roadmap, a guide to such 
release. That is to say, far from being dogmatic, the four noble trutlis aim to be the 
insightful observations o f one who has seen things for what they are (or are becoming, 
yathdhtttani), and who has experienced liberation. His statement elsewhere in the collected 
sayings, “I only teach suffering and tlie release from suffering” is just tlie kind of 
statement which overshadows the dogmatic tendencies of his followers who would have 
the Buddhist system nailed down in concrete terms. It is perhaps telling that the Buddha 
himself never recorded any of his own teachings, but intended them as words to be lived 
into practice and eventually discarded, as in the well-known parable in which a raft is ÿ
"■'iVabandoned once the traveller has successfully crossed tlie stream. Deconstructing the 
self into constituent parts, as the Abhidharmists have done, can only be useful when 
situated in the realm of practice. It is not tliat the ontology of tlie Abhidharma efforts 
was fundamentally wrong, but tiiat the ontology was not moved into the active realm of 
compassion, a move which both empties tlie ontological concerns and in a way redeems 
them by re-establishing such deconstruction witliin the functional realm of practice. It is 
this understanding tliat Nâgârjuna wanted to move his students into and he pursued witli 
them the rigorous path of logic as a means by which tliey were to let go of the 
“grounding” elements of knowledge and move instead into the active and more mystical 
realm of wisdom. True prajna is not merely knowing limits and parameters but practically 
living into true reality where all notions o f ego-consciousness are surpassed by a wiser 
approach. In this respect, cannot be separated from dhyâtia for the acquisition of
prajna depends on the practical activity of dhyàna. Alex Wayman suggests that 
Nâgârjuna’s intent behind writing the MMK is in the tradition of skilful-means {upàyâ) 
combined with wisdom (prajna) according to tlie Boddhisattva-bumi; that Nâgârjuna
-F
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meant his MMK to be “a kind o f discerning to be combined witli calming (tlie mind).” 
Wayman cites from the Mâdhyamika text, Srî-màlàdmsimhanâda.
Wlien he matures any sentient beings by meditation [dhyànd), he matures 
them by having an undisturbed mind, his mind not straying outside and 
having no mistake of mindfulness. By not being side-tracked though he 
acts for a long time or speaks for a long time, he protects and matures 
their minds. They having been so matured stay in tlie Illustrious 
Doctrine. This is his Perfection of Meditation.'^®
Wayman concludes his remarks on Nâgârjuna’s purpose behind writing tlie MMK by 
asserting that “the text of practice of tlie MMK is that Nâgârjuna does not give up, ratlier
stays with it to the end without straying from his purposeful discourse. The MMK kind 
of contemplation aims at a fruit . . .”'®’
As suggested at the outset of tliis chapter, Nâgârjuna’s method has been compared to tlie
âmpa-jhàna meditational program'®® in which the practitioner is encouraged to relinquish
the constructing activity of the mind through deep formless meditation stages. It is quite
plausible that Nâgârjuna is again reverting back to the example of the Buddha’s own
enlightenment experience tlirough his repetitive use of the catuhjkoti, the fourfold
negation, as a means by which one quiets the mind of arguments, by negating each 
.logical possiblity. The Stittas record how Gautama gradually developed a meditation
program from techniques he learned while studying under various famous teachers'®" , |-f:until he exhausted the techniques practiced by the religious aspirants o f his day, but he 
had not yet achieved enlightenment. It is recorded that Gautama attempted, while 
practicing extreme acetism, to control the sense sensations through an act o f the will. A 
poignant inhibitor Gautama cited was that altliough he was able to achieve impressive 
meditation stages, he was plagued by physical pains and an untranquil mind.'’® Wliat has
I
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:become known as the four “formless attainments” (anipa-samapatti or ampa-jhànas) are 
described as follows'’':
1. passing beyond the perception of sense-reactions (leaving the perception of tlie 
realm of manifold phenomena), one abides in the sphere of infinite space
2 . passing beyond tlie sphere o f infinite space, one focuses on being aware: one 
concentrates on infinite consciousness
3. passing beyond the consciousness one encounters the nothingness tliat remains
4. passing beyond nothingness (leaving even tliis cognition) one abides in the 
sphere of neither perception nor non-perception k
The Anguttara-Mikâya (IX, 32. AN IV 276f) records that beyond the four artipa-jhànas k
one may experience the ending of perception and feeling, or as recorded in the 
Visuddhimagga, one achieves the “attainment of cessation” (nirodha-samdpattt)}'^ '^  The 
Buddha’s death, in which he moves on to parinihhdna, has been described in the Dtgha 
Nikdya (D. 11.156) as his “exit from the world, in the fearless, calm and self-controlled 
state of meditation” in which he passed tlirough the four formless modes of meditation 
and then returned to die four jbdnas o f form meditation before passing on to parinibbdna.
This deatli record indicates that tlie Buddha, instead of conquering some kind o f ultimate 
meditation test (as he attempted in his ascetic practices), has acquired skill over his mind, 
but in passing to parinibbdna from the form meditation suggests practice that is natural, 
positive and perhaps even indicates compassion.
One notices tlie similarity of the deep level of formless meditation in which one moves 
beyond contemplating the infinity o f space, the infinity of consciousness, the sphere of 
nothingness, finally arriving at “neither perception nor non-perception” and Nâgârjuna’s 
metliodical use of the four-fold negation to disrupt and release his followers from their 
perceptions, their conceptual diffusion {prapanca). Beyond such perceptions is the 
ultimate cessation — the realisation of profound reality. Description fails completely, and 
only negative or paradoxical language can be used to “point” to this stage, yet tlie
25
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experience o f such realisation is suggested as “bliss,” complete calm. Nagarjuna seems to 
approve of this existential indication o f ultimate truth/reality:
“N ot caused by something else,” “peaceful,” \sântâ\ “not elaborated by 
discursive tliought,” “Indeterminate,” “undifferentiated”: such are the 
characteristics of true reality {tattvà)A^
In this passage, tlie only positive characteristic listed in an otlierwise completely negative 
description o f true or profound reality is “peaceful” (or “blissful” siva / “tranquil” santd).
It has already been suggested tliat Nâgârjuna uses prasanga type argument to move the 
student beyond discursive and analytical tliought, but that Nâgârjuna never suggests 
nihilistic nothingness. Moreover, in line witli accepting that Nâgârjuna has also written 
songs o f praise and training manuals for those embarking on the Buddhist path, he surely 
would not advocate a catatonic immobility. Following the example, again, o f tlie 
Buddha’s return to form meditation after he successfully moves through the arûpajhânas, 
it may be suggested tliat beyond Nâgârjuna’s negating philosophical campaign there lies 
the possibility for engaging in true practice. The bodhisattva-marga is active caring in the 
world o f form, but this activity is pursued via the wisdom and insight o f a bodhisattva. 3
Perhaps the beginning point for later Mahâyâna developments in substantialist 
tendancies, Nâgârjuna has used “true reality” (tattvd) as synonymous with niwmja. It is 
clearly sûnyatà which characterises and enables diis insight into nirmia reality. That is, to 
follow Nâgârjuna’s thought development, sûnyatà is what the Buddha meant h j pratttya- 
samutpàda. But in supplanting or reinterpreting pratttya-samutpàda as sûnyatà as the crucial 
characteristic of nirvàtia, Nâgârjuna perhaps instigates a new train of thought, as Nagao 
has suggested, which again pushes to find an absolute/abstract aspect in profound reality, 
what is described in later Mahâyâna tliought with terms such as “suchness” (pathata) and 
real nature {dharmata). As Nagao and otliers have suggested, Nâgârjuna’s sûnyatà seen 
by die Yogâcâra school as providing the philosophical basis for understanding diat 
“emptiness is not merely “non-being” but also the “being of non-being””.'’'* This 
paradoxical understanding o f sûnyatà, of which the Yogâcâra school was fully aware, was 
adopted by the Chinese schools o f Buddhism including the later Ch’an and Pure Land
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schools where “true emptiness” is equated witli “wondrous being”/ ’® It seems clear that 
Nagarjuna certainly does not mean for his use of sünyatâ to be misconstrued this way as 
he submits even sûnyatà to the fourfold negation to warn against the reification of any 
concept including sûnyatà'.
One may not say tliat there is “emptiness” {sûnyà), nor that there is “non­
emptiness”
N or tliat botli [exist simultaneously], nor that neitlier exists; the purpose 
for saying [“emptiness”] is for tlie purpose of conveying knowledge/’®
That is, although there is a clear purpose behind teaching sûnyatà there is no more 
foundational concept here than tlie illusory svahhàva of dharma. And yet it appears clear 
tliat future developments in Buddhist tliought were influenced through Nagarjuna’s 
unique use o f sûnyatà. Again, an example of Nâgârjuna’s reticence to assert anything 
beyond the blissful experience of ultimate trutli/reality;
Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite? What is infininte?
Wliat is both finite and infinite? Wliat is neither finite nor infininte?
Is there anything which is tliis or something else, which is permanent or 
impermanent.
Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neitlier?
The cessation of accepting everything [as real] is a salutary {sivà) 
[“blissful”] cessation of phenomenal development (prapancd)'.
No dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anytliing/”
Nâgârjuna’s message, like tlie Buddha’s, emphasises a different knowledge from closed- 
system substantialist thinking. The systematic approach may offer insightful analysis into 
the construction of itself, but it cannot move outside itself. Once die dharma or mind is 
located, the system is complete. True Buddhist practice does not operate widiin the 
confines o f such a pursuit. It is the openness and groundlessness of practice based on 
emptiness, on dependent origination, which gives opportunity^ for further practice and 
eventually a patii to liberation. This is die “working of emptiness”. It would seem diat 
both Nâgârjuna and the Buddha had experienced that the world opens up to a mind in 
meditation. Beyond this, nothing can be said about the nature or reality o f niruàtia or the 
experience o f liberation.
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Nâgârjuna begins MMK 22 by questioning any attempt to define the tathagata\ it is not 
one composed or defined by the five skandhas nor can it be one who is other than tlie 
very five skandhas (vs. 1). One defined by tlie five skandhas is clearly a dependent being 
still in the samsàric realm and yet, one not defined or composed of the five skandhas 
would be self-dependent and clearly in no relation to tlie five skandhas. In this case, there 
would be no possible connection between die two: how could the fully completed One 
become so if not ever dependent and defined according to the five skandhas (vs. 6)? Wlien 
engaged in diis kind o f pursuit, one is simply working in the realm of identity/difference 
{tattva!anyatvd) which has only limited relevance or effectiveness. A tathâgata cannot be 
adequately expressed as either existing or not existing (vs. 13) and any attempt to do so is 
a “crude” attempt (vs. 13) and further one liable to “complete defeat” (vs. 15). Wlien 
trying to categorise, as Streng points out, one must always speak in worldly 
designations.” ® Murti attempts to describe die tathâgata as a “mediator” between the 
absolute ipathata) and the realm of phenomena: “Though free [a Tathâgata], one still has 
enough of die phenomenal in one to feel kinship with fellow human beings and help 
them out o f samsâra.”' ”  The problem with this account is the absolute understanding of 
profound reality. Murti sees samsdra and nirumya as two ontologically different realms and 
die tathâgata as participating in both for awhile before eventually disappearing into the 
transcendental Real. It is this understanding of satnsara and nirmna tiiat Nâgârjuna sought 
to overturn with his use of sünyatâ. Hence, Nâgârjuna’s assessment of nirvdtia in which he 
can deny the differential between nirmna and satnsara and insist that the “extreme limit 
(koti) of jürvàna is also the extreme limit o f existence-in-flux \samsârâf (25:20). That is, 
the same fallible categories o f mundane thought and speech have applied such difference. 
Further, Nâgârjuna may prepare die way for, but is certainly not suggesting, die Japanese 
Buddhist understanding of ‘identity in difference’ (i.e. Abe, N ish id a , NishiTANi).
Perhaps it is telling that Nâgârjuna prefers die descriptors sdnta, “peacefol”, or siva, 
“blissful” which is beyond die mental constructing activity iprapanca) of the ego when he 
speaks o f nirvdna instead of using this term itself replete with its reified images, because
478 Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A  Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, 
p. 74
479 Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A  Study of the Mâdhyamika System, Tinling & Co., Ltd., 
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bliss speaks o f concrete experience.'®® Or, as Lustliaus explains, Nâgârjuna’s “Diamond- 
truth shredder” negational logic “gives way to aporetic living, to that special type of 
indeterminacy that is freedom.”'®'
ISO suggested by Perry Schmidt-Leukel during a Buddhist philosophy seminar in the Centre for Inter-Faith 
Studies, University o f Glasgow. See also, Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, “Mystische Erfahrung und logische Kritik 
bei Nâgârjuna,” Religiose Etfahrung und theologische Reflexion: Festschriftfur Heinrich Doring, Armin Kreiner and 
Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Hg.), Paderbom: Bonifatius, 1993, p. 384-5
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Yogâcâra: No Mind that Knows
That indeed is the supramundane knowledge 
When one has no mind {adttd\ that knows, |
And no object for its support \anupalamhhd\'.
It follows the revulsion \parâvriti\ o f basis'®^
182 Tfimsatika29, translated by Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A  Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A  New 
Translation and Interpretation of the Works ofVasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Baiiarsidass Publishers,
1982, p. 160
The emergence of what has come to be known as the Yogâcâra school, or the 
Consciousness/Mind-only {vijnàna-vàdaldttamàtrà) school within the Mahâyâna tradition 3;
is difficult to date, generally accepted as arising between the third and fiftli century CE.
The Yogâcâra school, in presenting what appears to be a systematic rendering o f the #
subjective subconscious through teachings such as the “three natures” doctrine Y
(prisvabhâvà) and the seed- or store-consciousness {âlayavpnànà) has received criticism for 
undermining the radical relativity Nâgârjuna demanded with mnyatd. However, the 
Yogâcâra school is also well-defined by its insistence on the practice of yoga meditation 
and its paradoxical assertions such as realisation comes when one has “no mind that 
knows” (Trimsadkd 29). Instead o f reading Yogâcâra teachings as re-asserting 
foundationalism or idealism, I suggest tlirough the course of tliis chapter tliat Yogâcâra is 
attempting to come to terms witli the personal aspects of liberation by following tlie path 
o f release through layers of subconscious. Nâgârjuna pursued liberation by means of a 
rigorous dialectic aimed at frustrating the logical and constructive activity o f the intellect; 
however, once this intellectual frustration has been achieved, he has little to say about the 
personal experience or working of liberation in the realm of tlie psyche. Yogâcâra, on 
the otiier hand, is deeply concerned with tlie personal experience and tlie way in which 
liberation is worked out such that the school aims to deconstruct tlie ego-self through 
the rigors o f meditation practice even into the latent areas of tlie psyche in the 
subconscious realm — all in order to overcome this latent tendency to construct the ego- 
consciousness. As will be discussed in this chapter, tlie tension between the 
establishment of an origin and location for the ego-self tlirough the systématisation of 
meditation sltills and tlie assertion tliat the ego-self itself must be “founded” on mnyatd 
will continually destabilise tlie doctrinal teachings of the ‘three natures’ and the ‘store- 
consciousness’ o f this school.
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The brotliers Vasubandhu and Asanga, of the fourtli or fifth century CE, are credited for 
authoring many of the important texts which provide the philosophical and analytical 
foundation of what is called Yogâcâra Buddhism. It is clear, however, that proto- 
Yogacara texts were already in existence before Asanga and Vasubandhu’s contributions 
worked to establish the movement as a proper school, most notably, tlie Samdhimrmocana 
Sutra (Eluddating the Hidden Connections, or Unravelling the Mysterf) from the third or fortli 
century CE.'®® Although contested by most scholars, tradition states that Yogâcâra’s 
Vasubandhu is tlie self-same Vasubandhu who entered first class Indian Buddhist 
thinkers with his seminal work in cataloguing tlie Vaibharika tradition, tlie 
Abhidharmakosa, which proved foundational for the Abhidharma scholastic argument.'®'* 
According to tradition, Vasubandhu’s brother, Asanga, deeply impressed with 
Vasubandhu’s achievements as an Abhidharma scholar, however also deeply concerned 
that Vasubandhu was missing an integral revelation into the Buddha’s teaching, 
eventually converted him to the Yogâcâra approach with the divinely inspired teachings 
of Maitreya who appeared to Asanga while he was in deep meditation. From this point 
o f conversion into the Yogâcâra school, all Vasubandhu’s subsequent writing and 
teaching efforts contributed to tlie Yogâcâra tradition. In light of tlie investigation here 
in this chapter, tlie issue o f one or more Vasubandhus is largely irrelevant. Furdier, 
whether or not Asanga owes his writing to the appearance of celestial Maitreya whilst in 
meditation, or to a human teacher named Maitreya, is also not tlie concern here, and 
tliose works generally attributed to Asanga, or Asanga via Maitreya, will be treated as 
Asanga’s texts. What can be said in response to the tradition which upholds a converted 
Vasubandhu is tliat tlie Yogâcâra scholars recognised the achievements of tlie 
Abhidharma scholastic tradition, but felt that it did not provide the skilful means 
necessary for expounding tlie Buddha’s teaching. What tlie Yogâcâra scholars undertook 
in developing the doctrinal tenants of die eventual school was a fresh clarification o f the 
Buddha’s teaching in dieir unique language and systematic understanding o f die
483 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation o f Yogâcâra Buddhism and the 
Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 65
484 In fact, there is suggested as many as tliree Vasubandhus: the Vasubandhu who wrote the 
Abhidharmakosa and lived in Peshawar (Gandhara), the Vasubandhu who wrote the commentary o f that 
work, the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya who lived in Ayodhya, and the teacher Vasubandhu also brother of  
Asanga who worked to establish the teachings o f the Yogâcâra school. See Frauwallner, Erich, On the Date 
of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Rome: Is. M.E.O., 1951 and 




established Buddhist doctrines o f karma, pratitya-samutpada, nairatmja or atidtman, and 
ultimate release and elemental to an understanding of a praxi-centric phenomenology.
485 Davidson, Ronald Mark, Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Asraya-parivrtti/ pardvrtti Among the Yogâcâra, 
unpublished doctoral thesis conferred by University o f California, Berkeley, 1985, p. 126 
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1999 p. 96
487 'pMs foundational practice was explored in the previous chapter in connection with the Buddha’s 
enlightenment experience.
488 see Silk, Jonathan A., “The Yogâcâra Bhiksu,” Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for IJnderstanding: The 
Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Silk, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 2000,
p. 266
489 for a synopsis o f scholarly positions on the origins o f the Yogâcâra school’s name, see Silk, Jonathan A., 
“The Yogâcâra Bhiksu,” Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of 
Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Sdk, University o f Honolulu: Hawai’i Press, 2000, p. 273
The school is kiiown as the vijmna-vàda (consciousness only) or cittamdtra (mind only)
school because the doctrine developed by its teachers is a systematic rendering of the 
.working of the mind or consciousness. However, in addition to its doctrine, the school 
was also deeply committed to the practice o f seated meditation, and thus also is known
"ÿby its practical rmt\^,yogdcdra (practice of yoga meditation). Thus, even with the naming f
of the school, there is introduced a tension between the doctrinal and practical for what I
is considered the effective Buddhist patli and this tension will be evident tlirough out 
both teaching and interpretation surrounding the Yogâcâra school. The multiple names 
of the school say much about its practical emphasis and the extent it has been 
understood and interpreted both by contemporary students of the school as well as 
modern scholars. Dawdson argues tliat part of the issue surrounding the multiple 
interpretations of Yogâcâra Buddhism is the fact that although material began to appear 
which supported what developed into a proper school, early on there was much less 
doctrinal cohesiveness to the movement. This is a tradition inspired by multiple sources, 
hence there exist multiple emphases.'®® This may certainly be true to tlie extent that most 
movements and schools arise out of a multitude of voices. However, it is also possible 
to recognise, especially with the pairing of Vasubandhu and Asanga, the complementary 
voices o f a new vision of the Buddha’s Dharma. Yogâcâra can be translated “practice of 
yoga”'®® which reinforces and renews the emphasis on meditation that has been an 
important aspect of Buddhism since its inception.'®’ The Xsaimyogdcdra is not unique to 
Buddhism and has denoted “tlie practice or observance of Yoga” in Classical Sanskrit.'®®
It is not at all clear how or why the t e r m w a s  adopted by the school o f Buddhism 
that bears tlie name, however, the emphasis it brings of dhydnic or yogic meditation 
practice is undeniable.'®"
72
49° King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n  Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999, p. 101
494 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n  Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1999, p. 96
492 both Lusthaus and B3ng suggest this linking; see Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A  Philosophical 
Investigation of Yogdcdra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, and King, Richard, 
Indian Philosophy: A n  Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999
Furtliermore, in connection witli its emphasis on practice and meditation, tlie Yogâcâra 
school developed the doctrine of tlie “conversion of the basis” iâsraya-parâwttî) in order 
to describe the generation of the movement necessary to transform the ego- 
consciousness to the point beyond cognition in which “no-mind” is realised. This |
Yogâcâra doctrine, “conversion of the basis” so to realise the “true self,” however, has 
two distinct interpretations and each has powerfully influenced tlie trajectory of 
Maliâyâna Buddhist teaching and the way it treats self-nature {svabhâvâ). King refers to 
the dichotomous understanding o f “true self’ as ‘No-Mind’ versus Ture Mind’:
There is evidence of considerable doctrinal diversity within the Yogâcâra 
school in India. Some strands emphasise what one might call a ‘No- 
Mind’ {acittà) interpretation, seeing the ‘revolution of the foundation’
(âsrqga-parâvrtti) as the cessation rather than the transformation of the 
àlaya-vtjnàna or store-consciousness. From this perspective the final goal 
involves a transcendence of mental activity and the attainment of a non- 
conceptual awareness (nirmkalpa jnànà) o f reality as it is. On the other 
hand, there is also much in the early Yogâcâra literature which is 
suggestive of a ‘Pure Mind’ interpretation. On this view tlie goal of 
Yogâcâra practice is to purify the store-consciousness o f defilements 
rather than to eradicate it. The ‘revolution of the foundation’ does not 
require the cessation o f the mind but rather the uncovering of the 
intrinsic purity o f consciousness, which then shines through. Non- 
conceptual awareness on diis view is pure consciousness reflectiving 
realit)  ^like a mirror tliat has been cleaned o f all defilements.
Flowever, this school has also been called the “doctrine of consciousness” school 
(pymna-vddà), “doctrine o f cognitive-representations only” school ivijflaptimdtratâ) (the 
term vifndna means “cognition” or “consciousness” while the term vljnapti means 
“representation”), or “mind-only” school {dttamdtraj^ ^  ^ descriptions which encourage 
interpretation towards idealist tendencies and the “positive” use of language that 
contrasts so poigiantly witli the “negative” approach of the Madhyamika. It has been 
argued that tlie Yogâcâra school internalised tlie Abhidharma ontology to tlie 
psychologised working of the consciousness.'"^ The Yogâcâra school also wished to stop 
tlie build-up of karma, in particular what they described as the seed-consciousness
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{àlayav'ÿnànâ), or the location within the psyche, the dependent nature {paratantra-svabhàvà), 
where the intentions and impulses begin and eventually bear the fruit of action m id/or 
manifestation of dharma. Before they are manifested, actions and consequently dharmas 
exist only as hidden seeds in the consciousness. Drying up this store-of seeds is one 
effort of the Yogâcâra Buddhist school. This “pure mind” emphasis of die Yogacara 
school, according to King, creates a tension between die seemingly contradictory goals of 
realising “no mind” and die endeavour to “purify the store consciousness o f defilements 
radier than eradicate it.” In diis sense, “non-conceptual awareness” is “pure 
consciousness reflecting reality like a mirror cleaned of defilements”. T h i s  
understanding o f a “pure mind” which merely needs to be cleansed o f defilement is 5
picked up by Dharmapâla's disciple, Hsüang-Tsang and brought to China where it was 
developed and solidified by die Fa-Hsiang school of Chinese Yogâcàra.^®'  ^ Bodi 
emphases, that o f a school bent on engaging meditative practice in order to transcend the 
paradoxical realm of language and concepts brought about via the working o f the mind, |
and that of a school searching to uncover the purity of the original mind through 
meditative practice, will be brought to bear here in investigating die Yogâcâra teachings.
Furdier, whether or not diese emphases are fundamentally at odds with each other will 
be investigated in diis chapter.
If  the Yogâcâra school is proposing that the end of illusion lies within the reach o f die 
mind or ego-consciousness itself, Yogâcâra begs die question of acute subjectivity and 
die idealism the school has been charged widi. The choice o f the Yogâcâra school to 
employ positive language and work with die concept svahhàva that Nâgârjuna condemned 
as dangerous and misleading, has caused schisms of thought in ancient as well as modern 
scholarship with a distinct contingent who view die school’s doctrine as an expression of 
idealism. Although diere are many convincing arguments for why diis would be an 
anathema to die Yogâcâra practitioners, it is die specific choice o f language which makes 
the school particularly susceptible to this interpretation. In choosing, for example, to 
describe the levels o f consciousness until one locates at its base die source of die ego- 
consciousness that is to be converted, or furthermore, to describe the “ultimate” in 
positive terms, such as “eternal”, “good”, and “pure”, it is all too easy to slip back into
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ontological or idealistic thinking as die emergence of die Chinese Fa-Hsiang school 
proves, Wlien one approaches the Yogâcâra teachings from diis perspective one sees a 
methodological similarity between die Abhidharma and Yogâcâra scholars. As the 
Ahhidhamakosa revealed die Abhidharma scholars’ meticulous and analytical approach to 
categorising die dharmas into diose beneficial aspects to be cultivated, and the defilements 
to be stopped, the Yogâcâra doctrine can be described as an internalisation o f die 
Abhidharma ontology to die epistemological and psychological concerns of 
consciousness whereby on a subconscious level die seeds of release are cultivated and die 
seeds o f defilement are dried up. Earlier I suggested that the abhidharma system of 
categorising dharmas 'externalised’ the Buddhist path such that a dualistic rendering of 
reality emerged. Should the Yogâcâra School be internalising die abhidharma mediod of 
investigating, tiieii it too will suffer from a dualistic perspective of reality whereby instead 
of a fragmented rendering of reality in which the ego-self is set up against external 
existeiits, diere results a fragmented self, the core of which is the existent ego-self. 
Either way, the ego-self is not destroyed nor seen for what it is, and this remains the 
crucial flaw according to die historical Buddha.
Yogâcâra Vaipulya — 3’^'^ Turning of Dharma-wheel
As almost all schools of Buddhism, Yogâcâra too sees itself well established in die 
orthodox teachings of the Buddha. However, in introducing their unique Yogâcâra 
interpretation of such teaching, the school found it necessary to propose an expansion, 
or formal “development”, to what had become the established Buddhist canon. This 
“development” literature was called by die school the Vaipulya, and was justified by 
introducing die first two major “developments” in die history of Buddhism, the 
recording o f die nikdjas coupled with the vast cataloguing work of the Abhidharma 
scholars, and second, die emergence o f die Madhyamika school, as die first two turnings 
of the wheel of Dharma. The third turning of die Dharma-wheel is claimed by the 
Yogâcâra school to be their own teachings of the “doctrine o f consciousness” {vyndna- 
vâdà)
Vasubandhu’s Trlmsatikd^^, or Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness Onty, introduces die 
Yogâcâra extension of die traditional six levels of consciousness in Buddhist thought to
See Williams, Paul, Mah^âna Buddhism: The Doctrind'Poundations, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 79 
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eight. The traditional Buddhist levels of consciousness^^^ are described in the treatise as 
the “perception” o f tlie object witli a “sixfold distinction” (vs. 8-14). Underneath such 
perception lies the level o f thought iynanas) and supporting thought and all perceptions is 
the store consciousness (âlayavijmnà), the holder of all seeds {bijd) (vs 2). The store 
consciousness, the treatise explains, “evolves like a flowing stream” (vs. 2) while the 
perceptions (the traditional sixfold sense perceptions or consciousnesses) are due to 
“conditions” and are like “waves supported by water” (vs 15-16). The suggestion may 
be: quiet the water (the alaya, or subconscious stream of consciousness) and die waves 
(cognitions and sensations) disappear. However, another possible interpretation is: stop 
the stream altogether so diat there is no further “material” for the mind to generate and 
entertain perceptions. This divergent interpretation for what die Yogâcâra “goal” for the 
dlaya consciousness is again reiterates the tension between divergent direads o f thought 
widiin the tradition.
Part o f the justification behind introducing the different turnings of the Dharma wheel is 
based on die rapidly popular idea of skilful means {updya). If  this doctrine is implied in 
Nâgârjuna's use and development of sUnyatd, it is explicit in die Yogâcâra school’s 
introduction of the diree turnings of the Dharma Wlieel. As Lusthaus explains o f the 
introduction of the third turning of die Dharma wheel in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the 
first two turnings (die teaching o f die four noble trudis in the nikdyas and Abhidharma 
Buddhism, and of mnyatd by the Madhyamaka school) “had expressed the dharma 
dirough incomplete formulations that required furdier elucidation {mydrthd) to be 
properly understood and dius effective.”^^  ^ In the wake of the previous turnings of the 
wheel, in which first mnyatd and next the “positive qualities of the dharma” were 
“hidden”, the Yogâcâra school endeavoured to “leave nothing hidden”. T h i s  desire to 
“uncover” is well established in Yogâcâra texts as the levels o f consciousness are 
plumbed to discover and remedy what we call die subconscious (normally “hidden”) 
level o f consciousness, the seed/store consciousness, dlcyapyndna. Furdier, in light o f the 
meditative practice assumed by the school, one can read samddbi as sam (bring together) +
Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, translated by Francis H. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist 
Translation and Research, 1999
The six consciousnesses are described as the activity o f the five sense-organs plus the mind {mano), see 
King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, p. 97
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âdhi (to place on, put, to impregnate, to give, to receive) whereby samadhi “brings together 
the cognitive conditions such that the mind is “impregnated” and brings to term deep 
seeded c o n d i t i o n s . I n  other words, even Yogâcâra meditation emphasises bringing 
what has been obscured or hidden to light as objects of cognition. Thus, on tlie basis of 
dieir own grounds for introducing the Yogâcâra interpretations, one ought to consider 
where the probing search to uncover even the subconscious level o f consciousness in 
order to reverse the construction of images and perceptions until there is “no mind that 
knows” has led as well as how effective this turning o f tlie wheel has been and can be in 
establishing die clearly fundamental Buddhist “no-self’ {iiairdtmjalanâtmmï).
In light of their own claims to provide clarification we can ask of tlie Yogâcâra 
movement at least three related questions of efficacy. First, by psychologising the 
Abhidharma systematics, have the Yogâcâra masters provided a clearer path to a 
transformative experience of enlightenment? Second, have the Yogâcâra doctrines 
provided a necessary clarification and justification for the Maliâyâna Bodhisattva ideal 
not previously found in tlie Mâdhyamika apophatic approach? Finally, tlirough fusing 
the experiential aspect o f praxis witli systematic explanation, have the Yogâcâra scholars 
provided a clearer path for personal liberation or merely established a self-defeating 
systematics?
Concerning the origins of Yogâcâra doctrine
Many scholars have traced tlie development of tlie Yogâcâra terminology in order to 
ascertain not only what tlie Yogâcâra scholars meant in their teaching, but also to 
determine how close to tlie original Buddhist teachings the Yogâcâra teachers remained. 
As tlie Madhyamalca, led by Nâgârjuna, used mnyatd as a radical interpretive tool for the 
Buddha’s no-self {giairdtmya, andtman), Rahula argues tliat Asanga and Vasubandhu chose 
dttamdtra and vijnaptimdtra to establish the very same teaching of nairdtmya. Rahula points 
to tlie “early” texts in the Buddhist canon to authenticate the Yogâcâra starting point of 
the constructing or imaginative working o f the mind. The Angiittara-nikdya states tliat 
“ ... the world is led by tliought icittd). By thought it is drawn along . . .” (AN, II (PTS), p. 
177, see also: Samyutta-nikdya, I (PTS), p. 39) and Asanga quotes tills reference in his 
MahdydnasutrdlankdraV^ Additionally, in reference to the passage from Sanyutta-nikdka
200 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A  Philosophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei- 
shih lun, Routledge Curzoii, 2002, p. 113
201 Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 81
Schmithausen’s in-deptli investigation into the origins of the Yogâcâra âlqyavynâna shows 
the gradual growth and maturation o f this ‘doctrine o f the mind’ which in early literature 
lies hidden in the material sense-faculties but which gradually gains importance until it is 
established as a “fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter” 
and tlien eventually “superseding tlie latter [corporeal matter] in its function of basis [-of- 
personal-existence] {asraya)f^ ^^ Accordingly, we see in Schmithausen’s analysis tlie 
gradual emphasis of the psychological and personal aspect of personhood taldng 
precedence over the physical components. This shift in emphasis supports the 
suggestion tliat altliough the Abhidharma and Yogâcâra teaching is different in content.
202 Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 82
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,“Nothing exists more than a name” (SN, I (PTS), p. 39), Rahula suggests that Asanga |
interprets nâma-màtra (“only a name”) to mean vijnaptimdtra (“only a conception”), again y'"ï"in the MahdjdnasidrdlankdraV^ Further to the references and development of mind and 
concept, Rahula makes the case that Asanga’s development of the dlayavyndna is also I
based on early or ortliodox Buddhist texts. In tlie Mahdvaggavannand (Colombo 1900, p. :
153) dlaya is associated with an ‘attachment to the five sense-pleasures’.^ °^  Rahula further y
draws attention to the similar “goals” in the following contexts: the Yogâcâra “goal” is 
dsrqga-pardvrtti or a “revolution o f dlayaviJndncC which points to nirvdtta, in the Atiguttara- |
nikdya, dlaydsamugghdta or an “uprooting o f alayd'' points to nirvana', and the Pali term 
khïnahïja (here we are to recognise the reference to Ufa “seed”, which suggests the |
Yogâcâra dlayavijndna as the seed storehouse) referring to an Arhat whose “seeds of 
defilements are destroyed”.™'* These connection points are all plausible seed ideas from 
which the Yogâcâra school developed their doctrine or “extension” teaching, the r|
Vaipulya, However, critics remain sceptical of the idea of seed-consciousness; Griffiths, i
for example, does not see evidence o f a clear development of this doctrine in early 
Buddhist writings, and has described it as a “philosophical construct”™^ o f Yogâcâra to 
explain how the early Buddhist doctrine of ‘no enduring self can co-exist philosophically 
with the equally foundational doctrine of karma in which the actions one performs in life 
are causally connected to the arising o f further phenomena.
78
their systematic approach is complementary. Furthermore, the shift away from physical 
elements, dharmas, to the multi-layered psyche/mind, dtta, allows Yogâcâra to explore 
questions of personal liberation and the plausibility of the hodhisattva-marga. Thus, the 
tension between a doctrinal systematic and liberative praxis is carried into even modern 
scholarly interpretation of tlie school.
Three Natures {trisvabhàvâ)
From the Mâdhyamika perspective, the choice of the Yogâcâra school to employ the very 
term svabhdva, specifically condemned by Nâgârjuna and the Madhyamika school, 
requires a certain justification, given the ongoing debate between Buddhist schools. The 
Mâdhyamika had criticised the concept of svabhdva for, as tliey argued, it led to an 
ontological grounding which has no basis in Buddhist teaching, and furtiiermore it 
represented the end o f any practical aspect of Buddhism for absolutes subvert the activity 
o f liberation.™^ The Yogâcâra school not only employed tlie term, but developed out of 
it a theory concerning the psychological make-up o f tlie self, the dtman and the world 
with which tliat self engages.
The theory of the three natures (trisvabhdvd), or “the three forms of being (svabhdvâ)”'^ '^  ^ is 
elucidated in Vasubandhu’s Trl-svabhdva-nirdesd^^ in which the three natures are analysed 
in terms of dieir reality, existence, and their relation to tlie otlier two for ultimately, 
according to this treatise, tliey cannot be described independent of each other. As tlie 
treatise explains, the three-natures consist of: the imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhavd), 
the dependent nature iparatantra-svabhdva) and the ultimate or “absolutely 
accomplished” ™^ nature iparinispanna-svabhdvà). The imaginary nature iparikalpita-svabhdvd) 
is tlie fully illusionary “reality,” generated by tlie untrained mind, which constitutes the 
empirical world o f duality {samsdrà). The dependent nature iparatantra-svabhdvà) is the 
“unreal mental creation” iasatkalpà), the mind {cittâ), and is ultimately the cause or 
generator of the imaginary nature. The ultimate nature or “perfected aspect of
202 see chapter One on Nagarjuna
20® Tola, F. and Dragonetti, C., “The Trisvabhavakaiika Journal of Indian Philosophy, 11
(1983), p. 232
200 Wood expresses doubt that the Tri-svabhàva-nirdesa\% in fact an authentic work o f Vasubandhu’s in 
Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A  Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijfîànavàda, Honolulu: University 
o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 31
210 Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A  Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A  New Translation and Interpretation of the 
Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 90
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experience” *^* iparinipanna-svabhâvâ) is that “inalterable” reality which is the non­
existence of duality, tlie perception of the wise, tlie enlightened, the buddha.
The dependent nature (pamtantra-svabhava) is the working of tlie mind {dttd) which is 
divided conceptually into two parts, tlie seed or store-consciousness {alayavijndna) and the 
active consciousness (pravrttwjndnd). The active consciousness is made up of the seven 
variant manifestations of consciousness, e.g. sensory data and mental cognition discussed 
above as part of tlie eight levels of consciousness. The seed-consciousness “holds” or 
“contains” the residue o f conscious diought created by the mind; and this residue is 
“subliminal” *^^  in that it is not consciously registered by the active conscious. Eventually, 
the residual elements are “reactivated” *^^  or “transformed” *^'* as tliey pass from tlie seed- 
consciousness into the active consciousness and become manifest.
The three natures doctrine is metaphorically described in tlie example of an “elephant” 
conjured from a magic spell using pieces o f wood. In this metaphor, Vasubandhu 
explains that the “elephant” is the “imagined aspect of experience” *^^ , the “image” or the 
“illusion” (the pankalipita-svabhàvâ). Its (the elephant’s) appearance is the other- 
dependent nature or tlie “relative aspect” of mind which allows for dualistic rendering 
(the paratantra-svabhdva). This other-dependent or “relative aspect” o f mind arises out of 
the store-consciousness and uses tlie activity o f the seven remaining levels of 
consciousness to create or generate the illusion of the elephant. The “non-existence of 
the elephant” is the perfected view or die absolutely accomplished nature iparinispanna- 
svabhdvà) which does not operate with a perception of duality and therefore does not 
“see” an elephant. The nature of the pieces of wood is not explored in this metaphor for 
it is irrelevant to the point at hand, namely the false constructing activity of the 
dependent nature.
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Vasubandhu further explains in the Tri-svabhàva-nirdesa that the appropriate approach to 
the three natures doctrine is a three-fold application of knowledge (parijna), rejection 
iparytla), and attainment iprdptb) whereby one comes to correctly understand that the 
subject-object reality is only imagined, at which point one ceases to participate in tlie 
duality of perceptions and effects a “direct realisation” {sâksàt-kriyâ) into tlie three 
natures doctrine itself which is to say, one perceives reality as a Buddha.
Wliat can be gained by viewing the self from the three-natures perspective? Wliy did the 
Yogâcâra school put forward such a teaching, which at tlie outset appears problematic to 
tlie other Buddhist schools? This “positive” investigation of the mind, coupled with an 
intricate system of self-nature to contextualise the mind-only teaching, is set up in clear 
contrast to the sceptical Madhyamika approach of Nâgârjuna and his students. Asanga, 
in the Dharmaviniscaya (section concerning teaching) of the Abhidharmasamuccaya 
(Compendium of Higher Teaching), addresses the issue of die value of language and 
concepts by cataloguing and analysing “four searches ipayesanaâf. Asanga identifies (1) 
the search for names for which it must be concluded that the “own-characteristics 
{svaladsanaf' o f names, phrases and consonants are “not absolute (aparinispannd)”-, (2) the 
search for substances for which it must be concluded that the characteristics o f the 
“aggregates (ykandbd), elements {dbàUÎ) and spheres {ayatanap" are “not absolute”; (3) the 
search for the “designation of own-nature {svabhàvaprajncpüpayesanâf for which it must 
be concluded tiiat “with regard to the relationship between the name {abhidhânà) and the 
diing named {abhidheyâ), own-nature is only a designation iprcÿncptimàtrà) in as much as it 
is a linguistic sign {vyavahâranimittàf'and (4) the search for particularities for which it 
must be concluded that “witii regard to the relationship between the name and die diing 
named, particularities are only desigiations in as much as they are linguistic signs. 
Asanga seems fully aware o f the Madhyamika concern with die limitations o f language to 
convey the Higher Teaching and clearly takes the view that a sldlful approach to language 
as a medium for conveying Higher Teaching is die only recourse one has to lead a 
student toward a realisation o f the Higher Teaching. In the same chapter, Asanga 
cautions that it is possible to appreciate and desire to penetrate the Higher Teaching and 
still fail specifically because of an “adherence to the meaning of the sound (letter) 
(yathâmtàrtbàbhinivesàp', Furdier, even a bodhisattva may take a “superficial” approach to
Ï
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the teaching (the Vaipulya) and consider it only according to “the meaning o f the sound ;f
(letter) {yathàmtàf\ In doing so, Asanga charges, the bodhisattva exhibits as many as
twenty-eight false ideas, including the idea of “grasping”, “misapprehension”, “intense A"'Idelusion”, even “repudiation of practice”. A l s o  included in the list o f twenty-eight 
false ideas is the problem of tlie “idea of signs (yiimittadrsttf' fumitta means “external 
causes” *^®) which is described in an explanatory note as
... grasp[ing] superficial signs and characteristics widiout understanding 
the profound meaning of tlie teaching .., one conforms to words, one 
clings to words. One arouses abhivivesa “attachment”. One says 
nihsvabhâvâh sarvadharmâh, etc., but one is attached to superficial signs 
and characteristics.^*^
Taldng “signs and characteristics” for anything other than the empty pointers that they 
are is akin to giving tliem agency. The problem with an “external cause” in the Yogâcâra 
system is that such a suggestion allows for a “real” subject-object duality when the 
Yogâcâra school is arguing for a totally internal construction based on the grasper- 
grasped duality o f consciousness. Lusthaus explains diat nimitta “signifies the 
characteristic sensorial marks of an object (e.g. a snake’s color or shape), especially in the 
sense that such marks serve as the efficient cause (fiimitta-kâranà) o f the cognition of 
something that is observable.” ™^ Asanga is reinforcing that there is a correct and skilful 
approach to the Yogâcâra Vaipulya, in which one is fully aware o f the limitations and 
ultimate failure of language and conceptual-based teaching to generate tlie movement or 
change necessary in tlie mind for understanding tlie “profound meaning of the teaching”.
Asanga therefore suggests diat systems and elaborate doctrine (including that of the 
Yogâcâra) are means that are never sufficient on their own for they are ultimately just 
signs, lacking any efficacy o f dieir own. One is reminded of the caution that Nâgârjuna 
gives his students who might take his teaching utilising mnyatd wrongly — it is as 
dangerous as handling a snake from the wrong end.
Dharmas are natureless {nihsvabhdvâ)
82 . . I
In addition to tlie necessary awareness o f a limitation in language, tliere is tlie question of 
where tlie teaching endeavours to lead and if it is successful in its method. Vasubandhu’s 
Trimsatikà (Treatise in Thirty Stanzas) begins with a verse that suggests that all discussion 
o f self idtmaii) and dharmas is carried out in a metaphorical sense and is coherent only 
witliin the context o f the activity o f the consciousness:
The metaphor of self \âtmatï\ and dharmas
Evolves in various ways
Upon tlie transformation o f consciousness.™
Kochumuttom suggests diat Vasubandhu employs the terms dtman and dharma as broad 
categories meant to encompass all representations of subjectivity (dtmaii) and objectivity 
{dharmd) and understands Vasubandhu to be establishing this wide array of subject-object 
duality in reference to the “transformations of consciousness.”™ That is, all creation of 
subject-object reality arises directly out of, and it wholly dependent upon die activity of 
die consciousness. Indeed, concepts (as die subject-object reality created by the mind) 
are really not different from die consciousness itself.^™ Again, verse 17
This [threefold] transformation of consciousness 
Is [just] die distinction [between subject and object];
Wliat is thus distinguished.
Does not exist as [subject and object]
Therefore this is all mere representation of consciousness.™
Lusthaus prefers to speak of the problem of grasper/grasped duality rather than a 
subject/object duality lest we are led to tiiink in ontological categories not addressed in 
Yogâcâra Buddhism. The Yogâcâra school of thought would insist that it is not an 
external subject-object struggle that the practitioner is engaged in, but the internal 
epistemological one of perception where the ego-consciousness, die mind, is deluded 
into creating a reality for itself to engage with. Wliat both Kochumuttom and Lusthaus
:
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agree on, however, is the propensity toward a false duality that the ego-consciousness 
engages in when “reality” is decidedly non-dual. The subsequent verses explain that the 
“transformation of consciousness” consists of the dlaya or store consciousness, the manas 
or thought consciousness, and die ‘perception of the object’ consciousness with its 
sixfold distinctions. In odier words, die treatise is speaking of what the Yogâcâra 
tradition has called die eight-fold consciousness, as discussed above. Thus, when 
engaging in the “world” of die consciousness, one utilises the concepts of self and 
dharmas metaphorically and not as expressions of profound reality. That is, the world of 
duality in which “grasper” and die “object grasped” encounter each other is seen by the 
Yogâcâra school as evolving out o f die activity of die eight-fold consciousness. The 
treatise emphasises this fact by first describing die make-up and working of the three 
natures in some detail, and dien in verses 23 dirough 25 announces that the whole 
purpose of the teaching of the three-natures theory is to arrive at the realisation that 
dharmas are truly natureless in dieir profound reality:
On the basis o f diese three natures 
The threefold naturelessness is established.
Therefore, the Buddha taught with a hidden intention 
That all dharmas are natureless.™
That is, dharmas are wholly dependent upon die movement (transformation) of die mind 
{dttd), and their appearance, as established by die diree-natures doctrine, arises ultimately 
from the dlaya or store consciousness. In other words, dharmas have no nature o f their 
own, but depend upon the activity of the dtta. Thus, the three-natures doctrine 
establishes the naturelessness of dharmas by demonstrating dieir origin in the ego- 
consciousness, which is itself, according to ordiodox Buddhist teaching and reinforced 
by die Yogâcâra texts, natureless. Verse 24 shows this progression of naturelessness, 
implying the coordinate three natures:
The first is naturelessness of characteristics \laksand\‘,
The next is naturelessness o f self-existence;
The last is the nature diat results from die privation of die former 
Self and dharmas that are grasped.™
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The imaginary nature iparikalpitâ) is the “illusion” tliat tliere are characteristics to 
perceptions. The dependent nature (paratantrd) works from the activity of duality which 
generates the material which “substantiates” the pankalpita. And the ultimate or 
accomplished nature {parinispanna) is die direct realisation into die ultimate nature o f the 
three natures: that they are all empty (smya), natureless {nihsvabhâvà).
This is the ultimate trudi of all dharmas 
And is also the same as true suchness,
Because it is eternally so in its nature.
It is the true nature of consciousness only.™
Kochumuttom views the discussion of the three-natures doctrine as the establishment of 
die concept o f non-duality as die ultimate description of no-self. The Tn-svabhdva-nirdesa 
(A  Treatise on the Three Natures) explains diat the three-natures doctrine is not a 
description of tiiree independent realities, rather, die three natures are “not mutually 
different in definition.”™ Through implementing a dialect of existence/non-existence 
and duality/non-duality, Kochumuttom reads Vasubandhu as showing diat the three 
natures ultimately share a conceptual basis, tiiat is, non-duality:
All these three natures 
Depend for dieir definition 
O n [the concept of] non-dualit)r;
For, [widi reference to die imagined nature],
There is the unreality of duality,
[With reference to the other-dependent nature].
It is not in the dual form in which it appears,
And, [with reference to the absolutely accomplished nature].
It is by its nature die absence o f that duality.™
Similarly, in die Trimsatikd the “absolutely accomplished nature” (parinispanna-svabhdva), 
Vasubandhu explains, relates to the “other-dependent nature” iparikalpita-svabhdvà) as the
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“perpetual devoidness” of such otlier dependency, or duality.™ One must “realise” that 
the “subject-object designations” are all “mere representation of consciousness” to move 
out o f such a mundane perception and achieve supramundane knowledge.^^* Again, 
Sthiramati’s commentary explains that tliis “realization of mere representation of 
consciousness is equated witli ‘seeing tlie tiling as such’ {yathâ-bhûta-darsanà}” Thus, 
profound reality as such is not equated witli “mind” nor “mind activity” but with the 
realisation that all form perceived in a pre-enlightened state is “mind only” or entirely 
unreal. Wliat is real can only be perceived by the “great sage” who utilises 
“supramundane knowledge” and “has no mind tliat knows”:
That indeed is the supramundane knowledge \jmnd)
Wlien one has no mind \acittd[ that knows.
And no object for its support \anupalambhdg.
It follows the revulsion \paràvittd[ of basis 
Through the twofold removal o f wickedness;
That itself is tlie pure source-reality \dbàU{\,
Incomprehensible, auspicious and unchangeable;
Being delightful, it is the emancipated body \vimukti-kàjd),
Wliich is also called the truth [-body] \dharma-kàyd\ o f tlie great sage.^^ ^
Thus, the distinction is made between the functioning of the eight levels of 
consciousness, which is botii dependent upon and generates the dualistic construct of 
language and a dualistic construct of tlie lived-world, and the functioning of the true 
nature of consciousness-only which does not construct a dualistic lived-world, but 
penetrates the “ultimate trutii o f all dharmas”, emptiness or naturelessness itself. Wliat 
seems to be suggested is a “two-fold trutii” o f consciousness in which, as in Nâgârjuna’s 
understanding, emptiness or naturelessness is the common defining “character” of each 
level, what Kochumuttom calls non-dualism. N ot creating a dualistic lived-world via the 
eight-fold working of the consciousness is what is meant by “no-mind” or “there is no 
mind that knows”. Directly realising emptiness is an experience beyond the mundane 
categories o f knowledge and perception. Wliat is not meant by this description o f the
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“true nature of consciousness only” is that there is no profound reality beyond what tlie 
mind creates. Recalling the metaphor of conjuring an elephant out o f pieces of wood, 
the Yogâcâra school is not as concerned with the nature of the pieces of wood as w
penetrating the true nature of consciousness through which liberation comes. Whatever y
the nature of the pieces of wood, tlie important factor for the accomplished nature is tliat 
tlie elephant is not perceived as an ultimately real entity. Perhaps seeing things as they 
MQ., jathâbütam, is for the accomplished nature “no-perception” or what is meant by a 
“non-conceptual” {iiiwikalpà} perception. Or again in tlie example from Vasubandhu’s 
Vimsatika o f the person suffering from cataracts of tlie eye who sees a hair across his/her 
vision: tliere is no hair, and tlie hair perceived is not onto logically “created” by the 
individual’s mind, but is merely an illusionary perception by tlie person suffering from 
the vision problem. The illusionaiy perception will necessarily be brought to bear on the 
existential experience of tlie person and it is at this level that one can muse about the 
“creation” of sometliing. For indeed, although the hair does not ontoiogically enter the 
realm o f profound reality, it does alter tlie way tlie subject is able to interact, understand 
and engage profound reality. In tliis way, it is clear that Yogâcâra concern lies within the 
realm of tlie existential ratlier than idealistic. Lusthaus claims that Yogâcâra exposes the 
solipsism and narcissism of the mundane cognitive world; that arriving at “no-selP’ for 
Yogâcâra Buddhism is to undermine tlie narcissistic ego-consciousness by negating die 
object {artha). Without an object, the self is thereby negated.^ '^* Yogâcâra then uses 
naturelessness as an expression of mnyatd to establish no-self, not in tlie manner of 
expressing physical substancelessness but ratlier to convert the ego that lies at the base of 
the human conglomeration of skandhas and consciousness.
Tension between “no-self’ and perfected self
Wood suggests that verses 25 and 29-30 of the Tnmsikd contradict each other in defining 
what is meant by “mind only” or “the nature of mind only”
{yynaptimdtratdlvijndnamdtratva). In verse 25, it is stated that “The true nature of mind 
only {yynaptimdtratâ) is the true nature (paramdrthd) o f all dharmas, because, remaining as it 
is at all times {sarvakdlam tathd-bhdvdt) it is suchness {tathatâ)f This suggests that “mind 
only” refers to what is immutable, to tlie suchness of reality (and also mnyatd as Wood
2®4 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A  Philosophicd Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei- 
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points out)™. Contrast this to verses 29-30, stated above, in which it is suggested that in 
the realm of no mind iacittà) and no perception is the source reality or “pure realm” 
idhatu) and one is confronted with, what is for Wood, tlie “unacceptable conclusion” tliat 
“mind only” in its pure form is really “no mind,” that it both reflects the immutable 
aspects of reality as well as arises dependent on causes and conditions. Wood cites what 
he describes as Sthiramati’s “murky” commentary on this passage to underline his thesis 
that Vasubandhu is attempting to line up the Mahâyâna idea of the unoriginating, 
unchanging nature of things (paramàrthâ) witli tlie orthodox Buddhist teaching that tlie 
mind, like any other skandha, is based on the reality of mutability and change.^^^ 
Stliiramati says,
The self nature o f the perfected nature is tlie true nature of things. Since 
the perfected nature is tlie true nature of the dharmas Axvdh are essentially 
dependent on causes and conditions — tliat is, because such is the very 
nature of things (dharmata) — tlie perfected nature alone is the self nature 
of things. In truth, everything lacks a self nature {paramàrtha-nihjvabhàvatâ} 
in virtue of the non-existent self nature (abhàva-svabhâvatvâh) of tlie 
perfected nature.™
Wood identifies a struggle in the Yogacarin texts between a Mahâyâna teaching of 
essence and immutability witli the classic Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-origination 
(praUtya-samuîpàdd), Thus, the Yogâcârin texts provide the conceptual groundwork for 
the working out of what Wood has identified as a tension between the doctrine of 
pratftya-samuipada and that of dharmadâtti and tathagatagharbha, the concept of immutable 
essence that takes different forms in Mahâyâna texts.
U ed a , conversely, returns to Sthiramati’s commentary on karika 28 to elucidate 
Vasubandliu’s meaning, part of which reads:
... tlie Yogin ... sees an object as it really is (jatbabhûtàrtbâ) ... and tlie mind is 
established in the state of being aware of everything as well as o f itself as tliey
2®® Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A  Philosophicd and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijmnavdda, Honolulu: 
University o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 56, Wood also finds that the understanding o f sûnyâtâ'm the Yogâcârin 
texts deviates from the earlier Buddhist concept o f the emptiness o f all dharma. What Wood calls the 
“otlier emptiness” in Yogâcâra may point toward the reality that mind is asatlw tliat mind is “false or 
deceptive”, however, this does not achieve the same effect as the Mahâyâna doctrine “that all dharmas are 
void {sarva-dharma-smyata)." p. 26
2®® Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A  Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijiiânavàda, Honolulu: 
University o f  Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 59
2® 7 Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A  Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijnànavàda, Honolulu: 
University o f  Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 59
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really are. There is not only (no object) to be grasped (and there is no grasping 
consciousness either) but also there arises the super-mundane, non-conceptualizing 
Yision in which subject and object {âlambhya-âlamhhakà) are identical with each 
other without nullifying and extinguishing their distinction {sama-sama)T^
UEDA’s understanding is that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati describe witli tlie doctrine 
vijnaptimàtratà nothing otlier than reality as it is: non-duality realised. This is to say, die 
mind, as “grasper,” does not see objects to be grasped as such, but in fact die mind must 
“become identified” with the “object” so diat whatever takes place through diis new 
non-dual “perception” is experienced in an entirely different way.^ *^* As UEDA illustrates:
... the mountain is seen from widiin, or by itself widiout the seer outside it ... 
thus, when the mind sees a thing as it really is, it is the mind seeing itself as it really 
is, and, at die same time, by losing itself in die mountain (no-mind), die mind sees 
the mountain from widiin, or, as it were, the mountain is seen by the mountain. 
There is no seer outside except for die mountain. '^**’
Wliat Ue d a  describes as the identification of subject and object seems to be related to 
what is meant by “non-conceptual” {nhvikalpd) perception, or “non-conceptual 
awareness” {niruikalpa jnânà) which has its roots in die Indian Nyaya school of 
philosophy. Sponberg notes that die meaning of nirmkalpa jiïâna can be rendered “non­
discriminating” but also carries the positive connotations o f “direct and intuitive 
cognition of the Absolute”, or more simply, “intuitive wisdom”.^ "** The Nyaya school 
made a distinction between “determinate conceptual perceptions” (vikalpa), which 
include sensory and consciousness data expressed via language and other determined 
routes, and “indeterminate, non-conceptual perceptions” {tiiwikalpa jnânà) which 
constitute the initial contact a subject has widi reality. These non-conceptual perceptions 
create experience which is ineffable and widiout die possibility of error. Error can only 
occur once the subject engages in sensory and/or mind activity. '^*  ^ Asanga’s The Stmtmaty 
of the Great Vehicle devotes a chapter to explaining the degrees of nirdkalpajmna (there are 
three) and the way this intuitive wisdom works to achieve what Sponberg considers the
!
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“characteristic Yogacara innovation of an explicitly dynamic notion of liberation.”™ The 
three degrees of nirdkalpa jm na  are 1) the preliminary stage in which the bodhisattva 
endeavours to pursue this intuitive wisdom upon die faidi o f hearing about it from 
odiers who have achieved it; 2) the fundamental or root stage in which the bodhisattva 
achieves this intuitive wisdom personally; 3) and a “subsequendy-acquired” stage which 
is die “fruit” o f the second or fundamental stage.^ '*'* In otiier words, it is not enough in 
Yogâcâra Buddhism for a bodhisattva to achieve intuitive wisdom personally, but the 
true bodhisattva must commit this break-through to practical activity. Compassionate 
activity comes on die heels of the personal achievements of those who would emulate 
the Buddha.
Interestingly, here die Yogâcâra school is using a concept which establishes the direction 
that is taken by subsequent Chinese/Japanese schools of returning to or attempting to 
recover the initial error-free perceptual experience. This effort is seen in Chinese idealism 
and exposed widi the parable of the 6* patriarch who likens die error of attempting to 
recover die pure self to one who would polish a mirror clean of dirt and find the true 
unblemished surface beneadi.™ Wliat die movement of return and reversal indicate is the 
circular nature of religious awakening whereby the boundaries o f experiencing truth and 
untruth are blurred to allow die movement between them to occur. Wliat the image of a 
circle doesn’t allow for is die absolute boundarilessness of the Buddhist direct 
penetrating experience of awakening, an experience completely non-graspable. Once the 
direction of ‘return’ is suggested, it is a short step to idealistic and ontological arguments 
which pull away from die more uncertain space of how nirvikalpa jm na  is used in some 
Yogâcâra texts as an expression of “no self’ in nonduality, ultimately beyond the scope 
of language and open only to die realm of experience. The nonduality expressed through 
a “direct and intuitive cognition o f die Absolute” balances the apparent opposite poles of 
“no-self’ and “perfected self’ by establishing no-self in the realm o f experience. By 
working to keep no-self in the realm of activity, whereby a bodhisattva will continue to 
engage in ‘perfecting’ levels of meditation and practice whilst engaged in the 
compassionate activity of leading others to liberation, die tension between ‘no-self and 
‘perfected self will not and should not be reconciled, but remain a paradoxical reality.
24® Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism,” JL4BS (1979:2), p. 53
244 Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism,” JIABS (1979:2), p. 53
245 The direction o f reversal is also exhibited in N ish id a ’s philosophy whereby he attempts to recover an 
“intuitive” experience o f reality through cultivation, best accomplished via the arts or religion.
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Dan Lusthaus states that, in general “Buddhism is concerned with seeing, not being, tliat
is, epistemology rather than ontology” for questioning being is “a misleading category
error.” *^^  Furthermore, he argues tliat “Yogâcâra may be deemed a type of
epistemological idealism” in that it insists “we shift our attention to the epistemological
and psychological conditions that compel us to construct and attach to ontological
theories.”™ Likewise, when Kochumuttom analyses the vijnapti-màtratà (consciousness ^
only) doctrine, he concludes that “basically, vijnapti-màtratà is an epistemological theory”
.in which “one’s (empirical) experience of objects is determined by one’s psychic 
dispositions, especially tlie idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, and that, tlierefore, 
one in the state of sargsdra can not know the things in their suchness (jathata).
Kochumuttom further explains tliat Sthirimati’s explanation that '‘sûnjatà is considered 
defiled or purified depending upon whetlier it is looked at from tlie sphere of samsara [or] 
nirvana (MK 1.22)”™ reinforces the epistemological argument. However, it must be 
recognised that this is a different approach to mnyatd dian what is put forward in 
Nâgârjuna’s teaching. Wliat lies “beyond” conceptualisation for Nâgârjuna is never 
described in such absolute terms. At most, there is the suggestion that the bliss of 
experiencing tlie ultimate can be anticipated. However, nothing like tlie descriptions of 
“pure” and /or “eternal” are entertained by the Madhyamika contingent. Further, there 
has occurred a shift in the understanding o f mnyatd by Sdiirimati from tlie relativising 
tool of deconstruction used against any and every concept, including itself, to a kind of 
realm, an ultimate in and of itself. Wliat Nâgârjuna explicitly warns against, tliat is, using 
or entertaining “self-nature” in any instance, seems to have snared at least the rhetoric of 
some Yogâcâra masters. Perhaps care was taken after the systematic explanation of the 
three-natures ijri-svahhdvà) to eloquently drive tlie narrative toward “no-self’ and 
paradoxically step beyond self-nature with “empty self-nature” {nüjsvabhdvà)', however, 
have and can the same steps be taken in reference to mnyatd, tathdgata, etc? This is tlie 
troubling legacy which the language, in addition to the interpretation, of tlie Yogâcâra 
school, has helped establish.
Conversion of the basis {dsraya-pardvrtti)
24® Lusthaus, Rutledge Engclopedia of Philosophy, 1989; http://www.rep.routIedge.coiu 
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Convinced that there is a much stronger alliance between tlie Madhyamaka and Yogâcâra 
schools, N a gao  writes that because o f the emphasis on vijnana (cognition) o f the 
Yogâcâra school, “to the universal [Mâdhyamika sünyatà) there was added the particular, 
the individual, and tliereby the concrete seen in yogic practices emerged on the stage of 
sünyatâ, the abstract.” '^**’ In addition to bringing forward the individual through concrete 
practice, N agao  sees the Yogâcâra doctrine of the conversion o f tlie basis iasraya- 
paràvrttî) as the counter-balance to Mâdhyamika negativity, specifically Nâgârjuna’s 
smyatâ. I have already discussed in the previous chapter the problem and 
misunderstanding of mnyatâ viewed solely from a negative perspective, as NAGAO 
purports. However, N a g a o ’s suggestion tliat tlie Yogâcâra school engages the 
individual in perhaps a more concrete manner, through tlie insistence of a concrete 
practice and hence an existential transformative experience is worth investigating. 
Interpretations based around epistemological idealism or realism, or non-duality make no 
more sense in Yogâcâra than in any Buddhist school when existeiitially one confronts 
duhkba. The Yogâcâra “conversion of the basis” is key in locating the school’s Vaipulya 
in the larger context of Buddhist practice.
Vasubandhu describes in tlie Trimjatikd tlie worldngs of the three-natures doctrine and 
concludes by stating that only tlirough a “transmutation of support” {dsraya-pardvrtti) or a 
“conversion of the basis” (Nagao’s r ende r i ng ) does  one cease creating unreal images 
with the mind. At this point, one has attained the supra-mundane knowledge which is 
notliing short of the source reality {dhdtii), the trutli-body {dbarma-kdyà) of the Tathâgata. 
Wlien Asanga writes in the Summary o f tlie Dharma body (the dbarma-kdya o f the 
Tathâgata), he also describes the “conversion o f support” whereby “the dependent 
pattern with impurities is eliminated” and converted instead to a “dependent pattern in 
pure aspect.”^^* In Asanga’s Dharma body all the outward manifestations of a 
conventional body have been “converted” so that tlie skandhas such as form, sensation,
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conceptualisation etc. are expressions o f purification or mastery.^^^ And yet, lest one " t:think of tliis “conversion” in a dualistic manner in which impurities are systematically 
scrubbed clean, Asanga also insists tliat “There is notliing that can be awakened, but it is 
not the case that there is no perfectly awakened one at all. At every moment [Buddhas] 
are immeasurable and are manifested tlirough the non-existence of existence.”™ In tlie 
Trimsatika, “abiding in perfect bodhi changes beings forever” (my emphasis). After the 
“transformation o f support” tlie “liberation body” is realised.
Quite noticeable in these descriptions of the conversion of the alaya consciousness is the |'S'emphasis placed on “body”, even a proper working of skandhas which operate in and
.1
among the world of form, rupa. Lusthaus supports this understanding of the conversion 
o f the alaya consciousness which necessarily depends on the realm o f form witli his 
analysis of how die Yogâcâra tri-smbhdva system parallels one version of the ampya-jlfdna 
progression. Aldiough die subject o f contention in early Buddhist dialogue, and 
continued scholarly dispute,^ "^* one version of the story of die Buddha’s deadi suggests 
diat he progressed dirough die mpa-jndna and dien dmpya-jndna levels of meditation, only 
to then descend completely and pass through the rupafndna levels once more before he 
died. This story, if accepted by the Yogâcâra school, supports according to Lusthaus, the 
idea of the npa-dhdtu as the typically Mahâyânan “middle way” between extremes such 
that the ideal is not arupya but instead a purified or converted rupaT^ This is how the 
dlaya consciousness should be approached, that is, not as something to be annihilated or 
as die stream that should be completely dried up, but as die consciousness which needs 
to be penetrated, all aspects unveiled, and die working of the mind seen for exactly what 
it is as a dependent nature. This seeing things for what diey are/are becoming iyathd- 
bhtJtam) is die ultimate goal for the Yogâcâra and it does not entail leaving one realm of 
existence (the existence of vijndpti-mdtrâ) for another (some transcendental ultimate 
realm). Sponberg notes tiiat in Asvabhâva’s commentary on Asanga’s Mahdydna-samgraha, 
Asvabhâva identifies as die “antidote” which instigates the revolution involved in dsraya-
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pardvrtti, “non-discriminating cognition {nirdkalpa jn d n à ff^  Sponberg goes on to assert 
tliat to support tlie teaching that a bodhisattva could be free from samsaric conditioning 
yet continue to work actively in the realm of sanisdra to free other humans, the Yogâcâra 
school promoted the working of nirdkalpa jndna which would allow for a direct seeing 4
into sanisdra wridiout partaking of the cognitive activity o£ sattisdra. This view o f Yogâcâra A
teaching -  the penetrating experience of nairdtmya — brings together what was earlier 
identified as tlie two emphases tliat create tension in the development of the school’s 
doctrine, that of realising “no mind” and tliat o f purifying the mind.
To return to the Trimsika verse. 22:
As long as this absolutely accomplished nature 
Is not seen,
That otlier-dependent nature, too.
Is not seen.™
Wliich is to say, without the perspective of the ultimate vantage point, one does not see 
the dependent nature as it is, in its suchness, i.e. as a mind which engages in constructing 
imaginary cognitive structures. Only die perspective from the absolutely accomplished 
nature can make it clear. And verse 25 clarifies how the absolutely accomplished nature 
“sees”:
That from which all elements have dieir ultimate reality,
[Is die third naturelessness,]
It is also called suchness,^^^
Suchness, tathatd, is that direct knowledge of reality in its imaginary and other forms 
which signifies an awalœning. As Lusdiaus asserts:
... tadiatâ does not so much involve the eradication of delusion as such, 
as much as it involves seeing delusion as delusion .., Wlien a delusion is 
recognized as a delusion, in an important sense it no longer functions as a 
delusion. Instead its delusive power is neutralized and it is understood 
simply as a phenomenon. A phenomenon, however, is understood by the
■■■'54
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Buddhist as a complex web of conditionality. Thus, properly understood, 
tathatâ is synonymous witli pratîtya-samutpâda, i.e., conditionality.^^^
So, although tlie epistemological edge of Yogâcâra is evident and forcefully argued by 
both Kochumuttom and Lusthaus, still there is the insistence that what is meant by direct 
knowledge fniwlkalpa jmnâ), or “seeing tilings for what they are/becoming” tathatâ or 
jathà-bhütam, as Lusthaus admits above, cannot be extricated from experience. Again, the 
Tnmsika verse 27-8:
One does not abide in the realization 
O f mere representations of consciousness 
Just on account of the [theoretical] perception 
That all tliis is mere representation of consciousness,
If one places [=sees] something before oneself.
One does abide in the realization 
O f mere [representation of] consciousness 
Wlien one does not perceive also a supporting consciousness,
For, the graspable objects being absent, A
There cannot either be the grasping o f that,
[Namely, the grasping of the supporting consciousness].™
In short, tlieory does not give release. Only die true experience of the accomplished 
nature, in which one is released from the activity of grasping, can account for direct 
knowledge. Thus, even diough the Yogâcâra school has certainly developed and 
established an intricate dieory of cognition, this is not to supplant experience and praxis.
Meditation
Widi regard to the importance o f meditation within the context o f teaching, Asanga 
states unequivocally that the person striving to “dwell in the teachings” cannot rely on 
the teachings alone but must engage in meditation and diat, vice-versa, engaging in 
meditation is not sufficient in itself but must be coupled widi listening and reflecting on 
die teachings for its full value.^^* Asanga makes it clear that the systematic teaching of 
the Yogâcâra school is not meant to stand in the place of Buddhist practice, but rather A*
that both aspects of theory and praxis are complementary and indeed co-dependent on
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each other For full value, to move intellectual understanding toward the “profound
■"Ameaning of the teaching,” knowledge toward penetrating insight. A
' - IAsanga, in The Summary of the Great Vehicle, investigates how meditation moves the
bodhisattva forward in attaining the stages of perfection which allow for spiritual
maturing. There is a point at which the bodhisattva is ready to “once again become
aware of conscious construction only” which Asanga describes as the moment A
meditation and the teaching fuse to achieve the same end:
Through a transcendent wisdom of quietude and insight focused on the I
all-pervading doctrine and tlirough a wisdom characterized by a variety of ■.I
images and conscious constructs attained subsequent to non-imaginative 
wisdom [nirvikalpa jnana], he eradicates all the causal seeds in his 
fundamental container consciousness and nurtures all die seeds that 
enable one to contact the Dharma body. He converts his support and 
comes to attain the true qualities of all Tathagatas, and he attains the 
wisdom of omniscience. This is why he [again] becomes aware of 
conscious construction only.
Seeing magical illusions in all the constructs that arise from tlie container 
consciousness and all die images of diose imagined constructs, diat 
wisdom attained subsequently to non-imaginative wisdom is 
fundamentally exempt from error. Just as a magician is himself 
undeceived by his magic tricks, so the bodhisattva, when enunciating the 
padi of cause and result, always remains free from error in all his 
descriptions.^^^
Thus, Asanga explains the bodhisattva’s ability, dirough the merging of perfect 
meditation and doctrine and die subsequent transformation that occurs to the 
bodhisattva, to remain and occupy die “space” of mind-only, yet not be deceived by die 
illusionary reality of mind-only.
Asanga further expands his discourse on the bodhisattva’s meditation practice by 
asserting tiiat once the bodhisattva has achieved a concentration diat “bring[s] to 
presence the truth not mediated dirough language” and further “intensifies his meditative 
practices in order to bring about an attainment of the three Buddha bodies”,^ '*^  diat
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meditation is more than a means to an end. Asanga quotes from the Treatise on Meditating 
on Conscious Construction-.
In states of quiescence the bodhisattva 
Understands that images exist only in his mind.
And, abandoning externalized ideas of objects,
He assuredly understands them to be only his own thoughts.
Abiding witliin himself, the bodhisattva 
Understands that tlie objective realm does not exist.
And also that tlie subjective realm is empty.
He then directly experiences the unobtainability of both.™
This can be read as an abbreviated description o f how the Yogâcâra path internalises the 
Abhidharma concern witli dharma elements to describe tlie working of the psyche, 
clarifies die Madhyamika emptiness, and maintains the experiential component of 
awakening, for widiout this last practical aspect the bodhisattva cannot pursue the 
compassionate work of instructing and freeing otiiers.
Furthermore, this passage highlights the similarity Yogâcâra thought has with 
Nâgârjuna’s two-trudis whereby emptiness renders both realms of sanisara and nirvana 
relative and reverses any action of transcendence. Here, the Yogâcâra practitioner 
internalises the argument so that neidier die subjective ego realm nor an objective 
external realm o f dharma activity can claim transcendence. The non-duality described by 
the Yogâcâra text is not die opposite o f duality but rather “neither-nor” which is how the 
super-mundane is commonly described by language which always falls short. King 
maintains that
For die Yogâcâra school the doctrine of emptiness (sünyatâ) is ‘re­
located’ into a phenomenological and meditative context. To realise that 
everydiing is empty is to understand diat the entirety of one’s experience 
is devoid of subject (grâhalta, ‘one who grasps’) and an object (grâhya, 
‘that which is grasped’). This does not mean that there is nodiing at all 
but rather to clarify precisely what is real and in what sense it is so.™
2®4 Asaiiga, The Summary of the Great Vehide, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartha (Taisho, Volume 31, 
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Clearly the Yogâcâra doctrine is not intended to substitute the Abhidharma material 
dharmas for the psychologised and internalised substrata of the mind, or àlaya, yet tlie 
parallels in systematic development are obvious. Anacker points out the tension in 
Vasubhandhu whom he sees as both asserting “nothing” along witli the Madhaymaka 
sûnyavàda and at the same time prescribing a “therapeutic course of action (acard) rooted 
in meditation This tension is not confined to Vasubhandhu’s treatises, but is
also evident in Asanga, as has been shown in the texts above. And the tension is not
2®® King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu andBuddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 
1999, p. 98
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King also identifies in the Yogacara path the reality that “We are only truly aware o f our f
own perceptions, not sure of anything external; all we can depend on is our
•y-
debilitating to the Yogâcâra argument but in fact integral to it in that sünyatâ and 
meditation therapy come together to define the individual liberation experience. Thus, 
Yogâcâra asserts criticism both on tlie Abhidharma pre-occupation witli the material 
realm which is not how it appears, and on Madhyamika sünyatâ for not recognising how 
sünyatâ redefines individual experience, actualising it so that the Dharma can properly be 
worked out.
Lusthaus’ summary of the Yogacara position is useful to these concluding remarks:
The mind doesn’t create tlie physical world, but it produces the 
interpretative categories through which we know and classify the physical 
world, and it does this so seamlessly tliat we mistake our interpretations 
for the world itself. Those interpretations, which are projections of our 
desires and anxieties, become obstructions (âvarand) preventing us from 
seeing what is actually the case. In simple terms we are blinded by our 
own self-interests, our own prejudices (which means what is already 
prejudged), our desires. Unenlightened cognition is an appropriative act. 
Yogâcâra does not speak about subjects and objects; instead it analyzes 
perception in terms o f graspers (grâhakà) and what is grasped (grâhyd).
Consciousness projects and constructs a cognitive object in such a way 
that it disowns its own creation — pretending tlie object is “out tliere” — in 
order to render tliat object capable of being appropriated ... That self- 
deception folded into the very act of cognition is what Yogâcârins term 
ahhüta-parikalpa. Realization of vijnâpti-mâtra exposes this trick intrinsic to 
consciousness’s workings, catching it in the act, so to speak, thereby
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eliminating it. Wlien that deception is removed one's mode of cognition 
is no longer termed vymna (consciousness); it has become direct 
cognition
One might say, then, tliat tlie activity generating experience is as much in question for 
Yogacara Buddhism as the epistemological foundation o f reality. “Seeing” things 
correctly is better defined witliin an experiential field, at least for Mahâyâna Buddhism 
which in its different forms is always concerned witli how tlie bodhisattva teaches or 
otlierwise relates to the unenlightened. As explored in the previous chapter, Nâgârjuna 
implemented a deconstructive four-fold negation, paralleling an ampya-jmna progression 
o f meditation, in order to lead the practitioner out o f the realms of limitation, field by 
field, until tliere is nodung left by which to define and characterise experience; his 
method has completely transformed traditional Buddhist activities and teaching. 
According to his own assertions, the Four Noble Trudis and entirety of die Buddha’s 
teaching can only be implemented and acted upon in light of mnyatâ. Similar in motive, 
yet differently oriented, is die Yogacara endeavour to uncover die working of die mind, 
layer by layer, until there is “no mind diat knows”, which is to say, an utterly transformed 
mind which does not create its own objects for consumption. Nâgârjuna attempts to 
recover samsaric activity dirough a mystical apophatic approach whereas the Yogâcâra 
school is prepared to be much more descriptive in their approach.
Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Vhenomenolog^ : A  Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei- 
shih lun^  Routledge Curzoii, 2002, p. 538
Chapter 3.
Dôgen’s Datsuraku-datsuraku
Mastering the Way in sitting meditation is awakening the mind for 
enlightenment. Awakening the mind is not one or different, sitting 
meditation is not one or different ..
Dogen talces the physical activity of seated meditation and applies tliis practice to the 
metaphysical speculation of the mind. The body-mind/mind-body unit is bound 
together for Dogen and is tlie ego-self that must be put aside before true practice is 
possible. As will be examined in this chapter, Dogen is not satisfied to merely transcend 
the ego-self, rather tlie more profound movement is a ‘trans-descendence’ to the simple 
practice in the here and now that lacks all vestiges of self and ego.
As an exemplar of praxi-centric phenomenology, Dogen introduces, out of the historical 
discussions and teachings of twelfth century China and Japan, a unique interpretation of 
the issue of hongaku (original awakening) which he expresses as 'original realisation and 
wondrous practice’ {bonshd mjdshu) or as tlie 'unity of practice and realisation’ {shusho itto). 
In order to denote a dynamic non-dual rendering of praxis and tlieory, Dogen offers a 
renewed presentation o f die concept o f Buddha-nature (bussho) whereby being-time {ujt) 
is integral in expressing, instead of transcendence, the direction o f trans-descendence. 
For Dogen, trans-descendence recalls Buddha-nature that is expressed mutually with a 
personal manifestation of no-self through a particularly phenomenological approach to 
awakening (expressed stylistically datsuraku-datsurakip. His contribution to die 
development of Buddhist thought and practice has been recentiy recovered by the 20* 
century philosophers o f the “Kyoto Scliool”^^ " and since that time he has gained an ever- 
widening audience inclusive of Buddhist practitioners and philosophers East and West 
alike. Modern philosophical scholarship has noted his discussions surrounding being­
time igtji), ceaseless practice total dynamism iyenki), total exertion igûjiiî) and
compared these discussions with Western existential and phenomenological thinkers, 
including Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. However, it must be noted that Dogen 
wrote and taught for the express purpose of making clear the Buddha patii for others so
2*’^  Cleary, Thomas, Rational Zen: The Mind of Dogen Zenji, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1992, p. 100 
™ namely, W a t SUJI Tetsuro, N ish IDA Kitaro, T a n a b e  Hajime, N ishitANI Keiji, PCaraki Junzo, lENAGA 
Saburo, T a m a k i Kôshirô, HiSAMATSU Shin’ichi, and A b e  Masao, see Editor’s Introduction to A b e ,
Masao, A  Study of Dogen, ed. Steven Heine, Albany: State Umversity o f New York Press, 1992, p. 1-3
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that his soteriological intentions should not be lightly separated from what may be 
termed his “philosophy.” Dogen is clear about his reasons for writing, as he records in 
one of his first essays, the BendOwa (Discourse on Practice):
I decided to compile a record of tlie customs and standards that I 
experienced first-hand in the Zen monasteries of the great Kingdom of 
Sung togetlier with a record of profound instruction from a [good] 
counselor which I have received and maintained. I will leave this record 
to people who learn in practice and are easy in the truth, so that they can 
know the right Dharma of tlie Buddha’s lineage.^^^
This testimony, which occurs early on in Dôgen’s prolific writing career, emphasises 
anodier aspect to Dôgen’s teaching in addition to his penetrating philosophical essays 
and religious instruction, that is the personal and autobiographical nature o f Dôgen’s 
teaching which works to break down tlie systematic development of dogma and enforces 
tlie phenomenological aspect of Dôgen’s presentation of reality and one’s participation in 
that reality.
Development of Buddha-nature (Jp. Bussho)
To prepare for the way in which Dôgen treats Buddha-nature, it is helpful to trace the 
development and history of this term and its relation to the concept of dharmakdya. As 
discussed in the Nâgârjuna chapter, Dharma, literally represented by the Chinese character 
for “law,” is a Sanskrit word witli a variety o f nuanced meanings tliat may best be 
understood in context. The “myriad dharmad' often indicate physical and mental 
phenomena, die multiplicity o f things in the world.^^^ However, from the earliest 
Buddhist texts, dharma also indicates the teaching of the Buddha himself, the “eternal 
trudi.” Later Mahâyâna developments, in particular, die treatment of the Buddha’s 
Dharma in the Prajnâpâramïtà literature, is taken to mean 'die way things are’ in their own 
nature (tathata or dharmatd) and it is referred to as the dharmakdya or the body of his truth, 
his teaching, and not in a personal sense at all. The Buddha himself is no longer with the 
community, but his teachings, the dharmakdya, are what sustain the community. As 
discussed briefly in die Nâgârjuna chapter, die Prajndpdramitd literature strongly 
emphasised diat ultimate reality or the nature of things was in fact empty (smyd). 
Williams notes that as the
Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogent(p: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, 
Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 3
The ‘myriad dharmas’ can also indicate the teachings o f  tlie myriad Buddhas and bodhisattvas in the 
Maliâyâna structure o f the Buddha realms.
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... dharmakâya was taken to equal die essential ultimates (dharmas) which, 
possessed to a full degree, make up the Buddha’s realization, in die 
Perfection of Wisdom literature die dharmakdya comes to refer not only to the 
Doctrine which sets forth the true nature of things, but also the the 
realization and the true nature of diings itself.
In diis way, a shift occurs away from understanding the Dharma stricdy in terms of the 
teaching of the Buddha, his “Doctrine,” to die notion of the all encompassing nature of 
the Buddha’s Dharma vrhich is called the dharmakdya. Direcdy corresponding to diis shift 
is the development of the diree bodies of Buddha. Through Nâgârjuna, there is accepted 
a two-body system, the Buddha’s historical body and die eternal truth of his teaching. 
However, widi the development o f die Yogâcâra, a diree-body system is introduced that 
corresponds widi the tri-partite aspect of selfnature (trisvabhdvd). The dharmakdya (or 
svdbhdvikakdyà) as described in Asanga’s Mahdydnasamgraha is the “purified Thusness or 
Suchness,” the “true nature of things taken as a body (10:1)”^^  ^ and is the basis for the 
odier bodies because it has undergone die “revolution of the basis” and is thus “pure 
revealed.’’^ '^^  Important for understanding Dôgen’s Buddha-nature in diis development 
of dharmakdya is to note a gradual move toward a cosmic understanding of Buddha 
reality, one in which Buddha’s teaching infuses all of reality, and the sigiificance that the 
dharmakdya is interpreted dirough sttnyata.
Another teaching introduced in Mahâyâna scriptures is diat of tathdgatagarbba or die 
“womb of die Perfected One” (or “womb of Buddhahood” ’^ )^ which, according to the 
Dankdvatdra Sutra, functions in the same fashion as the storehouse-conciousness {dlaya- 
vijndnd), storing the “seeds” of previous actions and dioughts.^^® The Tathdgatagarbba 
Sutra claims diat “all the living beings, diougli they are among die defilements of hatred.
273 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinaTFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.
173
274 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalToundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 'i {
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276 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctfinaiFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.
176. The other two bodies are the Sâmbhogikakâya or the Body o f Complete Enjoyment, a physical body 
(rüpakâyd) and impermanent, it is considered by the Mahâyânists to be the “actual Buddha in his 
supramundane form”276 the Transformation Bodies or Nairmànikakâya^^hich. occur throughout 
history, such as the historical figure o f Siddhartha Gautama, and work as “a mere image manifesting 
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277 Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The JemlNet of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, p. 36
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anger and ignorance, have the Buddha’s wisdom, Buddha’s eye, Buddha’s Body sitting
firmly in the form of meditation” that they “are possessed of the Matrix of the Tathâgata y
\tathâgatagarbhà\, endowed with virtues, always pure Additionally, the Mahâyâna
Mahàparlnirvafia Sûtra teaches that enlightenment is a universal reality and that there is the
.presence o f the tathagatagarhha, eventual Buddhahood, in even the unforgivably wicked 
people {iccbàntikas), a concept not accepted in previous Buddhist teaching,^®® In the 
Srîmàlâdmsimhanàda Sûtra, the tathagatagarhha is equated with dharmakdya, as the 
unenlightened, “defiled” mode o f the “permanent, steadfast, calm, eternal” Dharma- if
body: “The Dharmakâya o f the Tathâgata when not free from the store of defilement is 
referred to as the Tathâgatagarbha.” ®^^ Altliough most of tliese scriptures also assert tliat 
the dharmakdya must be understood in terms o f hlnyata, this assertion loses effectiveness 
in the context o f teachings that strongly suggest permanence as either Mind Y
(consciousness) or even some ontological realm of Self Williams notes of the A
Mahdparinirvana Sutra that although the Buddha teaches no-self, in a manner of speaking 
this teaching may as well be stated: the very Buddha-nature is Self/®  ^ This teaching is not 
intended to exhibit the unreliability o f language, as did certain Madhyamika teaching; f
rather, it is bent on portraying the indisputable reality of Buddha-nature which can be f
'b'spoken of negatively or positively. y
The foregoing scriptures teaching dharmakdya and tathdgatagarbba doctrine were part of y;
.the basis for the Chinese schools of Buddhism, finally by the T ’ang Dynasty flourishing 
sufficiently separate from Taoism (although certainly influenced by Taoist thinking as to 
be a thoroughly Chinese interpretation of Buddhism.^®® The Hua-yen School (Flower 
Ornament School) takes its name from the Flower Ornament Scripture, the Mvatamsaka 
Sutra and its systemetiser, tlie tliird patriarch of Hua-yen, Fa-tsang’s writings are 
influenced by both the Avatamjaka as well as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahdydna (Ta-
—  ------Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p.
Y
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cVmg cFi hsin As Cook notes, Hua-yen thought sought to “syncretise various
Buddhist doctrines, primarily those o f emptiness and tathagatagarhha^ such tliat in the 
cosmic understanding of reality, “[t]here is notliing mean or inferior, or anytliing to be 
despised in die whole of existence, when it is properly seen apart from self-interest.” ®^^
Ill fact. Cook claims diat ultimately, the Hua-yen philosophical system is “an elaborate 
reworking of die Indian concept of emptiness” through the understanding o f a 
“conditional interdependence” of all phenomena.^®^ The famous example of the Hua- 
yen understanding o f die interdependent and “mutually causative” ®^^ nature o f reality is 
the Jewel N et o f Indra, in which a great net of infinite dimensions is studded with an 
infinite number of jewels that are positioned such diat they reflect each other perfectly ad 
infinitum. Thus, the one jewel holds the entirety o f die whole net in its face, and the 
whole net dependent upon die one jewel. That the Hua-yen school called itself die 
“school of the “interdependent origination of die universe” (dharma-dhatu
pratîtyasamutpâdàfi^^^ is furdier evidence o f their concern. The understanding of the
' ftathagatagarhha doctrine (synonomous widi dharmakâya as discussed above) diat equates 
phenomenal and noumenal reality as portrayed in die Awakening of Faith, is seen by Fa- 
tsang through “mutual identity” and “interdependence” as the equating of phenomenon
fwith phenomenon. In this way, Buddha-nature is expanded from the One Mind as #f
consciousness only, to a cosmic Mind idharmadhâtiî) such that nothing in the vast 
universe is without Buddha-nature, including “ants, grass, and dirt.” ®^^
A prolific writer, Dôgen’s collection of writings entitled the Shobogetityp is his seminal 
teaching studied and revered by bodi religious practitioners as well as philosophers. The 
Shôbügent^ d has die distinction of being die first significant writing composed in Japanese 
during an era in which scholarly work was written solely in Chinese. Dôgen also 
composed poetry, and compiled in the Shinji-shôbôgent^ , a stylistic collection of koan
28'^  Cook notes that the Awakening o f Faith scripture, although claimed to be written by Asvaghosa, is most 
likely a Chinese document, in Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park 
and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 51
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State University Press, p. 55
285 Cook, Francis FI, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, p. 30-1
287 Cook, Francis FI., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania I
State University Press, p.2
28® Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, p. 30
285 Cook, Francis FL, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, p. 52-3
250 Tsujimura, Kôichi, as cited in Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, Vol. 2: Japan, trans. James 
Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 74
251 Dôgen, Master Dogen’s Shobogen:yp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, 
Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 5
252 Dôgen, Master Dogen’s Shobogenyp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, 
Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p, 6
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composed in Chinese. The term Shobogen^p is composed of four Chinese characters.
Truth-Law-Eye-Treasure, and is commonly translated as “the treasury o f the true dharma 
eye.” However, Dumoulin points out tliat a meaningful translation is difficult to 
ascertain and he cites Wilhelm Gundert, who indicates that these characters point to “all 
the precious things that fill the eye which beholds the real, true law [Dharma] of 
Buddha.” It has already been noted that dharmajDharma can be used to convey both the S
mundane, i.e. aspects o f phenomena, as well as the supramundane, i.e. the teachings o f |
the Buddha(s). Dôgen allows for tlie word-play to express the ambiguity exhibited 
between these “categories”. ’Bndàh.^.-Dharma is reality and ‘the way things are’ manifested 
in the Universe in the myriad forms or dharmas. Thus, according to Tsujimura Kôichi,
Shobôgentyô can be rendered “the eye o f the authentic law (subjective and objective 
genitive) tliat contains in its vision the all — that is, everything in the entire world.”^^®
Tsujimura’s translation recognises the possibility of word-play that Dôgen may have had 
in mind: the Dharma as manifested through the myriad dharmas. Echoing the Hua-yen 
school, Dôgen says in tlie Bendom,
... everything in tlie Universe in ten directions — soil, earth, grass, and 
trees; fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles -  performs the Buddha’s work.^ ®^
And further.
The grass, trees, soil, and earth ... all radiate great brightness, and their 
preaching of the deep and fine Dharma is witliout end.^^^
In other words, to separate the world of objects, the world of multiplicity, as delusion 
from an ideal Buddha reality is to misunderstand Buddha Dharma. This attitude towards 
everyday existence is one repeated tlirough the history of Zen anecdotes and koan. 
Barrett records this familiar Zen saying:
Before you have studied Zen, mountains are mountains and rivers are 
rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no longer mountains and
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rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have had Enlightenment, 
mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers
Also brought to bear in this title is the occurrence of die “eye” which sees the Dharma 
made manifest through myriad dharmas, A  human eye has limited vision, in scope and 
deptii, but die Buddha eye sees perfecdy and renders reality transparent to the truth. As 
will become apparent, Dôgen emphasises a praxi-centric phenomenological approach to 
enlightenment and his inclusion of the image of an eye serves to reinforce the 
existentiality o f this approach. He was not, of course, the first to utilise the image, 
however, it factors into die tide of his ma^mm opus appropriately. Finally, the etymology 
of the term Dharma also carries die meaning o f method or practice.^ '^  ^ Again in the 
Bendmva, Dôgen describes the Buddha’s Dharma as die transmission of die “right- 
Dharma-eye treasury” according to the “supreme and great method” — that is, die 
method of Therefore, Dôgen’s writings in the Shobdgentyp are his efforts to reveal
the treasury such that one may dynamically see die Buddha-Dharma made manifest 
throughout the myriad dharmas by means o f skilful praxis, t^ atyen.
Original Awakening {hongaku) thought in Tendai
Born in 1200 during die Kamalcura era in Japan, Dôgen began his Buddhist training as a 
young acolyte o f the Tendai Buddhist order on Mt. Hiei and upon his ordination as a 
monk was given the name “Dôgen” (Foundation of the Way).^ *^^  Scholarship 
surrounding medieval Japanese Buddhism and the remarkable development o f Kamakura 
era schools diat have survived and flourished to diis modern day have generated a 
number o f theories regarding die intellectual and religious environment of that period. It 
is certainly remarkable that from the training ground of Mt. Fliei’s Tendai sect came die 
influential religious leaders Eisai, Hônen, Shinran, Dôgen and Nichiren and speculation 
both sectarian and non-sectarian agree that a strong catalyst creating the divergence of
253 Barrett, WiUiam, “Zen for the West,” in Zm Buddhism: Selected Writings of D,T. Su:piki, edited by William 
Barrett, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xvi-xvii
25-^  NISHIJIMA and Cross reference the Sanskrit-English Dictionary (arranged by Sir Monier-Williams, Oxford: 
Oxford Press, 1899) in Master Dogen’s Shobogen:yp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo 
Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 329
255 Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogentrp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NiSHljiMA and Chodo Cross, 
Woking, Surrey: WindbeU Publications, 1994, p. 12
256 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A  History, V ol 2: Japan, translated by James Heisig and Paul Knitter, 
New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 52
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views and eventual schools of tliese monks was tlie issue of hongaku t h o u g h t . Hongaku 
or “original enlightenment” thought has its primary origins of influence in the Awakming 
of Faith in the Mahâyâna treatise and the Mahâyânamahâpariniwa'tia Sutra, in which the âlaya- 
vijnana consciousness of the Yogâcâra school is redefined to fit within the concept of 
tathâgatagarhha (the seed or womb of Buddha nature) so that conventional and ultimate 
truth are found to have the same ontologically grounded place in the pure mind.^ ^® As 
noted, the Chinese Hua-yen school adopted tlie Awakening of Faith treatise along side the 
Flower Ornament Sûtra as basic texts. Developing parallel to the Hua-yen school was the 
Chinese T ’ien-T’ai sect which is established in Japan as the Tendai sect by Saicho (767- 
8 2 2 ) In Japan, hongaku thought is developed in terms of Tendai’s recognition of the 
primacy of tlie Saddharmapunàanka Sûtra or Hotus Sûtra which subsumes all previous 
vehicles under the over-arching superiority of the Fotus Sutra, the understanding that 
perfect bodhisattva precepts are an “expression of innate Buddhahood and also the 
direct cause for its realisation,”®®® and tlie establishment of esoteric ritual which effected 
both “spiritual liberation” as well as “practical, worldly ends” (such as good harvests, 
healings etc) and thus reflected tlie monistic non-duality of ultimate and mundane 
t r u t h . F o l l o w i n g  Saicho’s establishment o f the Tendai doctrinal direction, Jacqueline 
Stone identifies five noteworthy developments instigated by his disciples and further 
shaping the sect in which Dôgen would eventually begin his training. These 
developments are 1) amalgamating esoteric teaching with the Fotus Sûtra, which contains 
no such overt teachings, witli tlie result that the lj)tus became recognised as tlie “one 
great perfect teaching” transcending both time and space; 2) redefining the historical 
Buddha within an esoteric reading of the H)tus so that tlie historical Buddha becomes a 
timeless, cosmic Buddha who preaches continuously throughout time and space; 3) tlie 
“valorising” of the phenomenal world in which all being both sentient and non-sentient 
is imbued witli Buddha-nature, hence all form participates in tlie same ontological reality 
which is Buddhahood; 4) the shortening o f the length of time in which one might attain
257 see Stone, Jacqueline L, Original Endghtenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, 
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University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 18
301 Stone, Jacqueline I., Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: 
University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 20
107
Buddhahood from the aeons described in earlier doctrine to the possibility of attainment 
in a moment by eitlier monk or common layperson; 5) tlie introduction o f the Pure Land 
nembutsu practice of “constantly walking samadhi” as a ritual institution on M t Hiei.®®^
Dogen’s koan
This background concerning the question o f “original enlightenment” helps establish a 
portion of tlie religious and intellectual environment tliat Dôgen stepped into as a young 
monk training on Mt. Hiei. Biographical sources record that Dôgen eventually 
confronted the issue o f hongaku with the zeal of attempting to bring what seemed to be 
contradiction within tlie teaching to existential reconciliation. Dôgen confronted the 
problem personally, by travelling to China for more input into the teachings. This move 
to resolve a matter o f theory existentially establishes early Dôgen’s inclination toward Aj
experiential learning, and paves the way for the development o f his praxi-centric 
phenomenological approach.
According to the biography Kent^eiki, recorded by his disciple after Dôgen’s death, Dogen 
left Mt. Hiei consumed by “great doubt,” dissatisfied tliat no teacher could explain how 
original enlightenment could be reconciled with the practices pursued by the 
bodhisattva.®®® Altliough Dôgen’s own writings do not mention his “great doubt” as the 
reason for leaving Mt. Hiei, and some modern scholars credit this reading to sectarian 
interests in creating a break between medieval Tendai original awakening thought and the 
new Kamakura era Buddhist thought,®®'  ^he did express the contradiction himself early in 
his career, shortly after returning from China, in lAcVukant^t^ngi {General Teachings for the 
Promotion ofXat^ti):
The Way is basically perfect and all-prevading. How could it be 
contingent upon practice and realization? The Dharma vehicle is free and 
untrammelled. What need is tliere for man’s [sic] concentrated effort?®®®
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Further, that tlie question o f enlightenment and practice become such an integral theme 
in Dogen’s life-long writings should clearly indicate tliat reconciling the issue of original 
enlightenment (hongaku) with tlie alternative Mahâyâna path of acquired awakening 
(shikaku) was core to his own enlightenment experience and crucial to tlie development 
o f his teaching.
Dôgen’s struggle over die issue of hongaku and die simultaneous need for practice, and 
the way the quesdon played into his own enlightenment experience has been aptly called 
by Joan Stambaugh, his koan. As Dôgen was to become idendfied as die founder o f the 
Sôto sect of Zen Buddhism in Japan which emphasises the practice of (seated
meditation) in contrast to the Rinzai sect of Zen which utilises koan practice as a primary 
niediod o f inspiring enlightenment, it is not perhaps an obvious association; however, it 
is surprisingly appropriate. Dôgen himself compiled a collection o f koan. Understood 
primarily as an enlightenment device, a koan is an enigmatic story or saying diat a teacher 
gives a monk in training to ponder and meditate over until the monk discovers the key, 
unlocks the mystery and gains an enlightenment experience (satori). However, considered 
only widiin diese parameters, koan practice becomes formulaic and restrictive, causing 
enlightenment to take on a linear, goal-driven manner which all but undermines the 
enlightenment. Shim ano  Eido defines koan as “the time and place where Trudi is 
manifest” which suggests a dynamic aspect to the koan and further, diat there is an 
experiential expectation, SHIMANO asserts that “every place, every day, every event, every 
thought, every deed, and every person is a koan. In that sense, koans are neither obscure 
nor enigmatic.”®®® Thich Nhat Haiili also emphasises the inseparability between the 
personal and practical nature o f koan as he states:
In Zen, practitioners use kung-an jkôan] as subjects for meditation until 
their mind come to awakening. There is a big difference between a kung- 
an and a madi problem - the solution of the madi problem is included in 
the problem itself, while die response to the kung-an lies in the life of the 
practitioner. The kung-an is a useful instrument in the work of 
awakening, just as a pick is a useful instrument in working on the ground. 
Wliat is accomplished from working on the ground depends on the 
person doing the work and not just on the pick. The kung-an is not an 
enigma to resolve; this is why we cannot say that it is a theme or subject 
o f meditation.®®’
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Dôgen’s koan consists o f his efforts to reconcile what he had learned from his Tendai 
Buddhist teachers at Mt. Hiei, that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and yet that 
the monks must engage in and recite the scriptures. Dôgen is caught in tlie
classical argument which had split school from school in China and eventually would do 
so in Japan, the opposition between tlie doctrine of original awakening (2#:#, hongakiJ)
and that of acquired awakening shikakuf^^. In philosophical terms, as Abe points
out, Dôgen is caught in a dualistic-minded struggle to idealise Buddha-nature by 
subscribing to either the doctrine of original awakening or that o f acquired awakening, 
thereby making one primordial and subjecting the other to it. Indeed, by subscribing to 
either the doctrine o f original awakening or acquired awakening, one understands 
Buddha-nature “as a reality arising directly beyond time and space, something with a real 
existence independent of all practice.”®®® From tlie perspective o f “original 
enlightenment” alone, one possesses an innate Buddha-nature which is more valuable 
tlian any scripture or practice merely pointing toward Buddha-nature. Considered thus, 
the question o f practice becomes moot, it is out-weighted by tlie essential and/or 
ontological reality of Buddha-nature. From the perspective of acquired awakening, one 
dedicates oneself to arduous practice and study with the hopes of obtaining or partaking 
in Buddha-nature. In this case, Buddha-nature is dualistically separated from the 
practitioner as an idealised “other” reality to be obtained through effort and human 
activity. Both views, argues Abe, “abstract equally in taking as an object the Reality of 
the Buddha-nature or awakening, which is fundamentally unobjectifiable and cannot be 
idealized.”®^® Possessing an innate Buddha-nature or striving to achieve or realise 
Buddha-nature are views which equally idealise as ontological or essential tlie Buddha 
reality.
Dôgen’s great awakening (daigo)
Dôgen’s “great awakening” (daigo) came during a meditation session and is recorded in 
tlie Meishu version (1538) of tlie biography, the Kem^eiki, as follows:
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... Ju“ching chided the monk sitting next to Dogen, who had fallen asleep during a 
prolonged and intensive meditation session, “To study Zen is to cast off body- 
mind. Why are you engaged in single-minded seated slumber rather than A
single-minded seated meditation Upon hearing this reprimand, Dôgen
attained a “great awakening” {daigâ) from his previous doubts concerning tlie 
relation between meditation [or practice] and enlightenment. He later entered Ju- 
ching’s quarters and burned incense, reporting, “I have come because body-mind 
is cast off.” Ju-ching responded approvingly, “Body-mind is cast off [shinjin 
datsurakti)', cast off body-mind idatsuraku shifjiit)f Wlien Dôgen cautioned, “Do 
not grant the Seal [of transmission] indiscriminately,” Ju-ching replied, “Cast off 
casting o ff ’ [datsuraku dasurakd)W^^
Heine points out tliat tliis version of Dôgen’s enlightenment dialogue is supported also 
by tlie account in the early 14* century biographical material, the Eiheiji sanso gyogo-ki.
However, the latest version of the IQnt^iki (the Menzan text of 1738) ends Dôgen’s 
enlightenment dialogue witli the phrase, “cast off body-mind” instead of tlie tautological 
“cast off casting o ff’ of tlie earlier manuscript.®^® As will become apparent, however, tlie 
climax of the instruction, datsuraku datsuraku, poignantly locates tlie enlightened “self’ 
witliin Buddhist emptiness [sUnyatd), effectively resolving the hongaku — shikaku impasse 
dirough a trans-descendence which redefines the nature of practice. The English term 
“trans-descendence” was used by Takeuchi Yoshinori to describe N iSHIDA Kitarô’s 
concept o f “immanent transcendence,”®^® however, it is clear diat Dôgen exhibits an even 
deeper understanding of diis concept when he introduces his datsuraku datsuraku. As 
exhibited below, Dôgen works dirough the transcendent activity of abandoning one’s 
ego-self and circles back to reclaim the mundane through the very event of 
enlightenment; this movement is a trans-descendence.
Dôgen’s enlightenment story begins widi die tension between the mundane activity of 
slumber iya) juxtaposed with die activity o f enlightenment iyatyeiî). And the master’s 
question, why would one prefer to engage in slumber when one could be participating in 
the activity o f the Buddha’s, recalls Dôgen’s first encounter of the “Way” upon arriving 
in China. Dôgen had recentiy arrived in Ming-chou and met a monk from Mt. A-yu-
I l l  A
wang monastery in charge of making meals. Dôgen, restricted to tlie boat for 
immigration reasons, wanted to continue his discussion witli tliis monk whom he found 
compelling. Dumoulin describes the encounter thus:
Dôgen implored tlie worthy monk to stay aboard a while but he declined 
because he had to return to his work in the monastery. Wlien Dôgen 
asked what was so pressing about his work, tlie monk explained that 
kitchen work was his form of Zen practice. Surprised, Dôgen inquired 
why in his advanced years he did not prefer to devote himself to 
meditation and kôan practice. At tliat die old monk laughed out loud.
“My good fellow from a foreign land,” he said, “you do not yet know 
what practice (Chin., pan-tao\ Jpn., bendo) means, nor do you yet 
understand words and scriptures (Chin., m o n jf Abruptly
bidding good-bye he vanished into die dusk. Later diat year, Dôgen was 
to meet die cook a second time ... Taldng up where they had left off,
Dôgen asked him what he meant by “practice” and “words and 
scriptures.” The monk replied, “Words and scriptures are: one, two, 
three, four, five. Practice means: nothing in the universe is hidden.”®"
The tension diat is introduced into the setting of Dôgen’s enlightenment account 
between the obviously disparate realities o f sleep and meditation echoes die profound 
encounter Dôgen had widi this enlightened monk in diat die transformation of the 
activity of just cooking to Zen practice has less to do with the apparent activity itself and 
much more to do with die personal experience out of which it flows. In diis regard, until 
Dôgen is able to actively realise what Buddha-nature is, his has all the efficacy of 
mere
Wliile overhearing Ju-Ching admonish die sleeping monk, Dôgen himself experienced a 
great awakening which he shared to his master as “body-mind is cast o f f ’ {shinjin- 
datsuraku). One may interpret body-mind {shmjhïf^^ as die simplest description of the 
two aspects in Dôgen’s kôan. ‘Body’ is the temporal and transient form, a mere 
collection of skandha, in which one acts out religious practices such as reading the 
scriptures, engaging in koan practice, and meditation iyat^îî). ‘Mind,’ as discussed in die 
previous chapter, underwent a slow transformation from being merely another skandha to 
housing die seed-consciousness iâlaya-vÿnanà), a transformation which gave increasing 
importance to die mind as die source of Buddha-nature, or at least the potentiality for
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realising Buddha-nature. This trend of hongaku tliought inherited by the Tendai sect, as 
discussed above, eventually matured into the teaching of an innate Buddha-nature in 
every sentient, if not also insentient, being. Consequently, ‘mind’ in Dôgen’s shinjin can 
be understood as representing original enlightenment, the innate or all-pervasive Buddha- 
nature. Essentially, body-mind (shinjiii) refers to the “whole self’ in Dôgen’s 
terminology. Thus, the most appropriate way to read 'fh itjbT  is ‘body-mind,’ not ‘body 
and mind.’ The phrase body-mind (shinjifi) repeatedly occurs in Dôgen’s writings 
throughout his teaching career and clearly indicates his understanding tliat practice and 
enlightenment belong inseparably to the experience of the individual and that neitlier 
aspect can endure alone. Elsewhere he expresses the integrated relationship between 
body and mind witli the phrase shinjin ichinyo (oneness of body-mind). Consequently, by 
emphasising tliis inseparable relationship between mind-body/body-mind [shinjiii),
Dôgen brings his original problem o f original enlightenment [shin -  mind) and acquired 
enlightenment jin  — body) togetlier in order to finally shed tliem both. Thus, I disagree 
with Tamaki Kôshirô’s interpretation of Dôgen’s fascicle. Slutting the Way with the Body- 
mind iShinjingakudo), in which he suggests that because Dôgen places body before mind in 
the title, and discusses body after mind in the text, he is thereby “indicating that the body A'Iis rather more important than tlie mind.” On the contrary, Dôgen makes every effort 
to present the concepts of body and mind as inseparable before he asks searchers on the |
Way to shed the body-mind.
For Dôgen affirms to his teacher that he has “cast o ff’ idatsurakif) body-mind. Datsuraku 
is a great challenge to translators, for “cast o ff’ in English sounds like an action arising 
purely out of tlie will, which is unsuccessful in capturing the nuance of the term. Words 
such as “molt,” “drop off,” or “shed” have also been used to avoid the problem of tlie 
will®" and yet, according to Fleine, tliey still fall short of conveying both the active and 
passive subtleties o f the term: cast off body-mind, body-mind is cast off. Fleine proposes 
the alternative translation “letting cast o f f ’ ®" which comes close to the way Fleidegger 
uses the term Gelassenheit to describe the way Da-sein lets Being be. Literally “letting-
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ness” in English, Gelassenheit can be translated as “the ‘releasemenf o f the will to will as 
well as the will to not-wilL”®"
1I
Surprisingly, after affirming tlie inseparability of body-mind with the integration of tlie 
term shinjin, it is now suggested that this body-mind is cast-off {shinjin-datsurakih) in its 
entirety. As reflected in the Buddhist doctrine o f no-self {andtman), this “whole self” 
must be let go. “Letting go” is an encouragement to molt or drop away the “whole self’ 
which may enforce the duality that Abe identified as the idealising of Buddha-nature (A
either as a goal o f practice, or as the innate possession of all beings. According to 
Dogen’s suggestion o f shinjin-datsuraku, die true “gain” is not finding and asserting one’s 
whole-self, it is allowing the whole-self, die body-mind, to be let go.
However, Dogen’s enlightenment story takes a further step: “cast off casting o f f ’
(daturaku datsuraku), as Dogen’s teacher Ju-ching instructed him. Datsuraku-datsuraku '
indicates a letting go of the step of transcendence one took away from the ego-self It is, |
in fact, a movement of trans-descendence in which die oneness of body-mind is finally 
fully realised dirough ultimate emptiness. This tautological teaching recalls the 
“emptiness of emptiness” of Nagarjuna, but within Dôgen’s phenomenological 
paradigm, acts as a kind o f return to one’s Buddha-nature in the plain authentic way one 
is, in this body at diis dme. Dôgen suggests diat as ego-selves, we merely slumber in diis 
world. Dôgen’s enlightenment story, concluding with a trans-descendence, datsuraku 
datsuraku, is die relinquishing of any spiritual high place and establishes Dôgen’s future 
teaching as operating out of an existential realisation of sünyatâ.
Genjô-kôan
In the Genjô-kôan fascicle of die Shôbôgetyo, Dôgen reinforces the process of his own 
enlightenment story discussed above in terms of an existential realisation of sfmyatd.
Aldiough Nishijima and Cross translate “The Realised Universe,” KasuHs notes
the diverse interpretations of what Dôgen intended by the title. Getjd has been 
understood to mean “manifestation,” “being present already in its completed form,” and 
“to presence” (this latter Kasulis favours because of its active connotations). Kôan has
335 Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts off “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsurakuj journal of International 
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114
“equality” and the an translated “keeping to one’s own sphere” whereby die endre phrase 
is understood to mean “die individuality o f things manifesting themselves equally.” This 
latter translation is favoured by Waddell and Abe. However, diere is also the possibility 
o f taking kôan to indicate a paradox, such as given to students as an object o f meditation 
(Waddell/Abe and Dumoulin reject this possibility while Masunaga Reiho, Deshimaru 
Tais en, Kim Hee-Jin and Kasulis are willing to consider it plausible) and dius die phrase
320 Kasulis, Thomas, Zen Action!Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1985, pp. 83-6 
323 N ish ijim a  and Cross insert “[seen as]” in their translation o f this passage in Master Dogen’s Shoboge/yo: 
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«
either been interpreted from its literal meaning of “public notice” thus rendering the 
entire phrase “the presence of public (or objective) reality”; or the kô has been translated
.33
•■à :
genjôkôan can be understood to indicate that “presence itself’ can be a kôan. That one 
may become “direcdy aware of impermanence” ®®° contains a kind o f existential paradox
and is further indication of Dôgen’s phenomenological approach to enlightenment. A
Outside of die fact that modern or medieval Japanese can be an ambiguous written 
language, Dôgen often engages in wordplay and wilful manipulation of language in order 
to free up meaning or disrupt conventional images. That Dôgen might intend for the 
title to be ambiguous, or at least be aware of die multivalent nuances is certainly within 
the realm of possibility. However, in the context of Dôgen’s enlightenment story 
recorded above, the suggestion that becoming direcdy aware of impermanence contains 
the elements of an existential kôan is compelling.
The Genjôkôan fascicle begins with die introduction of the categories of Buddha-dharma 
and the myriad dharmas, illusion and enlightenment, buddhas and ordinary beings, and 
insists that the practitioner enter into diis seeming duality. He writes:
Wlien all dharmas are [seen as]®®^ the Buddha-dharma, there is illusion 
and enlightenment, contemplation and action, birth and Death, buddhas 
and sentient beings.
Wlien myriad dharmas are of die nonself, diere is no illusion or 
enlightenment, no buddhas or sentient beings, no arising or perishing.
Because the Buddha-way intrinsically leaps out of plentitude and dearth, 
there is arising and perishing, illusion and enlightenment, sentient beings 
and buddhas. Still do flowers fall to our pity and weeds grow to our 
displeasure.®®®
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According to Stambaugh, Dôgen has introduced a “dialectic” in this first paragraph in 
order to suggest that “form, duality, and emptiness (nonduality) are still present”.®®® She 
sees the first statement to be a positive “tliesis” statement, an “is”, in which myriad 
dharmas denote differentiation. The second statement she likens to an anti-thesis A
statement, an “is not”, in which, although it does not simply negate the thesis, it 
proposes that nonduality is exhibited through nonself. The third statement, she asserts, 
is not a synthesis but a transcendence, a “neitlier is nor is not” in tliat the Buddha-way 
“leaps out” o f both the categories of plentitude (myriad dharmas) and deartli (emptiness, 
nonduality). Finally, the last statement that flowers fall and weeds grow she sees as tlie 
‘resolution’ of Dôgen’s dialectic, a “both is and is not,” a paradoxical situation of 
“suchness” in which one must grapple witli tlie presenced reality of form and 
emptiness.®®'  ^ Interestingly, Dogen’s “dialectic” as suggested by Stambaugh seems to 
contain an inversion of the famous negative catuhskoti dialectic employed in Indian I'
philosophy and utilised by Nâgârjuna (see the discussion of positive and negative 
cattihskoti in Chapter 2: Nâgârjuna), and tlius proposes an altogether different outcome.
The negative caUihskoti is expressed:
N ot {A}
N ot {Not-A}
N ot {Both (A) and (Not-A))
N ot {Neither (A) nor (Not A)}®®®
The negative catuhskoti drives logic and understanding to its final and ultimate negation, a 
technique tliat Nâgârjuna used to push practitioners beyond tlie conceptual realm and 
into the practical, and ultimately “empty,” realm. Dôgen’s dialectic, as proposed by 
Stambaugh, turns Nâgârjuna’s dialectic of the four-fold negation on its head for 
emptiness {sünyatâ) is subsumed within a paradoxical “preseiicing” instead of extended as 
the (non)-foundational reality of all dharmas. To understand clearly what Dôgen is 
expressing in the Genjôkôan it is beneficial to consider more of the text. In the next y
section Dôgen writes:
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Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad dharmas is J
delusion. When tlie myriad dharmas actively practice and experience 
ourselves, that is the state o f realization. Those who greatly realize 
delusion are buddhas. Those who are greatly deluded about realization 
are ordinary beings ..
In this paragraph, Dôgen critiques the single-minded wilful activity o f the person who 
would attempt to create or bring into being individually the reality of the myriad dharmas. A
This is foolish for Dôgen has already asserted in the first passage the nonself of the 
dharmas, and tlius attempting to bring fortli their true nature (their Buddha-nature) via 
practice is simply delusional. And yet, when one allows tlie myriad dhamas to act 
according to their true nature (one tliat is in alignment with Buddha-Dharma) there 
occurs a mutual realisation. Letting the dharmas act according to their nature frees them 
to express tlie deepest reality in a way that is meaningful to the practitioner. This mutual 
awakening is brought out in other portions of the Shôbôgent^ o and will be considered later.
Again, Dôgen emphasises tlie distinction between buddha and a deluded being. Echoing 
the difference between slumber and the deluded being in the above verse is caught 
in a rote routine of practice whereas tlie buddha has pierced to the essence of practice.
In the next paragraph, Dôgen comments furtlier on the experiential nature of awalcening 
and cautions further against the one-sided activity of wilful exertion:
Wlien we use the whole body-and-mind \shinjitî\ to look at forms, and 
when we use tlie whole body-and-mind to listen to sounds, even though 
we are sensing them directly, it is not like a mirror’s reflection of an 
image, and not like water and the moon. Wliile we are experiencing one 
side, we are blind to tlie other side.®®’
It is not enough to that we actively experience tlie surrounding world, even utilising tlie 
whole body-mind. The experience is one-sided and belies a problem of perception. This 
brings us to the much quoted and arguably the thesis statement of the entire fascicle:
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To study the Buddha-way is to study the self; to study the self is to forget 
the self; to forget tlie self is to be verified by [or “experienced by”]®®® 
myriad dharmas; and to be verified by [“experienced by”] myriad dharmas 
is to drop off the body-mind o f the self as well as the body-mind o f the 
other. There remains no trace of enlightenment, and one lets this 
traceless enlightenment come fortli for ever and ever.®®®
Here Dogen’s assertion of a true emptiness again comes to the forefront and we are able 
to consider the question o f how presence and emptiness are meant to relate to one 
anotlier. This seminal passage in tlie Genjôkôan echoes the existential expression of 
sünyatâ described in Dôgen’s enlightenment story (via datsuraku-datsuraku). Studying tlie 
Buddha-way, one is made aware of the dual importance of practice and enlightenment 
and, perhaps accepting the precepts of the bodhisattva-way, one vows to carry out this 
initial faitli in tlie actions charged of tlie bodhisattva. Taking on the activity of die 
bodhisattva, one learns to put ego interests aside and concentrate on the precepts of 
giving, compassion, etc. In this body-mind frame, one is prepared to become aware of 
die activity in the body-mind frames of the surrounding phenomenal world whereby die 
body-mind structure, in its false duality, is no longer what sustains the bodhisattva’s 
activity nor the activity of the surrounding phenomenal world. No structure to maintain, 
mutually and direcdy experiencing profound reality, one rests on an enlightenment which 
is traceless, an enlightenment “based” on sünyatâ. And yet, tiiat traceless enlightenment 
“come(s) forth” which is to say it participates in and through die depeiidently originated 
world o f phenomena.
Returning to Stambaugh’s suggestion diat Dôgen’s dialectic affirms diat “form, duality, 
and emptiness (nonduality) are still present” we should be clear in understanding what 
“presence” or “presencing” means for Dôgen.®®® Dôgen concludes the Genjôkôan fascicle 
widi die re-telling o f a famous kôan followed by his commentary on it. The story is 
recorded dius:
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In this kôan, Dôgen speaks metaphorically o f the Master’s practice o f t^tyen, despite of 
and because of his original awakened state, as an expression of true Dharma. The 
Master’s actions have the effect of transmitting tliis true Dharma to his student who does 
prostrations to show his realisation. Dôgen’s commentary following tlie story reads:
The real experience of the Buddha-Dliarma, the vigorous road of the 
authentic transmission, is like tliis. Someone who says that because [the air] 
is ever-present we need not use a fan, or that even when we do not use [a 
fan] we can still feel air, does not know ever-presence, and does not know 
the nature o f air. Because the nature o f air is to be ever-present, the 
behaviour of Buddhists has made tlie Earth manifest itself as gold and has 
ripened tlie Long River into curds and whey.
As Dôgen states, the “behaviour of Buddhists,” that is the practice of tyâtyen, is according 
to the natural activity of Buddha-nature in phenomena -  tya^ en, or practice, is a natural 
manifestation o f ‘the way things are’ [tathàtâ), or Buddha-Dliarma. A static “presence” 
does not allow for the manifestation of Buddha-Dliarma, thus air as “ever-present” 
witliout the activity o f the Master’s fan is dead air. Only tlie dynamic unity of practice 
and realisation togetlier {shushô ittâ) can explain how tlie Buddha-Dliarma is “ever­
present.” And “presence” can only be understood in the context o f dependently 
originating phenomena. Wliat Dôgen is suggesting is the mutual inter-dependence of 
mundane and profound reality, which is in fact an assertion beyond what Nâgârjuna 
proposes when he argues tliat mnyatâh the (non)-foundational base for botli samara■md 
nirvana. However, practically speaking, these approaches may be closer together than 
tliey appear dialectically. Thus, Stambaugh perceptively notices that Dogen is 
comfortable with the paradoxical “resolution” of “both/and,” however, altliough she 
may develop tlie nature of activity that the practitioner engages in she does not 
sufficiently clarify how Dôgen deals witli the paradox of “presence” witliin tlie context 
o f emptiness in tlie Genjôkôan.
331 Master Dogen's Shobogetyo: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, 
Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 37
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Zen Master Hotetsu of Mayoku-zan mountain is using a fan. A monk comes 
by and asks, ‘The nature of air is to be ever-present, and there is no place that [air] 
cannot reach. Why then does the Master me afanV^ The Master says, “You have only 
understood that the nature of air is to be ever-present, but you do not yet know the truth y
that there is ?io place that [air] cannot reach. ” The monk says, “What is the truth of 
there being noplace [air] cannot reach?At this, the Master just [carries on] using /
the fan. The monk does prostrations.®®^
A
119
Buddha-nature {bussho) and Being-time jiji)
Dogen’s understanding o f Buddha-nature as it is is a complete rejection of the picture of 
a transcendent, timeless, constant profound reality separate from mundane existence. 
Rather, Buddha-nature, expressed tlirough the impermanence of tlie skandhas dhamas 
is a dynamic penetration of everyday reality in which both Buddha-nature and its 
manifestation in ordinary beings celebrate togetlier a mutual realisation, a “total 
existence” ishitsu-d). It is in the Bussho fascicle of the Shobôgetyô that Dôgen performs 
what has become one of his most well-known reinterpretations of a Buddhist scripture.
By manipulating tlie Chinese character u (W) within the phrase shitsu-u (^ W ), Dôgen
offers a profound commentary on Buddha-nature which has influenced Japanese 
Buddhist religion and Japanese philosophy alike. The sentence in question, from the 
Mahdpamiiwma-sUtra, reads: A ll  living beings totally have [shitsuai] the Buddha-naturef^ Taking 
instead the noun form o f u which means “being” or “existence” the sentence is re­
phrased as: A ll  living beings totally are [or “totally exist as”] the Buddha-nature. Or, as Dôgen 
re-states it again: “In short. Total Existence is the Buddha-nature, and the perfect totality of 
Total Existence is called “Mvifig beings. However, Dôgen is concerned that he not be 
misunderstood to be suggesting that Buddha-nature and manifest beings are some kind 
of monistic ontology or ideology. Furthermore, what he has in mind with Total 
Existence is not a state or condition at all defined by die common understanding of time. 
He states;
Remember, the Existence [described] now, which is totally possessed by the 
Buddha-7iature, is beyond the “existence” of existence and non-existence. 
Total Existejice is die Buddha’s words, the Buddha’s tongue, the Buddhist 
patriarchs’ eyes, and die nostrils of a patch-robed monk. The words, 
“Total Existence'' are utterly beyond beginning existence, beyond original 
existence, beyond fine existence, and so on. How much less could they 
describe conditioned existence or illusory existence? They are not 
connected widi “mind and circumstances” or with “essence and form” 
and the like. This being so, object-and-subject as living bemgs-aîid-Total 
Existence is completely beyond ability based on karmic accumulation, 
beyond the random occurrence o f circumstances, beyond accordance 
with the Dharma, and beyond mystical powers and practice and 
experience ... [At die same time] “The entire Universe is my possession" 'm the
332 Master Dogen’s Shobogenyo: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu N ishijim a  and Chodo Cross, Woking, 
Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 1
333 Master Dogen’s Shobogenyp: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu N ishijima and Chodo Cross, Woking, 
Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 2
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wrong view of non-Buddhists. [Total Existence] is beyond originally- 
existing existence; for it pervades the eternal past and pervades the eternal present.
It is beyond newly-appearing existence; for it does tiot accept a single molecule.
It is beyond separate instances o f existence; for it is inclusive perception.
It is beyond tlie “existence” of “beginningless existence”; for it is something 
ineffable commg like this. It is beyond tlie “existence” of “newly arising 
existence”; for the everyday mind is the truth. Remember, in the midst of 
Total Existence it is difficult for living beings to meet easy convenience.
Wlien understanding of Total Existence is like tliis. Total Existence is tlie 
state of penetrating to tlie substance and getting free.®®'*
Dôgen desires to free Buddha-nature from tlie philosophical categories of being and 
non-being, from tlie locations of mundane or ultimate, from the mytlis o f past, present, 
future. Locating Buddha-nature, even witli the Dharma itself, can never do justice to tlie 
true reality of Buddha-nature. In one sense, Buddha-nature is never sometliing that one 
is able to pin down with definitions and descriptions. Thus, Dôgen’s initial affirmation 
that Buddha-nature is Total Existence and tliat Total Existence is living bein^, is 
tempered with the caution of approaching these descriptors carefully. Dôgen cautions 
tliat Total Existence is beyond tlie categories of time, substance, or place; it is beyond 
identities o f real or illusory; and it is beyond tlie pure or mystical experience of practice.
However, unlike Nagarjuna who would make no positive assertions for tlie very reasons 
that Dôgen points out, Dôgen makes a series of positive statements that he hopes will be 
guides to understanding how living beings encounter and participate in Buddha-nature, 
or inversely, how Buddha-nature participates in the world of beings. He claims tliat, as 
Total Existence, Buddha-nature pervades past and present, and is not reliant upon tlie 
future; that it is ineffable; that it recognises the everyday, mundane. Wlien freed from 
categorical placement and the strict parameters of ontology or idealisation, only then can 
one explore tlie dynamic activity o f “penetrating to the substance and getting free.” 
Later in the fascicle, Dôgen describes the dynamic interdependence o f Buddha-nature 
and living beings:
So now let us ask the National Master: “Do all buddhas have the Buddha- 
nature, or 7iot?" We should question him and test him like this. We should 
research tliat he does not say “A ll  living beings are the Buddha-nature itself," 
but says “A ll  living beings have the Buddha-nature. He needs to get rid 
\datsurakd\ o f the have in have the Buddha-nature. Getting rid \datsurakih, is
334 Master Dogen's Shobogenyp: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, 
Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 2
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tlie single track of iron, and the single track of iron is the way o f the 
birds. Then the nature o f all buddhas possesses living beings. This 
principle not only elucidates living beings, but also elucidates the Buddha-
fiaturefi^
Here Dôgen again stresses the importance of datsuraku, the “letting go” of dualism — in 
tliis case, the dualism of idealising Buddha-nature as innate possession, however, given 
tlie list o f categories in tlie previous paragraph, Dôgen should now be stylistically 
understood as encouraging the “letting go” of all categorical parameters — so that the 
mutual manifestation and realisation o f Buddha-nature and living beings is possible. In 
this dynamic and interdependent formula, “presence” can never become the subtle 
ground for either Buddha-nature or living beings. The freedom of letting go \datsurakti\, 
and the trans-descendence of allowing die categorical parameters of both Buddha-nature 
and living beings be shed \datsuraku-datsuraku\, begin to elucidate how “presence” and 
Buddha-nature can interpenetrate one another without cancelling or over-shadowing the 
other.
Once Dôgen has freed both Buddha-nature and living beings from the categorical 
parameters of ontology, epistemology and the like, establishing all of reality within the 
dynamic and paradoxical tension of “presence” and emptiness, he turns to elucidating 
how diis paradox o f “presence” and emptiness works to express and manifest Buddha- 
nature. In this discussion, he emphasises that the understanding o f Buddha-nature is 
intimately connected to a proper conception of time and how time works.
The manifesting body preaching Buddha-nature is therefore open, clear, 
and bright — vast emptiness. The “preaching Buddha-nature” bodily 
manifesting is thereby expressing the original body o f all buddhas. 
Nowhere is there even one buddha not making the “diereby expressing” 
his buddha-body. The buddha-body is die manifesting body, and there is 
always a body manifesting Buddha-nature. Even buddhas’ and patriarchs’ 
capacity of uttering and understanding that die four great elements and 
five skandhas [are Buddha-nature] is a moment-to-moment expression of 
the manifesting body.®®®
Uji or “being-time” is how Dôgen tides anodier Shobogeti:^ fascicle in which he discusses
the dynamic way time is to be understood by the enlightened. Heine describes Dôgen’s
335 Master Dogen’s Shobogent :^ Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, 
Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 22
336 “Shôbôgenzô Buddha-Nature,” translated by Nonnan Waddell and Masao A b e , The Eastern Buddhist, 
Kyoto, (9:1, 1976), p. 98
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distinction between a “derivative” view of time, whereby time is ignorantly thought of as 
dualistically separate from living beings as the expression “time flies” indicates, and a 
dynamic or “significant” view of time:
Dôgen accentuates tlie dynamic nature o f movement and continuity, 
which is no longer statically conceived as time points “piled up on top of 
one anotlier or lined up side by side” in a linear uni-directional fashion.
Ratlier, movement is disclosed as the simultaneous interpenetration of all 
beings occurring right-now and throughout the unity of past, present and 
future. Dôgen distinguishes the genuine significance of passage 
{kjOryaku) from the derivative view tliat “time flies,” which is conceived 
of as “something like the wind and rain moving from east to west” ...
Kyoraku is not merely passing away. Rather, it signifies the 
comprehensive asymmetrical process of the True Man’s [sic] enlightened 
existential projection and ontological understanding right-now moving 
simultaneously in and through past, present and future, actively engaging 
tlie passenger and passageway as well as the full context of the 
experiential reality surrounding and permeating tlie movement.®®’
Exhibited in Dôgen’s description of a “moment-to-moment expression of the 
manifesting body” is what Heine describes as an “asymmetrical process” in which all of 
time is brought together meaningfully and significantly to provide expression of the 
Buddha-Dliarma through form, through the dependently originating bodies o f tlie 
buddhas and patriarchs. No uni-directional reduction occurs, whereby Buddha-nature is 
brought into the restricted realm of arising and subsiding phenomena, but ratlier the 
realm of arising and subsiding {samsara) is permeated by the significance of Buddha- 
nature as those who actively practice {t^ atiefi) continually bring the two realms (the 
ultimate and the mundane) togetlier through their active realisation {shushô itto). In this 
way, time cannot be understood from the mundane perspective of a series of points 
marching from a distant past “beginning” point toward a distant future “ending” point 
by the enlightened practitioner, for at every moment time is dynamically struck through, 
permeated by the ultimate such that its fullness is represented at each and every moment 
as it enables tlie mundane arising and subsiding activity to continue. Dôgen’s view of 
dependent co-origination ipraütya-samutpâdà) is far removed from the earlier systematic 
portrayal o f a doomed cyclical existence recorded in the Samyutta-Nikqya (12,1. SNlVf) 
such tliat Buddha-nature finds a natural manifestation witliin the very cycle of birth and 
death. However, tliis is not to say that Dôgen sees witliin “grasping” or “craving” a
337 Heiiie, Steven, Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen, Albany; State University 
o f New York Press, 1985, p. 54-5
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shining Buddha-nature, as can be the outcome of some tathàgatagarhha tliought. Rather, 
more in keeping with Nâgârjuna’s understanding of pratitya-sanmtpada^ both the mundane 
and the ultimate share the “foundation” of smyatâ which enables both practice and 
realisation.
Cosmic Buddha-nature
In contrast to the cosmic aspects of Tendai Buddhism which would regard the non­
duality o f sentient and insentient beings from a monistic standpoint, effectively erasing 
and denying individual aspects, Dogen castes non-duality in the light of his discussion ^
surrounding the Buddha-nature. Radier than viewing die participation o f non-sentient 
phenomena in Buddha-nature as indicating die transcendence o f an profound reality, that 
is, diat somehow Buddha-nature has infused or resides in all phenomena, die non-dual 
relationship is more dynamic. Dogen does not entertain transcendence but a trans- 
descendence so that there is no duality of sentient/non-sentient when regarding 
expressing profound reality. There are only different perspectives (e.g. a fish's view of 
the ocean).
In the Bussho fascicle, Dogen reminds his readers of Bodhidharma’s words: “Each mind 
is like wood and stone.” And then he goes on to explain:
“Mind here spoken of is die suchness o f mind (or mind of objective reality), it is 
the mind o f the whole earth; dierefore it is die mind o f self and other. Each mind, 
o f all the people on earth, as well as the enlightened ones in all worlds, and the 
celestials and dragons and so on, is wood and stone. There is no odier mind 
outside of diis. This wood and stone is o f itself un trammeled by the realms of 
existence, nonexistence, emptiness, form, and so on.”^^*
In her comments on Dogen's nonandiropological perspective, Joan Stambaugh points 
out diat for Dogen, we humans are but one aspect of die myriad dhamas/phmomeri2i. 
Wlien discussing nature in the Yama (Mountain and Water Sutra), Dogen “does not 
relegate mountains and waters to die dubious status of picturesque “landscapes,” but 
considers them dioroughly alive in a manner not identical widi human life, yet at die 
same time nondualistic widi it. [Tjlie categories of identity and difference alone are not
Cleary, Thomas, Rational Zen: The Mind of Dogen Zenji, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1992, p.95
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sufficiently subtle to encompass what Dogen wants to convey.”^^  ^ And, as Dogen asserts 
in this chapter tliat tlie Green mountains walk, he also claims tliat:
Green mountains are neither sentient nor insentient. You are neither 
sentient nor insentient. At tliis moment, you cannot doubt the green 
mountains' walldng.^"^”
Thus, although humans exhibit tlie tendency to establish tlie human consciousness as
Dogen and phenomenology
Kasulis notes tliat the descriptor “phenomenological” can be meaningfully applied to 
Dogen, albeit in a limited sense of the way Husserl introduced the science. That is, 
Kasulis recognises an element of “intentionality” in Dogen's understanding of how 
situation and conditioning influence one’s perceptions, however, Dogen does not 
develop a theory of “intentionality” as did Husserl. Where Dogen offers more 
development is in the particular way he proposes his own understanding of “bracketing.” 
As Kasulis says of Dogen's approach:
... Dogen is not a naïve realist insofar as he is sensitive to tlie 
contribution of mind in tlie constituting of experience. Yet he is no 
subjective idealist either. Although mind cannot be separated from 
reality, reality cannot thereby be reduced to mind. Dogen's tack is to 
concern himself only witli what is experienced. Limiting himself to tliis, 
he is not concerned witli notions of reality outside this process of 
experiencing consciousness. In ShohOgent ,^ Dogen frequently takes a 
seemingly metaphysical statement from the T’ien-t'ai or Hua-yen 
traditions and interprets it as a descriptive statement about the structure 
of a specific experience; in effect, he suspends metaphysical and 
epistemological commitments outside the realm of tilings as experienced. 
In tliis respect, Dogen is implicitly carrying out his own form of
Stambaugh, Joaa, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 41 
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interpreter o f reality, this small-mindedness itself is in fact the inhibitor of our 
experience. According to Dogen, “If  you do not learn to be free from your superficial 
views, you will not be free from tlie body and mind of an ordinary person. 
Stambaugh notes Dogen's remarkable originality in proposing a “nonantliropomorphic 
way o f experiencing.”
, ,3 4 1  &
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bracketing and tlie term phenomenological is surprisingly appropriate to 
characterize the nature of his methodology/'^^
A meaningful and direct “seeing” of phenomena as they are in themselves is not 
dependent upon the desires and efforts of beings, nor tlie inviolable essence of the 
phenomena themselves, but is ratlier the celebratory activity o f a mutual realisation. 
Only Buddhist emptiness {sünyata), which as Nâgârjuna exhibited is synonymous with tlie 
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratftya-samutpada), allows diis to take place. 
So, Dogen’s “phenomenology” Is a particularly Buddhist one in which seeing/realisation 
is mutually dependent with the arising of Buddha nature. It arises and is manifest in 
phenomena, but dynamically so — and becoming manifest in dbamas, it must necessarily 
retain tlie quality of emptiness and participate in the “form” of pratîtya-samutpàda. Thus, 
it is natural that tlie rocks, mountains and hills proclaim the true Dharma, not because, as 
in earlier Tendai tliought they have Buddha-nature, but because Buddha-nature is 
manifest thus, naturally in the 'way things are’ co-dependentiy with active realisation. 
This distinction highlights Dogen’s metliodology as one of praxi-centric phenomenology. 
Glass makes the interesting suggestion tliat Dogen’s re-writing/visioning of “all beings 
have Buddha nature” to “whole being is Buddha Nature” (Glass’ phrasing can be 
viewed as a “switch from figure to field sensitivities. Buddha Nature is not a property of 
the figure within tlie field (the self is empty) but rather is the radiant and luminous force 
of the field itself (emptiness is the self). The “self’ is re-located from figure to field. 
This observation perceptively shifts emphasis away from the form itself and allows for a 
proper treatment of space. However, what is lacking in tliis understanding of emptiness 
and self is the praxiological emphasis that is so important to Dogen.
The following fascicle of tlie moon (Tsukl) exemplifies Dogen’s suspension of 
metaphysical and epistemological concerns to strike directly at Buddha-nature as it is. In 
the Tsuki (Moon) chapter of the Shôhôgentjô, Dogen asks his students to consider tlie non­
duality o f phenomena and our perception of tliem. Using tlie image of the moon on 
water as an example, he argues that this image, usually regarded an idealised abstracted
Kasulis, Thomas, Zm Action!Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1985, p. 69 
Glass, Newman Robert, Working Emptiness: Tomrd a Third Reading of Emptiness in Buddhism and Postmodern 
Thought, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995, p. 99 Glass’ premise is that hiere are three ways to treat emptiness: 
(1) as presenciiig, (2) as absencing, taking away, or difference, (3) Buddha essence. Glass says o f the third 
way, Buddha essence: “the third reading o f the working o f  emptiness” is that “the reahsahon o f emptiness 
is not the realization o f things which are empty but the realization o f  emptiness alone. Forms, whether 
emptied or not, are not primary in this third understanding o f emptiness.” 63)
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notion of tlie real m oon  in tlie sky, is in no way less realBvm the physical moon we see in 
its gradation of fullness in the sky at this very moment. He quotes Sakyamuni Buddha’s 
words as recorded in the Golden Ught Sutra: “The BuddhYs true Dharma-hody jIs  just like 
spaceS‘^‘^ I  Manifesting its form according to things f i t  is like the moon in waterP Then Dogen 
expounds on this verse:
“The reality as it is in this “is like the moon in water" m 2.j be the [oneness of] 
water-and-moon, or it may be tlie wateTs reality, or the mooTs reality, or being in 
reality, or the reality of being in. “Being like" does not express resemblance; 
being like is concrete existence. “The Buddha’s true Dharma-body" is the 
reality itself of space. This space is the Buddha’s true Dharma-body or reality itself 
Because [space] is tlie Buddha’s true Dharma-body, die whole earth, die 
whole world, the whole Dharma, and the whole of manifestatmi, are 
diems elves naturally space. The reality itself of the manifest hundred 
things and myriad phenomena is totally die true Dharma-body of 
Buddha, and it is like the moon in water.”^^ ^
Dogen’s pairing of Dharma-body and space/emptiness in the context of perception and 
experience works paradoxically to validate experience in the context of “no-self.” 
Dogen’s “bracketing” here indicates that categorical thinking and analysing miss the 
profound impact “no-self’ has on experience; emptiness of self, emptiness of 
phenomena, work to make manifest die Dharma-body of Buddha. Dogen is asserting 
diat, regardless o f how you wish to 'come at’ reality, be it from the oneness o f water-and- 
moon, be it from the water’s perspective, or the moon’s, whether you describe yourself 
from reality’s perspective, or reality from yours, none of diese angles, none o f diese 
expressions can deny by way of abstraction or idealised form the tangible reality that all 
shape. 'Air here includes anything we can think of and much more. Thinking, living, 
being, performing religious actions, are diis same reality. None enjoys more reality. 
Dogen describes the phenomenon of a cloud passing over the moon and our perception 
that the moon moves. Our inclination is to distinguish between die real movement of 
die cloud and the mistaken perception that die moon moves. However, in Dogen’s 
understanding of non-duality, all phenomena participate in the true Dharma-body of the 
Buddha (and inversely, the Dharma-body o f die Buddha participates in all phenomena). 
Dogen’s discussion of “is like” is not to point out the essential unreality or illusion of 
phenomena, but to establish Buddhist “diusness” and the invitation for all phenomena to
The Chinese translation o f smyatâ R often rendered “space” in English. For example, tlie familiar verse 
from the Heart Sutra, “form is emptiness {sûnyatâ\, emptiness form,” reads in Chinese “space is colour, 
colour space.”
Dogen, Alaster Dogen’s Shobogenpo: Book 3, translated by Gudo Wafii N ishijim a  and Chodo Cross, 
Woking Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1997, p. 2
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manifest tlie Buddlia-Dharma. This openness to the world of phenomena and 
celebration o f tlie mutual experience of realisation is conspicuously positive; however, 
Dogen’s purpose is not to establish the position of “presence” or “being” but to open up 
experience to tlie extent that Buddha-Dharma is able to be made manifest. Instead of 
delineating the distinction between real and unreal, Dogen asks that the practitioner work 
witli what has been given and see there the Buddha’s true Dharma-body. This is the 
treasury that Dogen means to help elucidate: ripe in the practice o f is the whole of 
profound reality. One must perceive it thus to realise its all pervasive existence.
Chapter 4.
Martin Heidegger tlie Reluctant Priest
' C
This chapter will explore phenomenological thinking in the West, as exemplified in the 
work o f Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, the opening of Da-sein aligns with the action 
of becoming in tlie world — a journey that Da-sein engages via “pathways” that 
metaphorically wend around some of the thinking already discussed in earlier chapters 
with regards to certain Buddhist masters/schools. As laid out in previous chapters, tlie 
tension between theory (theonà) and practice (praxis) is a constant one throughout 
Buddhist history and although each master/school responds differently to the issue, it is A
one that demands renewed thinking as well as renewed practice. Theory, as a A
patli/roadmap/guide to correct practice, for example tlie noble eight-fold path given by 
Siddhartha to his followers, draws the practitioner out of him/herself with the promise 
of transcending the ego self by pointing to the transcendent. Practice is tlie living into all 
that tlieory attempts to describe and point toward and the honing o f the skills necessary 
to experience the transformation promised. The merging of theory and practice, where 
experience brings theory to life and lives are transformed, is often attempted in the A
" treligious calling; Buddhism calls such a nexus point enlightenment. Enlightenment 
therefore exemplifies tlie phenomenological nexus of seeing and experience in the 
Zen/Mahâyâna tradition. Perception is not just output of tlie mind and seeing enters the 
realm o f living experience — it entails individual transformation that must be contextual, 
personal and never static. Similarly, Heidegger’s Da-sein moves, especially in his later 
work, in the direction o f removing the barriers of subjectivity which would keep Da-sein 
in “control” o f its “destiny” (and ultimately Being itself) through the avenue of 
“thinking” which has been compared to Mahâyâna “meditation” as a practice which 
constantly moves the individual into lived experience of ultimate meaning. This never 
static relation of the individual to ultimate meaning destabilizes the cogito reliant subject 
and provides opportunity for transformation. In both Zen meditation and Heidegger’s 
thinking, individual transformation occurs after a shift in the perception/perspective of 
the individual engaging actively in the present situation. The transformation that occurs 
in the individual has the effect of transforming all aspects of the individual in his/her 
situation recalling Dogen’s teaching tliat a single enlightenment transforms tlie entire 
world. Paradoxically, of course, the world remains exactly as it has always been, and the 
activity of the individual continues ... in meditation, thinking, washing potatoes, walking
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through the forest. In the Zen/Mahâyâna tradition, the enlightenment experience is a re­
orientation to tilings in dieir suchness so that tlie practitioner’s activity does not 
necessarily change but tlie new perspective brought to the activity unveils what is truly 
happening and the change is likened to a meditation practitioner deep asleep to one deep 
in meditation. For Heidegger, tlie re-orientation is the difference o f allowing trutli to 
become manifest by remaining open to the possibility and the occurrence is likened to 
the blooming of a rose, “without why.” '^*^ Heidegger refers to this cleared and open 
being Da-sein, “there-being” .
Altliough Western philosophy made a brealc witli the religious concerns o f tlieology, 
more often tlian not, tlieology still provides philosophy witli questions and philosophy 
often seeks to set tlieology straight. Martin Heidegger wrestled early in life witli tlie 
concerns o f theology, first witli the Catholic church under which he studied towards a 
rectorate and soon after witli the Protestant community. However, once he entered the 
philosopher’s guild as a student under Husserl, he gave the appearance of giving up 
religion altogether, carefully writing around “God” as though participating fully in 
Husserl’s dictum of reduction. But Heidegger’s investigation of being in his first work of 
philosophy Sein und Zeit\'& indication o f his lifelong concern witli meaning and “ultimate” 
things such as die theologians struggled with in their overtly religious arenas. 
Furthermore, Heidegger’s experience digesting Christian tlieology informs his own 
philosophical writing. In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an 
Inquirer,” Heidegger states that “without tliis theological background I should never 
have come upon the patli of thinking” '^*^ tlirough the voice of the Inquirer qua Heidegger 
himself. In a 1935 lecture on Holderlin, Heidegger speaks metaphorically of “two 
thorns” in the flesh (after tlie Apostle Paul), as Poggler explains, “the alienation from the 
beliefs of his origins and tlie failure of his r e c t o r a t e . C l e a r l y  influenced by Meister 
Eckliart, Heidegger employs certain terminology from the German mystical tradition to 
best describe the relationship between Da-sein and Being. This blending of mystical 
Christian influence, Heidegger’s interest in Chinese Taoism, and his exposure to certain
In DerSatz vom Gmtd, Heidegger quotes ftom mystic poet Angelus Silesius: “the rose is without why; it 
blooms because it bIooms;/It cares not for itself, asks not if it’s seen” cited by Zimmerman, Michael E., 
Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heide^er’s Concept ofAuthenticiy, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 
1981, p. 238.
4^7 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to 
Eanguage, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 10
348 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
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The phenomenological response
The modern phenomenological movement was borne partly out o f a reaction to the 
unresolved “gap” problem -  that is, tlie gap between tlie immanent subject and 
transcendent eternal that provides the subject witli meaning — never addressed 
satisfactorily by Western philosophy to date, although, the problem had been located by 
a number o f thinkers, even pre-Socratics such as Parmenides. Husserl, in particular, 
reacted against the enlightenment model o f ascertaining meaning from a purely 
transcendental subject, consequently he began to look more closely at the world, and the 
relationship between the individual and tlie world, in order to reveal tlie essences of 
tilings for he considered truth or meaning to be located at or with the essence of a tiling. 
Meaning located outside the experienced world, the lived world ÇLebetiswe/i), such as 
provided by Kantian transcendental idealism, is predicated on unverified data and, in the 
end, unreal. Considered the founder of modern phenomenology, and the champion of 
tlie phenomenological method, Edmund Husserl intended to get at truth which he saw as 
grounded in the phenomenal world and “visible” only through applying a method o f
IZen texts,^''^ will be followed up with later in the chapter. Suffice it to say here that 
Heidegger did not scorn or deride tlie arena of the tlieologians, yet still chose to express 
himself carefully outside the “language” of religion. This bracketing of religious 
terminology (with the few exceptions noted above) gives him the appearance of 
attempting to become the philosopher par excellence and yet his writing does not come 
close to the systematic clarity o f Hegel’s for example, for he reworks language to attempt 
to express what is deep within him, what he knows/kens and tliinks together. This 
manipulation of language is frustrating for the systematic philosopher and is much more 
empathetic to the expressions o f the poet to whom Heidegger entrusts the utterance of 
the holy. Moreover, Heidegger’s employment of language may be seen as a method itself 
for capturing the imagination o f his readership and prompting not only academic 
critique, but individual response. So Heidegger may in fact be viewed as a reluctant 
priest in terms of how his philosophy beckons the individual to hearken and re-attune to 
the resounding call tliat issues fortli from the deep. And regardless o f Heidegger’s own 
dismissal o f the term “phenomenological,” he exhibits in his life of tliinkmg a 
phenomenological approach that supports praxi-centrism by example if not overtly.
Heidegger read D.T. SUZUKI, see Barrett, WtUtain, “Zen for the West,” Zsn Buddhism, Selected Writings of 
D.T. Sue^uki, edited by William Barrett, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xi
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investigation which endeavours to clear away all distracting preconceptions, so that truth 
in accordance to its nature as self-revealing, can be seen. Truth perceived under these 
conditions is tangible; it will present itself to the ready conscious. In viewing truth as 
tangible and available, Husserl suggests tlie collapsing of tlie dual worlds o f the 
noumenon and phenomenon. Steven Laycock writes,
Husserlian phenomenology is ... a noumenology. N ot only is the 
phenomenon to be comprehended as the object in itself precisely as it 
appears, but flie phenomenon itself, in its immanence, is in itself, and, in 
its appearing, appears as it is: in itself Its being (in itself) is its appearing.
The Kantian noumenon, by contrast, does not, and cannot, appear. It is 
wholly occluded by the very phenomenon to which it gives birth.
Husserl’s intention, as Laycock points out, is that via a phenomenological method of 
approach, one is able to apprehend/comprehend the object totally as it is given us. 
Husserl introduces the epoché as tlie metliod whereby one reduces one’s view of reality 
(called a horizon), by means of bracketing (epochi), to its essential elements. This 
approach seeks to understand the lived world (Ixbenswelt) as opposed to the scientific 
world, by going to “the things diemselves” (Dmg an sich). Husserl’s reading of Descartes 
in his Cartesian Meditations saw instead of individual ego a transcendental subjectivity that 
included objectivity. He employed tlie term “transcendental phenomenology” and 
eventually “transcendental phenomenological idealism” to describe the subject that has 
performed the epoché on the horizons of the outer world. In effect, Husserl applies a 
phenomenological reduction on the outer world so tliat a now transcendental subjectivity 
is able to analyse the meaning behind what has presented itself as the outer world. He 
describes the transcendental “phenomenologizing” subject applying tlie reduction in tliis 
way:
I deny myself the actions o f inquiry, of thematic experience, of 
judgement, o f axiological and practical projection, of deliberation, of 
decision, that insert into the horizon that pregives the world ... But with 
the inhibiting of tliis universal thematic domain, the possibility is opened 
of turning it around into a new kind o f tliematic arena. In unity with the 
epoche and as tlie one practicing it, I become precisely tlie 
“nonparticipant” onlooker of transcendental life in which the
Laycock, Steven W., Mind as Mirror and the Mirroring of the Mind: Buddhist Reflections on Western 
Phenomenology, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1994, p. 53
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acceptedness o f the horizon, as giving the basis for all natural tliemes, 
and these themes themselves course on/^^
Only tlirough this metliod o f phenomenological bracketing {epoche) are subjectivity and 
objectivity on equal ground, a transcendental ground. Phenomenology establishes our 
conscious as “transcendental consciousness” and the world as phenomena.^^^ This works 
to suspend tlie prejudices the normal conscious would carry around in every-day 
existence — this transcendental consciousness is a self-consciousness performing a careful 
and calculated mental process so as to make the LuehemweltvjçAcomç. as the meaning-laden 
phenomenal realm. In tliis readied state, the transcendental consciousness is prepared to 
encounter the phenomenal world as it is.
Husserl writes in The Idea of Phenomenology,
... phenomenological reduction ... entails a limitation to the sphere of 
things that are purely self given, to tlie sphere o f tliose tilings which are not 
merely spoken about, meant, or perceived, but instead to the sphere of 
those tilings that are given in exactly tlie sense in which they are tliought 
of, and moreover are self-given in tlie strictest sense - in such a way that 
nothing which is meant fails to be given.^^^
Hiiitikka comments on Husserl’s statement by pointing out tliat what is “given” in his 
expression “self-given” is not the noumena, but the object itself. The phenomenological 
reduction is a bracketing of anything which is not given to us in immediate experience. 
In fact, as Hintikka points out, in Husserl’s words “to be capable of being given belongs 
to the essence o f being.” Thus, bracketing is the attempt to consider only what has been 
given, excluding all other things “merely spoken about, meant, or perceived.” This 
careful assessment of reality, and the caution against relying on the subject to produce a 
full account, or even an unbiased account, recalls the discussion earlier on prapaiïca. 
There is agreement that the subjective ego produces a screen of misinformation or 
skewed perception that in fact veils reality from view. This is called prapanca (conceptual
Husserl, Edmund, Appendix 1 [to p. 42] in Fink, Eugen, Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a 
TranscendentalTheory of Method, with textual notations by Edmund Husserl, translated with introduction by 
Ronald Bruzina, Bloomingdale & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995 (German published 1988), p. 
163
Stroker, Elisabeth, “Phenomenology as First Philosophy: Reflections on Husserl,” itom  Edmund Husserl 
and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. Robert Sokolowski, Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 1988, p. 257 
Husserl, Edmund, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. W.P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 48-49 as quoted in Jaakko Hintikka’s article, “The Phenomenological Dimension,” The 
Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 
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diffusion) by Nâgârjuna and his commentators. The phenomenological approach seeks 
to consider what is “self given” instead of what is brought out by the subjective ego. 
Heidegger will pick up the idea of “self-given” in his discussion of the way in which what 
presences or is made manifest is given “Es gibf. Further, both Husserl and Heidegger 
differentiate between “appearances” and “essence.” Phenomenologists recognise the 
tendency for trutli or essence to remain hidden/obscured and the need for anotlier 
approach or activity on the part of the subject. Husserl maintains the necessity of 
reduction and pursues the avenue witli the subject until he has re-established tlie 
transcendental ego. Heidegger works more on attitude and openness o f the subject, 
recognising that no will is able to uncover or make appear trutli, that it is already “given.” 
Tugendhat offers the view tliat Heidegger does not discuss Husserl’s famous epoché for 
he is writing from “within” the epoché — he has performed the reduction before picking 
up the pen.^^ '^  In other words, as Sukale explains, “as long as there is Dasein tliere are 
entities in the world because Dasein lives in experiences, the horizons o f which 
constitute things in the world.”^^^
The way in which tlie consciousness acts and thinks in regard to the world is described as 
“intentionality.” A valid encounter of the world and tlie meaning tliat is revealed 
requires the activity of intuition. Intuition is the vehicle for “datum.” When the 
consciousness thinks of an object, tliat object in the consciousness, although not 
identical with tlie physical object, never-the-less partakes in some o f the reality. 
Although an abstraction from the physical, die object in the perception o f die conscious 
still contains die reality of the experience. In fact, according to Husserl’s method, die 
only way communication is possible is for two consciousnesses to abstract through 
experience die physical reality, and in the case where diis experience is similar enough, 
communication can occur. Likewise, there are infinite possibilities for experience, which 
does not diminish from the reality o f either die perceived object, or die perception. 
Furthermore, on the basis of further perceptions, die consciousness is permitted to 
“revise” earlier perceptions so that full understanding is somediing which can be built.
It can be seen, dien, that Husserl’s phenomenology is a mediod o f understanding the 
Eebensipelt humans bodi are a part of and experience externally to diems elves personally.
Sukale, Michael, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff; The Hague, 1976, p. 101 
Sukale, Michael, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1976, p. 119
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This approach relies on an understanding of the intentionality o f the subjective 
consciousness, using a method of reduction in order to view the outer world as pure 
phenomena by the transcendental consciousness. This method, by undergoing such 
eidetic reduction, positions the transcendental subjective consciousness to gain the 
perspective necessary from which to view tlie Lebenswelt as it truly is, as it presents itself 
to the subjective consciousness. Husserl sent the searching subject back “to the tilings 
themselves” to reflect on tlie lived world as it is without imposing preconceptions on it — 
to let the world of objects speak for itself. However, Husserl evenually settles on the 
privileged activity of a transcendental subject who cannot but reinforce the artificial gap 
that Kant brought forward. As with tlie philosophers of tlie enlightenment before him, 
Husserl’s transcendental consciousness sets itself up to be tlie interpreter of all 
experience/phenomena. This belies a wariness toward the phenomenal that may be 
found even among the phenomenologists — tliere is yet unease and mistrust if one must 
apprehend by first isolating the phenomena and limiting the data to measurables. 
Furtlier, the problem of the “gap” remains in this model. For Husserl, and in most of 
the Western phenomenological enterprise, to rely on the synthesising activity of human 
consciousness to interpret and introduce meaning to the world at large ensures a subject- 
object relationship which cannot be bridged, tlie division of which causes tlie search for 
meaning to ever spiral on without any hope of touching it. Husserl’s method remains 
static and relies on a “seeing” which doesn’t necessarily involve active participation in the 
“objective” realm. This reserve keeps established the subjective-objective category of 
dualism that works so well within metaphysical structures.
Heidegger and the phenomenological movement
Martin Heidegger, although a student o f Husserl, saw Husserl’s project revert back to tlie 
problem of unreliability and essences only detected from the standpoint o f the 
transcendental ego — experience becomes reflective of tlie malce-up of the subject. So, 
Heidegger instead focuses on what most philosophers presuppose, tliat is being as a place 
to begin contemplating meaning. By presupposing being in our effort to understand the 
world around us, we allow tlie very key to it all, the fact that anytliing exists at all, to 
recede and vanish from our vision. The absence of true contemplation leaves us engaged 
in idle chatter, focused on the mundane, interacting with tlie world-at-hand as we would 
a tool. Heidegger’s seminal work Sein mid Zeit began with a call to remember being as it 
has been assumed and hence forgotten in our philosophical musings regarding meaning.
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Wliat was called transcendental phenomenology with Husserl may now be called 
hermeneutical phenomenology as Heidegger takes it up/^^ Beginning with the intuition 
of the subjective “self’ overly influences tlie relation the subject may have with the 
“objective.” Contemplating 'understanding/ Heidegger begins his search for meaning by 
questioning how the subject gains an understanding of meaning.^^® Thus, with 
Heidegger’s beginning point, tlie subject is as much in question as the “objective world” . 
Steffney notes that Heidegger initially locates Da-sein at the “heart o f the ontological 
difference”^^  ^ as a sort of medium by which Being is able to show itself. Da-sein is the 
authentically tuned consciousness/subject which allows Being its voice and via such a 
role is transformed in tlie process. This early priority brought Heidegger criticism for
Sheehan, Thomas, “Husserl and Heide^er; The Making and Unmaking o f a Relationship,” in Edmund 
Husserl: Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation mith Heide^er (1927-1931f  edited and 
translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997, p. 15
Poggeler makes the observation that Heidegger has reversed Husserl’s priority o f ‘things’, or beings 
over being Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities 
Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 54
In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” Heidegger has the Inquirer say “ ... 
I dedicated Being and Time ... to Husserl, because phenomenology presented us with possibilities o f a way” 
in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 6
Steffney, John, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 
27 (July, 1977) p. 325
reason and logic. How is it that anything exists? How can one explain the multiplicity of 
beings which share in common being? In his 1919-20 lectures, Heidegger criticises 
Husserl’s beginning point of tlie subject’s intuition and suggests instead that one ought to 
begin to understand the factical life by beginning with understanding. Furthermore, 
Heidegger criticises Husserl’s reliance on tlie phenomenological method, what has 
become a burdensome theory-based approach.
For Heidegger the theoretical orientation of the pure ego of Husserlian 
phenomenology sucks the blood out of the richly textured Umwelt, that 
“first-hand world” of lived experience in which one primarily exists and /I
carries out practical tasks. In this first-hand world, things are not just f
“there,” and they do not primarily have “value”. They are not even just /
“things.” They are “the significant — that’s what is primary ... When you A
live in a first-hand world \fJmweli\, everything comes at you loaded witli 
meaning, all over tlie place and all tlie time, everytliing is enworlded,
'world happens’ . . .” (p. 73) In this way of living, we do not know ourselves 
as egos who obseve the entities lying around us. Rather (this was 
Heidegger’s rereading of intentionality), we are the act of experientially A
“living out unto something’ \ein “Leben auf etwas which has “absolutely 
nothing to do witli an ego.” (p. 68f)^ '^^
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privileging substance over essence — the ground of being over what kind o f relationship 
Being and Da-sein might have together. Later, Heidegger speaks more o f tlie “event” 
(Ereignis) in which Da-sein is cleared and Being “shows” or comes forward. Heidegger 
ultimately abandons the term “phenomenology” as an appropriate descriptor for his 
philosophy. Mere methods for capturing and quantifying reality are ultimately impotent 
in approaching die essence of something or describing meaning. As he later explains in 
A  Dialogue on Language o f ceasing to use either terms “hermeneutic” or 
“phenomenology”: “That was done, not — as it is often tiiought — in order to deny die 
significance of phenomenology, but in order to abandon my own path o f thinking to 
namelessness.
However, before Heidegger abandons die term “phenomenology”, he describes and 
investigates die etymology o f the term in order to clarify it more than define it in Being 
and Time: As he writes, a “phenomenon” is “what shows itself in itself, what is
m a n i f e s t , n o t  to be confused with all the manifest “showings” which although do 
appear are not self-showings, but indicate something else entirely (e.g. the symptoms of a 
sickness in which “redness” should indicate “fever” but may convey something else 
entirely, like “embarrassment”). “Logos” is the means by which something can be seen 
and therefore contains no truth-statement as such; it may voice trudi or falsity; it may 
facilitate uncovering or the covering up. Trudi is not be found in the statement but after 
die clearing, and Logos merely helps facilitate die communication o f Truth. Trudi, then 
is wrapped up with what is properly made manifest as a “self-showing”:
The expression “phenomenology” can be formulated in Greek as legein ta 
phainomena. But legein [logos: spealts,voices] means apophainesthai
[appearing]. Hence, phenomenology means: apophainesthai taphainomena — 
to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from 
itself. That is die formal meaning o f the type of research diat calls itself 
“phenomenology”. But this expresses nothing other than the maxim 
formulated above: “To die things theniselves
Here, instead o f Husserl’s understanding of phenomena as “things” Heidegger 
specifically indicates that die engagement o f phenomenology is the pursuit of the being of
Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to 
Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 29
Heidegger, Martin, Beifig and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 25
362 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 30
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beings which is more often than not concealed, covered up or distorted in some kind of 
illusion/'^^ Thus, works in a hermeneutical way tlirough tlie existence {“E xistenfj of 
Da-sein, interpreting to Da-sein tlie very beifig o f Da-sein. Da-sein itself becomes the 
hermeneutical key in glimpsing truth or essence. Heidegger relies on the Greek 
etymology of the word existence/existefuivrhich. conveys the meaning of “standing out or 
inside,” such that Olafson notes only tlie entities which have a world and uncover other 
entities other than themselves can be said to “exist” in tlie special way Heidegger
means.
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein and Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 31
Olafson, Frederick A., “The unity o f Heidegger’s thought,” The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. 
Charles Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 101
365 Heidegger, Martin, and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State 
University o f  New York Press, 1996, p. 202
The implications of Heidegger’s early definition of phenomenology are, in this study, the 
following: (1) Truth is often concealed, or only partially discernable. And rather than 
something/one causing its disclosure, it must participate in die moment o f truth with a 
self-disclosure; the transcendental ego is not fully in control o f die process. Indeed, as 
will become clearer after looking at Heidegger’s term Ereignis (event or truth event), the 
self-disclosing act is relational instead of one-sided. (2) The discernment o f truth is a 
hermeneutical problem more than an ontological or epistemological one. In other 
words, truth is evident and willing to “show” itself, but meaning needs a delivery, and 
Da-sein, in relationship to Being, provides that entry point for both the self-showing of ii
Being and the validation/authentication of Da-sein. Existensg  ^ Da-sein’s unique 
participation in the world, is itself, part of die “hermeneutical key” in truth’s self­
disclosure. That there is meaning (at all) depends on the manifestation of being in die 
world — through Da-sein, as a part o f Da-sein.
Da-sein “in the world” ( in der Well)
Da-sein literally means “diere-being” from die German and is Heidegger’s unique way of 
expressing human existence in its individual, particular manifestation. Da-sein, in 
addition to being defined as partaking bodi o f the specific and die transcendent, must 
take into account diat the way it finds itself is “in the world” {in der Welfy, specifically, Da­
sein finds itself “dirown” igwatfefi) into the world.^^^ This “throwness” reveals that Da-
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sein is “in a definite world and together with a definite range o f innerworldly beings” '^^ '^  
and indicates die “disclosedness” o f Da-sein and of any other innerworldly being. Being 
“disclosed” is how one reveals the trudi of being (or die “unconcealment” for which 
Heidegger uses the Greek aletheif^j and indicates as well that Da-sein is also defined as 
Mit-seiii, that is, bound together with other beings in a relationship of care or concern 
(So/ge). How Da-sein positions itself in die world depends on whetiier Da-sein has 
chosen to be authentic or inauthentic — that is, Da-sein eidier treats the world-at-hand in 
an objectifying way, using tilings and others as one would a tool, or else Da-sein awakens 
to itself in its “potentialit}?'-of-being” diat is the “truth of existence" ’^’^ and Da-sein’s attitude 
toward the world and those others in it is transformed. Heidegger’s expression 
“potentiality-of-being” refers to audientic Da-sein which is fully disclosed, cleared and 
resolute in its attunement. Heidegger identifies Afigst as a call which awakens Da-sein to 
its “potentiality-of-beiiig” by revealing die deadi that Da-sein inevitably faces, in which 
Da-sein “must absolutely “take itself back””.^ '^  ^ This is in fact the moment of trudi for 
Da-sein, for either Da-sein faces the certainty o f death, and thereby puts into action its 
“potentiality-of-being” or else Da-sein in fear turns away from diis certainty and slides 
back into an inauthentic mode of avoidance and ultimately, forgetfulness. Heidegger has 
grandly accused modern thought of “forgetfulness” in letting the reflection on “being” 
slip to lower concern. Heidegger is in effect calling for die re-attunement of our 
thinking.
Regardless o f whether or not one chooses an audientic or inauthentic mode o f being, 
being is ultimately bound up in die question of temporality. Heidegger has introduced 
Da-sein as a being which is specific, temporally and spatially, and at die same time 
defined as partaking of being which is “the transcendens", thus Heidegger states: 
“PhenomenologciaL truth (disdosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis" Heidegger’s use of 
transcendens is related to how he posits die existensy^  o f Dasein — Dasein can be said to be
366 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f  New York Press, 1996, p. 203
3'’’^ Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
Universitjr o f New York Press, 1996, p. 202
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 204
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 284
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 34
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transcendent not in the metaphysical sense, but in the way tliat Dasein’s experiences are 
temporal and yet ecstatically reach beyond the “m o m e n t . H e i d e g g e r  explains.
The ecstatic unity of temporality — tliat is, the unity of the “outside-itself ’ 
in the raptures of tlie future, the having-been, and the present — is the 
condition of die possibility diat diere can be a being that exists as its 
“There.” [Da-sein as “there-being”] The being that bears die name Da­
sein is “cleared” ... Wliat essentially clears this being, that is, makes it 
“open” as well as “bright” for itself, was defined as care, before any 
“temporal” interpretadon ... We understand the light of this clearedness 
only if we do not look for an innate, objectively present power, but rather 
question the whole constitution of being of Da-sein, care, as to the 
unified ground o f its existential possibility. Ecstatic temporality clears the 
Thereprimordially. It is die primary regulator of die possible unity o f all the 
essential existential structures of Da-sein.^^^
As Caputo notes, Heidegger returns to the word “ecstasy” in Was istMetaphysik seemingly 
emphasising its religious-mystical etymology, ek-stasis: “Da-sein’s existence is ek-static," it 
is “a standing out in {aus-steheii) the trudi o f Being, a standing open to the Open itself 
The transcendent nature of being is expressed, and can only be expressed, when a being 
is cleared in diis ecstatic unity o f temporality; when the being, from within, realises die 
ultimate “outside itself’ (ecstatic) mode which is defined by temporality. Da-sein lives 
into die temporal restriction of life itself and finds others diere, too. Later, this 
happening is called Ereignis, an “event” or “self-spectacle” or “appropriation.”^^'* Da- 
sein’s existence and being depend on die ecstatic unity of temporality, what Heidegger 
describes as a horizon.^^^ Importandy, Young points out that Heidegger uses the horizon 
to expose modernity’s “siclaiess,” that is, metaphysics. For metaphysics, Young 
summarises, is the “absolutization of a horizon of disclosure” so diat instead of 
realising that there are many horizons, one chooses to focus singularly on a particular 
disclosure, neglecting the multiplicity of horizons. This is part of what die 
phenomenologists sought to make clear — single perspectives can only yield partial truths. 
Young explains that metaphysics
See Robert J. Dostal, “Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 156 
372 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
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Heidegger, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 179
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misses ... not the being of beings, not being, but ratlier the fact that that 
tliere are just these universal traits which have categorical status for us is 
dependent on tlie selection made from the smorgasbord o f attributes 
possessed by reality itself ... And missing that, missing, not our horizon of 
disclosure but ratlier its horisypntal character — the perspectival character of 
our basic perspective on things — it elevates its account o f the being of 
beings into the (one and only) categorical account of reality itself/^^
' I
One o f the most serious oversights o f such a single-minded approach is the loss o f depth 
or mystery, or in otlier words tlie “sublimity” ’^® or “holiness” of Being. As Heidegger 
writes in The Question Concerning Technology, the effect of absolutizing a horizon is to “drive 
out every other possibility of revealing ... Above all, that revealing which, in the sense of 
poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance” ’^® And here. Young points out, 
by suppressing the revealing in tlie sense o fpoiesis, one further misses the “Es gibt” sense 
of the world as “g i v e n . S o ,  in absolutizing a horizon one misses the multiplicity in 
perspective, the depth and mystery tliat other perspectives bring, and the natural sense in 
which the World is given.
i
Because o f Da-sein’s constitution and the ecstatic unity of temporality, the world can 
never be conceived of as something “objectively present” for the world, Heidegger 
writes, ““is” “there” together with the outside-itself of the ecstasies. If  no Da-sein exists, 
no world is “there” either.” ®^*
Self and world belong together in one being, Dasein. Self and world are 
not two beings, as subject and object, not as you and I, but are — in the 
unity of the structure of Being-in-the-world — the fundamental 
determination of Dasein its elf.
Or as Steffney makes clear, Heidegger’s Dasein is never a mere “self” but necessarily 
includes a world, and even Being. Steffney further interprets Dasein as tlie very bridge.
Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 29 
Young’s term in Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002, p. 20
Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technolo ,^ as cited by Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 29
Young cites Heidegger, “ ... poeisis is the Greek sense o f  the manifest world as Tarought forth’, ‘granted’ 
to us in Being’s self-disclosmg act, the sense o f ‘nature’, in the broadest sense, as the jg^disclosure o f  Being 
(What is Called Thinking p. 237) in Young, Juhan, Heide^er’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 29.
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State 
University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 334
Heidegger, Marlin, Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie as quoted by Zimmerman, Michael E., EcHpse of the 
Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 27
141 Ithe “heart of the ontological difference, the link between Being and beings, the onto-
" - Ïconscious dimension tliat transmits tlie revealment of Being.” ®^^
Heidegger is often accused of single-minded concern for Da-sein and Da-sein’s 
potentiality-of-being, but it is important to note tliat Da-sein is cleared and ‘realised’ not 
in isolation but in the community o f others, that Da-sein in finding itself thrown into the S
world, is there witli others in the same predicament so that ratlier than fending each for 
oneself, each self is defined by tlie givenness o f tlie otlier, mit-sein.
The relations o f significance tliat determine the structure of the world are 
not a network of forms tliat is imposed upon some material by a 
worldless subject. Ratlier, factical Da-sein, ecstatically understanding itself 
and its world in tlie unity o f tlie There, comes back from these horizons 
to the beings encountered in tliem. Coming back to tliese beings 
understandingly is the existential meaning of letting them be encountered 
in making them present; for this reason they are called innerworldly. The 
world is, so to speak, already “furtlier outside” tlian any object could ever 
be.""*
The blending of subject and object comes when Da-sein retreats from the “horizon” of 
the ecstasy of time, and upon returning sees and understands itself and tlie world around 
more completely. The transcendent nature of being revealed in the ecstasy o f temporality 
comes to Da-sein in an epiphanal sense, but not because Da-sein has moved beyond or 
out o f itself. Instead, Da-sein comes back into tlie world of beings which reveals itself 
and Da-sein alike in opening fully in tlie present moment, like the rose opening in tlie 
fullness of time. O f course, “fullness” here is not ment to indicate linear, but die multi- 
dimentionality o f time. As Caputo notes of Heidegger’s later exposition, die rose is a 
model for Da-sein in that its blossoming arises “because” and not within the confines of 
external justification — “why” implies “time” (for Eckhart) and rational sciences (for 
Heidegger)."®" There is no inside or outside, no subject to encounter an object so to 
speak. Truth or essence is a self-revealing which does not depend on die objectifying 
mission o f gathering data; and viewed from this perspective, it acts out of its true nature.
Steffney, John, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 
27 Quly, 1977) p. 325
3®“' Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A  Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State 
University o f  New York Press, 1996, p. 335
®®^ Caputo further explains; “Dasein must be without why, not in the sense o f  that which lies forth o f itself 
{das VorUegendè), but in the sense o f letting the being lie forth (jZorliegen-lassefi). Dasein must suspend 
representational thinking in order to let Being arise, emerge, and stand forth. Otherwise Being becomes an 
object measured by the dimensions o f tlie human subject.” Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in 
Heidegger, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 191
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“without why.” Wliat Heidegger indicates by Da-sein “taking itself back” is the retrieval 
o f the objectifying subject who would impose itself on the world of beings to use those 
around as one would a tool, in order to re-orientate itself to its primary constitution of 
“care” {Sorge), Although not entirely clear, Heidegger seems to be suggesting that part of 
what enables Da-sein to revert back to itself, after the resounding call o f Angst, and not 
be self-consumed, is tlie constituent part of Da-sein that cares for others. Heidegger will 
use the image of a hermeneutic circle and tautology to reinforce this doubling back on 
itself o f Da-sein and it is partly the assertion tliat Da-sein is defined by care that keeps 
the image from complete solipsism, egoism, or indeed Nietzschean will-to-power. Thus 
far, already in Heidegger’s early concerns, there is die attempt to posit Da-sein as one 
who is re-attuned to die depdi and breaddi of what it means to exit in die world. In 
time, and yet not fully defined by temporal concerns, Da-sein lives outwardly, and indeed 
is called out o f itself by die holy mystery diat eludes definition. But Da-sein is not alone 
— neither heroic nor desolate — Da-sein is because others are. Da-sein is wrapped up widi 
odiers intimately such diat to “be” is to care for others. Da-sein’s existence is not 
primarily a singular concern and secondarily concerned for odiers, but from the Ï
‘beginning’ defined by Sotge. This orientation of Da-sein is not given the attention t
deserved. It is a mistake to place too much emphasis of Da-sein coming to a self- 
understanding in relation to Being when community is as “given” as the existence of Da­
sein. As Caputo points out of H eide^er’s later emphasis in putting aside questioning 
“why” (which gives deference to reason) and looks more closely at “because” -  Being is 
not an answer but a “gift”, a “favour.”"®"
Heidegger’s project in Bemg and Time has justifiably been criticized for being far too 
preoccupied with the ontological grounding of being (in Da-sein at the horizon of the 
ecstasy o f time) and dius becoming as immobile as any predecessor’s Heidegger himself 
has criticized. He admits as much in discussing his famous “turning(s)” {Kehre). Further, 
speaking of “resoluteness” in the face of the certainty of death, or the historicity of Da- 
sein’s “potentiality-of-being” as shaped by die National Socialist Party of Germany 
proved beyond any doubt diat diis particular mode of expression was more than 
ineffective, but dangerous in the wrong treatment. It is a grim example o f die tyranny of 
an absolutized horizon pursued with singular resoluteness. The “later” H eide^er moved
see Was is Metaphysik, 49/358, as noted by John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heide^er, Athens; 
Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 164
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May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, 
London and New York:Routledge Press, 1996, p. 2
see Graham Parkes’ essay “Rising sun over Black Forest,” in May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: 
East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, London and New York:RouÜedge Press, 1996, pp. 
79-117
away from some of tliis more ontologically grounded tliought Wliat can be seen in his 
early writing, however, is Heidegger’s desire to furtlier the collapse of tlie phenomena- 
noumena dualism that Husserl began, but did not follow through effectively. Heidegger 
locates the key to this collapse, in Being and Time, within Da-sein itself and this 
anthropological weighting has its own set of problems. However, as Heidegger 
continued to develop his understanding of Da-sein (to the point at which he nearly 
stopped using the term, “Da-sein”), he explores Das Nichts and the Abyss at the core of 
Da-sein and the issue of “grounding” becomes an “ungrounding”, a radical interpretation 
o f the ‘ontology’ of Da-sein. Heidegger’s latest writings keep the idea of Das Nichts A
nearby as he explores tlie idea of “being on the way” and “thinking.” These later 
writings seem to want to make up tlie deficit o f movement tliat the earlier ontological 
grounding denied.
Eastern Heidegger
Reinhard May’s text, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, attempts to bring to light the hardly 
dismissible, yet, curiously ignored, exposure Heidegger had with Chinese and Japanese 
texts and cultural emissaries in the form o f students and visitors. May patiently draws 
together (historically) the work Heidegger did regarding the “way” and “being on tlie 
way” with his conversations and work with Paul Hsiao in translating the first chapter of 
the Taofl such that Heidegger freely re-words the verses in chapter 15: “Who is able by 1
making tranquil to bring something into Being? The tao of heaven.”"®’ Ultimately, May 
concludes, Heidegger’s “Conversation” (elsewhere translated “A Dialogue on Language 
between a Japanese and an Inquirer”) in On the Way to Language is a Idnd of “confession” 
tliat Heidegger had real interchange with the Eastern non-metaphysical tradition and 
owes more recognition to this tradition tlian he has publicly admitted or freely stated, 
and that indeed his silence speaks loudly in the matter. Graham Parkes relates the 
historical encounters of Heidegger with Japanese philosophers in the 1920’s and 1930’s 
(e.g. N i s h i d a ’s student TAN ABE Hajime, the political thinker MiKI Kiyoshi, and /
Professor KUKI Shüzô who features in tlie “Dialogue”)."®® The meetings and sharing of ,
ideas preceded Heidegger’s own publishing of seminal turning points in his career (What /
" ï ' îis Metaphysics, Origin of the Work of Art). Thus, many have speculated as to how much
see Graliam Parkes’ essay “Rising sun over Black Forest,” in May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: 
East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, London and New York;Routledge Press, 1996, pp. 
79-117
“Das Sein des Seienden ist aber überhaupt nur verstehbar — und darin liegt die tiefste Endlichkeit der 
Transzendenz — wenn das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens sich in das Nichts hineinhalt,” Kant und das 
Problem der Metaphysik [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951], p. 214, as quoted by Steffiiey, John, 
“Transmetaphysical Tliinldng in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 (July, 1977) p. 
327
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"AHeidegger was influenced in his meditations on Das Nichts, particularly by the Kyoto 
School of Philosophy as they were simultaneously wrestling witli tlie Buddhist concept of 
mujsUfiyatd, emptiness, and likewise Heidegger’s meditations on the “way” in reference to 
the Chinese tao. Discussions surrounding an Eastern influence on Heidegger must 
remain speculative for Heidegger rarely spoke of these contacts and only occasionally 
remarked on tlie Zen and Chinese philosophical ideas to which he had been exposed."®®
Instead, Heidegger was more apt to draw the reader back to early Greek or German A
source material for his own thought It is not the purpose here to further substantiate A
these influences except to agree that Heidegger had more meaningful exchange with |
Eastern material than he cared to discuss or reveal and his reasons for leaving tlie 
Eastern philosophy to surface by itself are ponderous. Wliat is quite obvious, however, 
is that Heidegger’s thinking around tlie phenomenological exposé of Da-sein is filled out 
with greater deptli and meaning as he turns his attention to botli tlie aspects of Das 
Nichts and ‘being on the way’. Wliat is more, tlie Eastern tradition that influenced Zen 
Buddhism (including tlie Mahâyâna concept of emptiness as discussed in earlier chapters) 
has viewed these issues as integral in defining meaningful existence.
Da-sein and Das Nichts
Pleidegger’s view o f Da-sein is deepened when he meditates on non-being, and his 
ontological emphasis lightens:
The Being of beings, however, is comprehensible only -  and in tliis lies 
the deepest finitude of transcendence — when Dasein by its very nature, 
plunges into Non-being."®®
Transcendence and non-being come together in Da-sein so as to create paradoxical 
ontology: being defined by non-being. The transcendence o f Da-sein is only fully 
realised in Da-sein’s most serious limitation: the certainty of deatli. Heidegger proposes 
that Da-sein’s transcendental nature via an un-grounding in Das Nichts is tlie basis for 
authenticity in the world-at-hand, tlie world o f beings. Zimmerman states it tlius:
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“Dasein is embodied openness to what is.”"®* Embodiment and the clearing, like the 
transcendent and immanent, ratlier than at odds or competition for dominance, become 
the ‘ground’ for tlie other. Heidegger finds meaning not located in idealistic 
transcendental planes of consciousness, but in openings, clearings where Being itself is 
brought to light in an occasion of self-showing. Heidegger speaks o f JJchtiing, the 
“clearing” which is also a “lighting” and tlie way in which phenomena show themselves 
as they are. Clearings, as tliose in the forest, have boundaries — they are simultaneously 
enclosures. Hence, the act of bringing to light is in the same instance covering up, 
concealing. And now what is exhibited is the “play” of Being and beings in the light of 
the clearing o f Da-sein, the consciousness that engages the world.
Heidegger, in Was ist Metcp/ysik?, examines the ground of being and finds tliere “Das 
Nichts", not in the grounding sense of an absolute Nothing, for as he points out, speaking 
of “nothing is" is wholly ridiculous. Ratlier, Heidegger wishes to introduce the nothing 
of an abyss, which is also inextricably part of the being of Da-sein. Moreover, it is the 
act o f holding itself out into Das Nichts that characterises Da-sein’s experience in the 
world o f beings. That is to say, die facing towards transcendence in which Da-sein faces 
Das Nichts, simultaneously places Da-sein within a tme, in the sense o f “audientic”, 
relationship with the world o f beings.
Because of its transcendental nature, Dasein must be thought of as 
comprising not merely a “self’ but, more inclusively, a world — even more 
inclusively, Being."®^
Heidegger refers to human and Da-sein’s existence as “ek-sistence” — diat which reaches 
beyond itself toward Being. “Standing in the light of Being is what I call the ek-sistence 
of man (sic).”"®" Heidegger finds die absolutism of modernity’s metaphysics a deadly 
trap and inaudientic to existence that finds not an ontological ground but the Abyss. 
However, Heidegger criticises Nietzsche’s Absolute Nothing which ultimately works 
polar to modernity’s substance as an equal absolute.
Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., 
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Da-sein on the way
In his 1950 lecture entitled, “Language,” Heidegger begins his reflections with what a 
logician might call an “empty tautaulogy”: “Language itself is language.” Anticipating tlie 
criticism, he states.
Merely to say the identical thing twice — language is language — how is 
tliat supposed to get us anywhere? But we do not want to get anywhere.
We would like only, for once, to get just where we are already."®'* |
Joan Stambaugh remarks tliat Heidegger speaks of a ‘way’ which is not a metliod, and 
which is no pre-subscribed route with beginning and end-point. She quotes from 
Heidegger’s essay, “On the Way to Language” (translated by Peter D. Hertz, but witli 
Stambaugh’s minor changes):
Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining 
underway ... We must get on the way, tliat is, must take the steps by 
which alone the way becomes a way. The way of thinking cannot be 
traced from somewhere to somewhere like a well-worn rut, nor does it at 
all exist as such in any place. Only when we walk it, and in no other 
fashion, only, tliat is, by tlioughtful questioning, are we on the move on 
the way. This movement is what allows the way to come forward."®"
It is important to note that Heidegger would choose tautology and paradox in 
lectures/essays on “language”. This should re-enforce what was earlier stated in terms of 
seeing around what is “merely spoken about, meant, or perceived”. Some have called 
Heidegger’s later writing “mystical” with tlie negative connotation indicating that it 
becomes obscure and even less comprehensible. Others have explored the “mystical 
elements” in Heidegger’s writing claiming that he is pointing beyond tlie cognitive to an 
experience that cannot be captured with language; to meaning that defies explanation."®"
Heidegger’s use of motion in this passage recalls Meister Eckhart’s Gelassenheit and 
mirrors the “stillness in motion,” “acting witliout acting” or “a doing o f non-doing” that
H eide^er, Martin, “Language: 1950,” Language: Hermeneutical Inquity, vol. 2, edited by David Klemm, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 42
Stambaugh, Joan, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question o f Metaphysics,” Heidegger and Asian Thought, 
ed. Graham Parkes, Hawai’i: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 82
35<5 Caputo quotes from Heidegger’s Habilitalionsschrift on Duns Scotus to point out H eide^er’s early 
concern with the overly rationalistic view o f philosophy and thinking: “Philosophy as a rationalistic 
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John D., The Mystical Element in Heidegger, Athens: Ohio Umversity Press, 1978, p. 7
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is described by N i s h i d a /®’ Heidegger speaks o f being underway without travelling to a 
pre-determined destination. It is one’s openness to the experience of being underway 
which “allows the way to come forward.” Stambaugh again quotes from “On the Way to 
Language:”
To clear a way, for instance across a snow-covered field. Is in the 
Alemannic-Swabian dialect still called wëge?f^  ^even today. This verb, used 
trasitively, means: to form a way and forming it, to keep it ready. Way- 
making understood in tliis sense no longer means to move somediing up 
or down a path that is already diere. It means to bring die way ... fordi 
first o f all, and thus to be the way. "®®
Here Heidegger collapses the subject-object duality of walking a well-worn rut toward a 
destination into the non-dual understanding o f way-malting as being die way itself. 
Indeed, he has brought us back to a tautology.
In an earlier essay (1947) Heidegger addresses die pathway, this time introducing die 
interplay of heaven and eardi in the formation of die one on the way:
The oak itself spoke: Only in such growdi is grounded what lasts and 
fructifies. Growing means this: to open oneself up to the breadth of 
heaven and at the same time to sink roots into die darkness of the earth. 
Wliatever is genuine thrives only if man [sic] does justice to bodi: ready 
for die appeal of the highest heaven, and transformed [aufgehobefl in the 
protection of the sustaining eardi. (FW, 3/89)'*®°
Ereignis: die event of belonging togedier of being and Being
The event of the way coming forward only while one is “underway” is very much in line 
with Heidegger’s discussion of the Appropriation (Ereignis) of Da-sein. Stambaugh 
explains that “way-making is how Appropriation (the belonging togedier of man [sic] and
 —   . 1357 Nishida, Kitaro, A n Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe & Christopher Ives, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1990 (originally published by Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1921), p. 34 ji
358 The word Bewegung, without an umlaut, conveys the meaning o f movement. However, wëgen (‘way 
making’) is a word that Heidegger manipulates to better express his intention that the term carry both the 
transitive and intransitive connotations o f action and being acted upon.
355 Stambaugh, Joan, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question o f Metaphysics,” Heide^er and Asian Thought, 
ed. Graham Parkes, Hawai’i: University of Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 83. Similarly, Stambaugh also notes that 
Heidegger relates his usage o f call (heissen) to the New Testament Greek kelenein and the Sanskrit origins o f  
the term that indicate an invitation rather than a command.
400 Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed.,
Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 273
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Being) a p p r o p r i a t e s . S h e  also asserts that Appropriation is the '^primordial relation” 
which is “thought by Heidegger under botli aspects of identity and difference ... [to be] 
more fundamental than the “elements” in it. The elements, man and Being, don’t 
constitute the relation; the relation constitutes tlie e l e m e n t s . D a v i d  F. Krell terms 
Breignis as “the propriative event” and ties it to disclosure (aletheia) while noting that the 
propriative event is always also “expropriative.”''^  ^ Hofstadter makes the English clearer 
by explaining the etymology of the term “Ereigfiis” which contains the meaning of the 
verb eipien in which one makes sometliing one’s own as well as an earlier verb eraugnen 
which means to bring sometliing before ones eyes, or to show. Thus, das Breignis, “the 
event” is the playful dance in which beings botli reveal and appropriate each other in the 
“play of eraugnen and ereignen” Zimmerman points out tliat the “ringing, circling play” 
that is Brelgnis, out of which the world malces itself manifest, is not a ground but an abyss 
{Ab-gnind)
There is movement described in what Stambaugh calls a relationship, and Krell terms an 
event. The movement is not as from subject to object, beings to Being, nor understood 
in reverse, from Being to beings. The movement is rather what Heidegger describes in 
the excerpt above when he describes waying bringing forth the path. In human terms 
(which is how Heidegger treats tlie topic in Being and Time), opening or clearing “oneself’ 
audientically brings forth the other which is always already there, but often times 
concealed or obscured. The action of clearing oneself (alêtbeid), of opening oneself and 
of letting be {Gelassenheii) so tliat tlie patli comes forth is what Stambaugh means by 
asserting that for Heidegger, the “relation constitutes tlie elements.” The movement 
described here is not o f one element asserting its will to force another into relationship. 
The movement is one of both action and non-action — opening oneself authentically and 
letting anotlier be. Hence, waying is tlie patli. If  Heidegger never achieved complete 
non-duality in Being and Time, it can be argued that in tliese later essays he moves in tliis 
direction.
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:
A:
Heidegger’s description of Etngnis as the event/relationship of Da-sein to Being as one 
o f disclosure {alêtheiâ) which at once authenticates Da-sein, but also reveals tlieir 
primordial relation — that they belong together and always already are appropriated, one 
to another, recalls Dogen’s efforts to explain Buddha-nature. The arguments appear 
circular: one’s Buddha-nature is autlienticated in an enlightenment experience; however, 
the Buddha-nature that is made manifest has never not been manifested. Heidegger 
states:
Being itself is the relationship {Verhaltnis) insofar as it [—Being] holds 
(hall) ek-sistence (Ek-sislenf) in its existential, i.e., ex-static essence (IVesen) 
in itself and gadiers it [=Eksistenz] to itself as tlie dwelling place of the 
trutli o f Being in the midst of beings.'*”^
Wliat both Heidegger and Dogen would like the student/practitioner to recognize is tliat 
being in tlie world is at its essence a relationship — (transcendent) Being to/witli 
(immanent) beings — and authentic existence opens to tliis truth in a self-relinquishing 
manner which at once is totally transformative. Heidegger understands Being and being 
interdependently: “Presencing (A.n-2veseîi) requires letting-be-present (An-msenfassetl),
presencing needs the openness of a clearing in which it may be what it is.”'*^  ^ In his 
reflections on Heidegger’s Contrlhutions to Pbilosophj, Otto Foggier writes that for 
Heidegger, “the divine by definition needs being in order not to forget itself and its 
greatness,” that the divine condescends to participate in history and human language 
while at the same time human beings look beyond the historical to tlie many showings of 
the divine. And thus, the temporal and eternal come together through tlie fulfilment of 
experience:
The temporality of human being is fulfilled in tlie moment o f insight, 
which is imagined in tlie Contributions as the play of space and time on the 
occasion of a moment of insight. On this occasion o f a moment of 
insight, time and space together flourish as one in eternity, though this 
eternity must be reimagined in the moment of insight as having the 
character o f the divine. Thus it becomes determined as “passing”: as tliat 
in which time is fulfilled in tlie experience of the divine, when the restless 
questioning of Dasein is stilled in a shattering unquestionability; then time 
wins its freedom, able to cede its position and to malie way for anotlier 
time. The accord of time, eternity, and the moment of insight can only
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be grasped in repetition, which (beyond recollection) lets what has been 
repeat itself in another way. The divine, whose essence is passing, is 
given to Dasein in a sign, so diat the divine eliminates itself when it is 
given to human being — suddenly and fleetingly, not firmly and 
unalterably.'*”®
Foggier sees here a parallel to Heidegger’s appreciation of Holderlin’s poetry as he voiced 
in his lectures o f 1934/5 in which he cites the hymn “The Festival of Peace” where 
heavenly tilings are described as “quickly past” and the eternity of the heavenly or divine 
as a “fleeting, scarcely graspable sign ... which can show everytliing blessed and 
everything terrible in the instant of its passing.”'*”^  Heidegger’s incorporation of 
Holderlin’s description o f tlie fleeting nature of eternity in relation to human existence 
resonates well with Nagarjuna’s description of nirvana and samsara and Dogen’s 
description o f the dynamic interdependence of Buddha-nature and living beings. Rather 
than seeing tliem as categorical states o f being, they must be treated and approached 
relationally, or in Buddhist terminology, from the standpoint o fpratttya-samutpada, that is, 
co-dependentiy arising in a repeatable pattern, yet always renewed.
Thus Heidegger’s reluctance, as intimated at the beginning of this chapter, to express 
himself within the language norms o f tlieology become clearer. He himself states, “The 
holy cannot be expressed ‘theologically’ at all, for all ‘theology’ presupposes God with 
such certainty tliat everywhere tlieology looks, God has already taken flight.”'*^” Instead, 
Heidegger puts forward poetry as the “language” and profound or meditative thinking as 
two means which most effectively evoke the sacred, tlie divine.
DichUn (poetry) and Denken (tliinking)
It has been suggested tliat what Heidegger calls meditative tliinking (Denken) approaches 
what the Zen practitioners describe as seated meditation (i^ a^en). Elements that have 
caused some to see tliis parallel include Heidegger’s description of allowing the way to 
arise spontaneously by using tlie German mystical term favoured by Meister Eckhart, 
Gelassenehiet. Caputo notes “tliere is a strictness, a discipline, in Heidegger’s concept of 
Gelassenheit an ascetic overtone for thinking — it is a “persevering meditation” (ausdauernde
‘108 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trails John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
(originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 330
409 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press 
(originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 330
from his second Holderlin lecture as cited by Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans 
John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 333
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üesinmmg)T^ And for Caputo, dûs “speaks of effort, practice, care with thinking, more so 
than calculative thinking.”'*^  ^ Meditative diinking is distinctive from 'representational 
thinking’ as Young points out, in that representational thinking always occurs “witiiin a 
horizon o f disclosure” whereas meditative thinldng is “in a certain sense, 
'horizonless’.”**^  ^ Likewise, whereas representational thinking establishes boundaries and 
categories, meditative diinldng allows die 'the mystery’ a presencing while it yet remains 
'the mystery’ and thereby allows it “to remain 'nameless’.”'*^'* Meditative thinking is 
similar, then, to poetic thinking in that both “allow 'the holy enigma [RatseJf to come 
'close’ to us 'as the enigma’”/^  ^ Heidegger states in What is Called Thinking “ ...when 
poesy is elevated and thinking profound” they think “the same.”'*^” It is Young’s 
conclusion that aldiough meditative thinking and great poetry share the same concern, 
yet, for Heidegger, diey are different modes that accomplish a different access. 
Meditative thinking is only able to bring one close or to die “brink of the mystical” — it is 
able to indicate the existence of die 'holy enigma’ but not to bring one into intimacy with 
die holy. Young considers Heidegger’s meditative thinking as that which indicates the 
holy, the mystery, negatively by showing die boundaries of cognitive expression. 
Poetry/art, on the other hand, brings the holy into “positive presence” by “thematizing” 
it.'*^ ’ Poetry/art allows humans a way to participate in the divine that cognitive and even 
meditative diinking cannot; poetry/art is immediate and intuitive. Interestingly, Young 
concludes that although it seems diat poetry/art is given privilege over thinking o f any 
kind, even meditative, still thinking has its definitive role in the “verification” of 
poetry/art by testing it.'*^® Young and others have noted that Heidegger’s later writing 
seems to want to merge philosophical writing with poetic utterance, what Young 
considers a “perfect marriage” and odiers consider greater chaos and obscurity in his 
meaning.
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Philosophical concepts as 'formal indication’
In The Fimdamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Tinitude, Solitude Heidegger argues that 
Dasein must question what it means to belong to the “wholeness” that is tlie world, 
what it means to be finite, and what is the individuation of Dasein itself. But tlie asking 
of these questions must be undertaken in a way tliat makes them relevant in addressing 
the “need” of Dasein: “The question which continues to face us is simply whether or 
not we are capable of experiencing, or at least releasing, the liberating power harboured 
within tliese questions as questions.”'*^  One of Heidegger’s projects in tliis volume is to 
show tliat philosophical concepts themselves are not tlie location o f truth for Dasein 
regarding the world, but tliat they do (I) indicate that there is truth for Dasein, and (2) 
prepare Dasein for engaging that trutli. The honest or sincere questioning activity of 
Dasein brings Dasein to the '''brink of possibility, the possibility M  restoring to Dasein its 
actuality, tliat is, its existenceT^^  ^ Really living is Dasein’s goal and philosophy is a “formal 
indication” to the truth and realisation o f diis goal. Heidegger says that “Philosophizing 
... can only lead us to the brink and always remains something penultimate in this 
respect.” At the brink, one is left to make a “leap” for “ [o]nly individual action itself can 
dislodge us from tliis brink of possibility into actuality, and tliis is the moment of visionT"^ ^^  
Heidegger writes tliat “[a]ll philosophical concepts are formally indicative, and only if they 
are taken in this way do they provide tlie genuine possibility of comprehending 
sometliing.”"*^  ^ Heidegger describes tlie “comprehending something” thus: “True
understanding never proves its mettle in repeating sometliing after someone, but only in 
its power to lead understanding into genuine action, into objective achievement, which 
by no means primarily consists in the production of more philosophical literature.”'*^'* 
Here Heidegger sets up the moment of vision, the Augenblick, as tlie active realisation or 
comprehension o f Dasein — philosophising does not achieve its goal in the philosopher’s 
head. Moreover, Heidegger has also stated diat “Philosophizing is something living only
Heidegger, Martin, TbeFmidamentd Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitnde, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 5
“'20 Heidegger, Martin, The Fimdamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitnde, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 170
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422 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
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Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
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where it comes to language and expresses itself O f course, the moment
philosophy “comes to language” it is immediately misinterpreted. This is entirely 
unavoidable given how we commonly approach meaning (i.e. like we do other objects in 
the world, as “something present at hand”), however, it should not be a discouragement 
from philosophy. We merely need to know how philosophising works, that is, it 
provides a person tlie space needed to engage in “genuine exposition and explication” of 
the questions (what is world, what is finitude, what is individuation) that will allow one to 
free Dasein and “ .. .let the intrinsic relationships betineen world, individuation, and finitude emerge 
together.”'*^” Heidegger also warns against the “direct” approach, philosophical concepts 
do not “directly intend what tliey mean” and we should avoid that kind of direct 
correlative thinking for the relationship between Dasein and the essence of what it means 
to be in the world is one tliat is made clear in a moment of vision where such truths 
“emerge.” Thus, one should not expect to construct philosophical systems that contain, 
or in any way explain, the more essential elements of existence. At the same time, 
philosophising is an excellent patli of approach to authentic existence.
At tliis point, it is again perhaps clarifying to compare Heidegger’s direction to the 
Buddhist treatment of utterances and different modes of expression. Nàgârjuna was not 
inclined to grant any utterance tlie privilege of being anytliing but an indicator of the 
mystery beyond. Words are vehicles whose scope is limited beyond which only silence 
reigns. Philosophical discourse has the sole purpose of frustrating cognitive paths so that 
the participant ceases to engage in such thinldng and eventually shuts it down -  there is a 
rest, a stillness, beyond the work o f thinking. Once tliis is accomplished, tliere is notliing 
left but the full participation (practice) in Buddhist activity. True practice takes the place 
o f 'great' art. Dogen has perhaps a more complementary path to Heidegger in that he 
takes “expression” and turns it inside out so that it expresses tlie individual as much as it 
is expressive o f an individual. In tliis way, both individuals and expression share a reality 
in non-duality tliat may be where Heidegger would find affinity. As discussed in the 
Dogen chapter, koan normally are used as a tool, a verbal test, to shatter an individual’s 
pre-conceived outlook so that a flash of insight may provoke transformation in the 
practitioner. Plowever, Dogen makes the case tliat kOan are more than mere verbal tools
^^25 Heidegger, Martin, The Fimdavmtld Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill 
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with which one utilizes and casts aside once the insight has been gained. By internalising 
the koan, as was indicated in the Dogen chapter, Dogen shows how even a verbal tool 
shares in the moment of insight, for the koan works existentially within the practitioner 
tlirough the transformation process and all aspects of the individual share the 
transformation.
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Heidegger’s Dialogue on Language provides a working exemplar of the way in which
Heidegger and Dogen share a similar view o f language and its relationship to beings.
First o f all, Heidegger chooses to express himself in the form of a “dialogue” instead o f a 
more linear philosophical presentation. A “dialogue” is naturally composed of different 
voices, and Heidegger emphasises this by juxtaposing his own voice (as the Inquirer) |
with the voice of a foreigner (the Japanese). Heidegger reminds us in the course of the 
dialogue of the gravity of such a move by recalling that he has considered different /
language groups isolated “houses of being.”"*^’ He softens his earlier consideration by 
admitting that it was a “clumsy” designation and allowing the inquirer to remind him tliat 
exchange between the two “houses” is only “nearly” impossible, not totally impossible.
Much later in the dialogue, the “Japanese” is allowed to say that tliere is a “deeply 
concealed kinship with our thinking, precisely because your patli o f tliinking and its 
language are so wholly other.”'*^® Furtlier, in discussing what Heidegger calls the “two­
fold” of “presence” and “present beings,” the admission of the “deeply concealed 
kinship” between their tliinldng is said to rest or depend on tlie “boundlessness which is 
shown to us in K u f that is, the Buddhist emptiness. Immediately upon this 
pronouncement, Heidegger defines the human being as “tlie message-bearer of tlie 
message of tlie two-fold’s unconcealment”'*^” and also the one “who walks tlie boundary 
o f tlie boundless.”'*^” Thus, Heidegger again suggests tliat Da-sein is the hermeneutic key 
embodied. Humans, like language, contain limits but express or provide opportunity for 
tlie “boundary’s mystery” to take shape, make an appearance. Language is likened to a 
“trail” on which
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an almost imperceptible promise announcing that we would be set free 
into the open, now dark and perplexing, now again lightning-sharp like a 
sudden insight, which then, in turn, eluded every effort to say it/^*
Language and tliought are both pathways or trails tliat lead toward the mystery, yet the 
mystery is really expressed within tlie existence of Da-sein. Heidegger’s Dialogue is a 
meditation in some ways on the collapse of subject and object as expressed through the 
human. Heidegger warns that it is “treacherous” to think in terms o f subject and object. 
The collapse of the subject and object occurs when the essence sought arises not outside 
of the seeker but as a result o f the seeking and indeed because of the necessity o f seeking. 
Language is no simple tool and engaged in properly also participates in Heidegger’s 
“hermeneutical circle” as speaking comes “from out of language’s reality,” thus from the 
source o f itself which is ever “coming.”'*®^ Furthermore, true “saying” is characterised 
“witli more silence tlian talk” and presumably this introduces to the so-called houses of 
being a more common ground tlian they previously saw.'*^  ^ Heidegger chooses to 
describe the source of the saying as “stillness” and “a stilling” that “quiets the breath of 
the vastness into the structure of Saying which calls out to the messenger.”'*^'* One is 
reminded o f the “stilling” and “quieting” aspects of nirmt}a that Nagarjuna speaks about 
after the clutter o fprapanca (conceptual diffusion) has been cleared away.
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There is within the Western phenomenological tradition a respect for the way truth 
speaks through the world and others in the world. And truth is understood as something /
gained or experienced only within the Lehemwelt As Sokolowski points out, the -f
“intentionality” that describes the way a consciousness/ego approaches the world (i.e. 4
through a manifold of intentionalities from pictures, ideas to words) serves to remind us 
that “the mind is a public thing, tliat it acts and manifests out in the open 
Moreover, Sokolowski maintains, phenomenology pushes back on the previous 
philosophy which would posit judgements and meaning itself as entities, either in the 
mind or transcendent to experience (as seen in Kant or Descartes) and suggests rather 
that judgements (and meaning) are a “dimension of presentation” and dependent upon 
the “propositional attitude” o f the subject. That is to say, truth is not detached from 
the phenomenal, but awaits a proper perspective from tlie consciousness which pursues 
it whereby it can be recognized or discovered, or in Heidegger’s terminology, an event of 
discovery (Ereignis). In tliis way, truth stands always available and immanently accessible 
within experience and not as a reified or transcendent ideal. Trutli is the event of 
discovery/ self-showing.
However, as Abe has observed, the West sees religion and philosophy as two separate 
disciplines, engaging different methodologies and pursuing at times, different 
manifestations o f truth. Abe asserts tliat the West sees philosophy as a “human 
enterprise for understanding humans and the universe based on intelligence or reason, 
whereas [religion] is faith in divine revelation.”'*^’ In Eastern thought, particularly in Zen 
Buddhism, there is no such difference, for Abe writes, “(s)iiice Buddhism is originally not 
a religion of faith in a transcendent deity but a religion of awakening to the true nature of 
self and otliers, praxis and theoria, to use Western terms, are interfused and 
undifferentiated.”'*^® This thesis has considered seminal thinkers within the 
Mahâyâna/Zen tradition, Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu within the Yogâcâra 
School, and Dogen, as well as Western philosopher and thinker, Martin Heidegger, and
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evaluated each in terms of a praxi-centric phenomenology. In other words, this thesis 1
has evaluated Abe’s statement by investigating the extent to which and more importantly, 
h-ow, praxis and theoria are brought togetlier in a universalis ed search for truth, reality, or 
die way things are (jathàhütani) .
In discussing Nagarjuna, it becomes clear that he leads Madhyamika thinking in a similar 
direction as the Western school of phenomenology. Nagarjuna decries the reifying 
tendencies of doctrinal Buddhism, and emphatically seeks to clear the practitioner’s mind 
of dogmatic teaching. However, one cannot leave die mundane realm to find the 
transcendent trudi elsewhere. One must instead prepare and cleanse one’s mind of die 
false perceptions and religious doctrines which would serve only to clutter one’s vision 
and further obscure true reality. When religious doctrine replaces genuine practice, dien 
truth is no where to be found.
Likewise, botii Nagarjuna and die Western pheiiomenologists possess great scepticism in 
the human use of language to name or adequately describe truth. The phenomenologists 
would rather recognize language for its role in ascertaining a portion of identity — 
language works with intellect to show up and exhibit, to communicate, àifferânce (widi all 
of its dependencies on presence, absence, gaps) that prepares the consciousness/ego to 
make judgements.'*^*’ But it only goes this far. Meaning, or true identity lies beyond die 
realm o f language and witiiout this understanding, die consciousness cannot get beyond 
the fundamentals of differince. Nagarjuna, too, makes his case to severely limit the 
effectiveness of language to reveal or even discuss die realm o f paramartha-satya or 
ultimate truth. In his more shocking moments he has asserted that the Buddha has in no 
place and at no time ever taught the Dharma, the truth.
Where Nagarjuna most clearly departs from especially Husserlian phenomenology, is the 
latter’s desire to locate (and hence “name”) the source of truth. Nagarjuna emphatically 
denies tiiis pursuit of an essence which bears and communicates meaning. Nâgârjuna’s 
attack o f svabhava, self-nature or essence, is to show that the pursuit of such essences — 
and ultimately The Essence, for this is where die search leads — is die very detriment to 
locating or better, experiencing, meaning. Wliat phenomenologists, like Husserl, propose
439 see Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 
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by clearing away the assumptions and making ready the transcendent ego for an ultimate 
encounter witli truth, is for Nagarjuna what the Buddhist scholars did in his time. That 
is, tliey exchanged one set o f categorical and short-reaching methods for another. If  ever 
Buddhist rhetoric approaches indicating The Essence or Ultimate Reality, it is in relation 
to speaking o f the tathdgata, the tlius gone/come one, the fully completed One, tlie 
Buddha, and in speaking of niruàna. Nàgârjuna dedicates a chapter in the MMK to 
unravelling tlie perceived foundationalism of botli the tathàgata and nirumia in order to 
show how severely misleading a Buddhist doctrinal approach can be.'*'*”
Prompted by the ever-troublesome question of time, Husserl theorises that we can 
identify three ways of dealing witli temporality: world or objective time which works 
according to worldly processes and is measured by worldly standards (clocks, etc); 
internal or subjective time which allows the ego consciousness to play out mental acts; 
and internal time consciousness which is botli the “core” or source of temporality, and at 
the same time which cannot be identified or considered independent o f either internal or 
world time.'*'** Husserl realises tlie problems resultant from the dichotomous presencing 
and absellcing which arise from objective-subjective treatment of time, and looks for the 
source o f the distinction. He finds it, ultimately, in tlie transcendent ego.
Vdieii Nagarjuna approaches the troubling problem of time and distinctions, his solution 
attempts to drive the seeker out o f tlie dead-end reasoning and perspective o f the 
samsark. Looking beyond the objective and subjective does not provide the source for 
botli, or rather, it does not provide tlie ontological ego-source, but instead Nagarjuna 
offers the opening of sûnyatâ — emptiness which in away “supports” both samjàra2X\à. 
nirvana. Within the approach o f sünyatâ differences are irrelevant. The pursuit o f limits is 
absorbed by its own impossibility, logically, and Nàgârjuna offers instead of àifferânce, a 
reorientation toward tlie Lehenswelt, one transformed by tlie experience, rather than 
knowledge, of truth.
Wliat has been described as Nàgàrjuna’s mysticism is partly his uncompromising stance 
toward the misleading aspects of phenomenal life, that is, the ego navigating and 
discovering tlie Lebenswelt. Altliough I would argue that Nàgârjuna ultimately has a
440 MMK 22 and MMK 25




. .positive stance toward to the Lebensivelt or samsaric reality in that he recognises it as a 
valid state, and further would perhaps take the recognised Buddhist stance that samsaric
'■■-Iexistence is ripe or opportunity for enlightenment, still Nagarjuna is emphatic that what ; ;;
is given in samara (in the Lebensivelt) can only be taken as such. Attempts to speak, 
describe, to categorise, will never achieve the phenomenologist’s hope of testing and 
verifying truth perceptions.
It can be argued that Nagarjuna clears tlie way for a praxi-centric phenomenology by 
aggressively destroying by means of logic, any false ground or foundation that would 
replace the ultimate patli of Buddhist practice. Although most of Nâgârjuna’s efforts are 
concentrated around clearing away reified images of Buddhist religion, he has penned 
simple documents describing and praising the Buddhist life and practice iSuhrkkha, 
Ratnavali, The Hymns of the Catuh-stavd). Wliat Nàgârjuna leaves us with, after his 
perceived negative attack on all truth assertions/statements, is the bodhisattva màrga\t^Hî\ 
that is, a relying not on the statements of truth eschewed in religious discourse, but the 
active pursuit tlirough daily practice of a bodhisattva, intent upon true realisation.
Nàgârjuna pushed, via a negating logic, the consciousness beyond this phenomenal 
world, much like the stages of meditation train the consciousness in ever greater 
concentration until at some point the consciousness is simply beyond. In meditation 
practice, it is difficult to distinguish a living yogi in a deep trance from a dead corpse. 
Wliat prevents Nâgârjuna’s Buddhist practice from becoming yet another 
religious/ philosophical transcendentalism is the way mnjatd is utilised. Smryatd in 
Nâgârjuna’s tliought prevents botli tlie foundationalism of presence as well as tlie equally 
foundationalism o f the transcendent. Wlien the mind is finally finished constructing 
arguments {prapanca) instead of ascending simply beyond arguments and doctrinal 
statements, the mind has been prepared to partake in tlie activities of a bodhisattva. For 
Nàgârjuna, the most difficult achievement is this preparing the mind. Nàgârjuna achieves 
tlie preparation through negating tlie constructing (particularly of arguments) activity of 
the mind -  tlie quieting of prapanca. A stilled mind is the achievement o f bliss (siva) and 





To propose tliat Nagarjuna engages in a praxi-centric phenomenology, is not to attempt 
to systematise Nagarjuna tliought, but to recognise in his thought the necessity of 
practice, engaging directly the phenomenal mundane world. Without practice in the 
mundane realm, as recognised much earlier in Buddhist thought, there is no movement 
towards release. Furtlier, Nagarjuna argues, witli sûnyatà as the “base,” the Buddhist 
practice cannot evaporate into transcendence.
Yogâcâra, emphasising meditation practice, further analyses the consciousness and takes 
the argument deep within tlie psyche. Ultimately, of course, the subject’s inner psyche 
must be released, however, on tlie way one might conceivably remain lost in the 
systematics of another Buddhist doctrine, this time one witliin the consciousness itself.
Both Nàgârjuna and Yogâcâra lay out the method of overcoming the illusory existence in 
the mundane realm of samsara as a progressive path, ending in emptiness realised. 
Nâgârjuna’s logic carefully cuts away the base until one is able to logically let go. Practice 
is not secondary, but becomes at this point the focal point. Yogâcâra progressively 
follows tlie path o f illusion deep witliin tlie subjective consciousness so that once the 
primary or primordial creator of illusion is identified then all grasping of self can at this 
point be relinquished, and 'no-self via 'no mind’ is realised.
The efforts in Yogâcâra to unravel the constructing activity of the mind appears to be in 
the same vein as Nâgârjuna who also sought, through deconstructive means to destroy 
the rational arguments of the mind which bar one from autlientic religious experience. 
However, the crucial difference may be in the way that Nâgârjuna would push tlie 
practitioner to a position of sûnyatà and insist tliat, if the practitioner had truly gone 
beyond conceptualising, nothing further can be said; the experience speaks for itself and 
the best one can do at tliis point is say more clearly what such an experience is not. The 
Yogâcâra approach, in contrast, also seeks to drive the practitioner beyond tlie 
conceptualising mode of tlie mind, which is designated as the portion of the mind which 
creates tlie distinctions when there are really none. This “beyond” however, is not left to 
apophatic language or the realm of the inexpressible, but described in a multitude of 
ways, none of which are designed to be definitive in and of themselves. Furthermore, 
and most importantly as a distinction between Madhyamika and Yogâcâra, a 
bodhisattva’s mission of compassion in the Yogâcâra view depends on a skilful
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employment o f language, for tlie bodhisattva is expected to lead otliers to liberation 
through efficacious teaching. Does “skilful means” provide the necessary room for both 
Madhyamika expression and the Yogâcâra approach? Possibly. However, the Yogâcâra 
allowance for positive statements o f the source for the ego and the “ultimate” also leave 
open the possibility for the grave error of relegating practical insight to systematic 
processes and locating the ineffable within ontological or epistemological frameworks 
which cannot but fail as locations of release.
Paradoxically, release is experienced — it is existential in nature — and thus, in one sense 
personal and individual. However, ultimate release is experienced as an expression of 
no-self, not the ego self. Yogâcâra teachings identify the ego-self as the mistaken activity 
of the mind, a location personal and individual, fully linked to the Buddhist teaching of 
karma. The Yogâcâra mind is less a location, more an activity, which directs and forms 
the rest o f tlie individual. Convert the activity o f the mind from the detrimental actions 
o f producing duality and die mind is allowed to participate in the ultimate, which is 
neither dual nor non-dual.
The structured appearance of Yogâcâra teaching, its similarity to the Abhidharma dbarma 
matrices in form, is problematic. In the Yogâcâra understanding, convert the alaya and 
the rest of the world o f dhamms is largely irrelevant — tliey no longer disturb tlie dlaya or 
prom pt the dlaya into constructing activity. The dlaya, still and peaceful, fully 
transformed, can now “see” and “know” the world of sanisdra for what it is and despite it, 
can remain in it precisely because it, the dlaya, is fully transformed. This is the Yogâcâra 
explanation for how the bodhisattva, although enlightened, can maintain contact in and 
with die unenlightened world. The Yogâcâra explanation makes the hodisattva-mdrga out 
to be very personal in the way it is executed. And less mystical than die apophatic 
approach of the Madhyamika, die Yogâcâra scholars are not dissuaded from providing an 
explanation for how the bodhisattva reconciles the otherwise dualistic and contradictory 
mission o f one who would delay ultimate freedom from the world of sanysdra in order to 
teach and encourage others along the padi of transformation. The Yogâcâra approach 
appears more readily based on practice dian even Nâgârjuna’s approach as the school is 
established and named based on the practice of yogic meditation. However, and not to 
de-emphasise the practice of meditation to the school’s doctrines, the Yogâcâra 
explanation of illusory reality issuing from the d/gya-consciousness, die origin of the ego-
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self, creates problems for the Yogâcâra approach. The jump from locating the dlaya and 
identifying the source of the illusory’s world’s creation to the empty mind, not creating 
and not participating in the mundane activities of illusory reality, is difficult to follow. 
Apparently, one achieves tlie insight in die rhythm of meditation and hodhisattva-mdrga 
activities.
Also problematic for the school is the trajectory the Yogâcâra teaching took once it 
encountered Chinese thought in terms o f tathdgata-garhha and universal Buddha-mind. 
Chinese Taoism undeniably provided the inclination toward this doctrinal development; 
however, it was easy for Yogâcâra teaching to take on this foundational structure, largly 
because of the systematic appearance of Yogâcâra thought. Sûnyatà receded from its 
primary role o f freeing die practitioner to engage in the activity of release.
By clarifying die question of die bodhisattva ideal, Yogâcâra seriously questions Buddha- 
nature and its relation to human-nature, for the bodhisatL^a ideal is not restricted to 
monks but is understood and intended for all sentient beings. In this way, Yogâcâra 
prepares the ground for investigating “personal” liberation and the significance of 
individual praxis. Consequendy, the way is opened for Dogen’s cosmological Buddha- 
nature which links human/sentient bein^  with the vast universe/non-sentient 
phenomena, not particularly important to earlier schools of thought for considered either 
polluted (Abhidharma diought) or inconsequential to the interior landscape of 
transformation (Yogâcara thought). Yogâcâra conducted die positive investigation that 
Nâgârjuna spurned with mixed results. Nâgârjuna provided the conceptual key, sûnyatd 
(emptiness), by which to defeat conceptions. But Yogâcâra raised the issue of personal 
liberation and praxis, not directiy addressed or at least obvious in the Madhyamika 
approach. Consequently, Yogâcâra paved the way for the synthesising idealism of 
Chinese Fa-Hsiaiig School, but also widi the help of Madhyamika, helped secure die 
paradoxical approach of Chan/Zen designed to both give teaching while simultaneously 
negating and transcending, it. It may be far too simplistic to assert diat Madhyamika and 
Yogâcâra and Dogen all insist, in their different approaches, on ego-less actualisation. 
However, despite the differences, dieir varied endeavours create striking contrast to the 
Western pre-occupation with freeing the “self’ which in the attempt to actualise the self, 
tends to create super-egos and solipsistic systems of self-reflection.
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In contrast to Nâgârjuna’s and Yogâcâra apparently linear progression to tlie position of 
emptiness {sünyatâ} what Dogen and Heidegger propose is a kind o f circling back for an 
encounter with profound reality or truth. Dogen, in like vein witli the Yogâcâra stance, 
approaches tlie problem of true realisation from a personal standpoint. However, ratlier 
than purely psychological, Dogen’s approach does not bracket most of the physical 
world but brings the cosmological and particular together in the moment of experience, 
that moment tliat brings together all conceptions of time -  past, present and future — as 
well as all conceptions of duality, so that true experience of Buddha nature happens while 
flowers fall and weeds grow.
Dogen’s actualised Buddha-nature pulls in the ontological reality o f the cosmos, 
enlightened at the moment no-self is realised, recognising the paradoxical situation in 
which time and space allow for the transcendental, in fact exist in and spring forth of the 
timeless and spaceless. Dogen’s portrayal of tlie Buddhist doctrines of no-self, 
dependent co-origination, and liberation are more descriptive and personal than 
Nâgârjuna’s apophatic sûnyatà, yet Dogen models his datsuraku-datsuraku on Nâgârjuna’s 
teaching that sünyatâ relativises all reality. Dogen places this teaching squarely in the 
realm of Buddhist praxis by personalising sünyatâ to reflect the historical, auto­
biographical account of his own enlightenment experience. But unlike the 
personal/psychological approach suggested in Yogâcâra, Dogen’s concern is also 
comprehensive o f the phenomenal realm so that the merging of subject and object 
pursued in Dogen’s vision is one o f mutual dependence, the immanent and transcendent 
as exhibited concretely in the personal with cosmological. In keeping with what at first 
sounds like Yogâcâra paradox, self is actualised hence abandoned through true Buddhist 
practice which takes place within time and space, and located in a subject.
In Dogen’s praxi-centric phenomenology, which he sign-posted with the title of his 
Shôbôgeniyp — seeing with a Buddha’s eye the worldly reality reflecting Buddha reality 
through t^ ât^ en practice — Dogen invites the individual to practice with every intention of 
seeing mundane everyday reality, botli sentient and non-sentient, participating in the very 
same activity. One’s flatten session is at once tlie efforts of an individual practicing in 
daily repetition as well as the grand turning of tlie universe in its recognition o f Buddha 
reality. The individual is not separated from any mundane reality and Buddha activity 
encompasses it all. But practice and activity are essential in tliis view for in this way.
■3
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Dôgen brings together the seemingly incompatible teachings o f original enlightenment
and acquired enlightenment, seeing them acting in concordance with each other. The -1
paradox o f beginnings and the factor of time does not disturb Dôgen, for he sees time
moving not uni-directionally, but inter-directionally, bringing together past, present and f
future in a dynamic and significant expression of Buddha-nature. ?
■
For Dogen, practice or î^ âiien, is the primary reason any sentient being participates in 
Buddha-reality, beyond tlie compassionate nature of Buddha-reality itself. Practice is tlie 
expression and the manifestation of Buddha reality consequently what is viewed as mere 
mundane reality from one perspective may be viewed as the Buddha Dharma itself 
should one be open to this revelation. Outside one’s direct experience, however,
Buddha-nature cannot be sought or described or taught. Personal experience is not the 
key factor, however, although it is significantly part o f Dogen’s teaching. As he stated, 
using the whole body to look at forms and listen to sounds, “even though we are sensing 
tliem directly, it is not like a mirror’s reflection of an image ... Wliile we are experiencing "
one side, we are blind to tlie otlier side.” Experience and perception are always 
insufficient. One must see with the Buddha-eye in order for Buddha reality to show 
itself. The ego-self is never able to demand tliis showing or see properly enough. Only 
experience as characterised by sûnyatà, in which the ego-self is completely sloughed off, 
draws forth Buddha reality.
Both Heidegger and Dôgen propose a transcendence away from beings: Dôgen via 
shinjin-datsuraku, letting cast off one’s body-mind, and Heidegger by placing Da-sein at 
the edge o f the abyss, facing death. Transcendence works to loosen one from the kind 
of mundane view that covers and dulls reality. Dôgen further attempts a transcendence 
o f transcendence, or what can be called a “trans-descendence”. Dôgen’s datsuraku- 
datsuraku encourages one to let go letting go so tliat one’s “traceless enlightenment” 
comes forth forever.
Both Dôgen and Heidegger propose their phenomenology in terms o f a kind o f circling.
Dôgen sees enlightenment in slumber and niruàna in sàmsara through tlie tautological 
teaching of datsuraku-datsuraku. Heidegger expresses the circling of Da-sein and Being 
between which tliere is dependence and revealing. Dôgen states in The Voicing of the Way 
fascicle (Dotokd)-.
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... at tlie very moment of falling away {fdatsurakff, tlie voicing of tlie Way arises, 
spontaneous and unexpected. It arises neither by strength of mind nor by strength 
o f body. It is the voicing of tlie Way, arising of itself. Furthermore, when this 
voicing o f the Way is being voiced, it is at once the non-voicing of the Way being 
non-voiced.'*'*^
Dogen’s words here recall Heidegger’s discussion of Waying which “allows die way to 
come forward.” Heidegger asserts diat die Way cannot be traced as a patii bound for a 
destination, and Dôgen writes that neither strengdi o f mind nor body, in odier words, no 
act o f will or force, can bring forth the Way.
Heidegger’s circling, brought to view through his use of tautology and his re-orienting 
Da-sein in relation to the Abyss or Das Nichts, attempts to clear Da-sein o f inauthentic 
concerns so that the event o f Being and die experiencing location of Being in Da-sein 
can 'meet.’ Heidegger remains concerned widi authentic experience, although his 
language changes throughout his career of writing and thinking. Near die end of his life 
he writes more of how the authentic experience can occur, or what it looks like in terms i |
of wending one’s way through a forest, the experience of wandering (with purpose) 
which allows die way to make itself clear before one.
Husserl and Heidegger both initially sought to challenge the notion that meaning be 
located outside the world of beings, what Husserl termed die lived-world (Lebens2Peli).
The descriptor “phenomenology” which Husserl held to and Heidegger found wanting 
as it increasingly became the way to name a bygone school o f philosophy, remains 
meaningful when freed up from describing merely a mediod or school of thought.
Heidegger declared that phenomenological philosophy is “over” because of its cliche 
attribution. However, Heidegger also comments that
...in what is most its own, phenomenology is not a school. It is the 
possibility of thinking, at times challenging and only thus persisting, of 
corresponding to die claim o f what is to be diought,'*'*^
Heidegger viewed Husserl’s phenomenology as a “way o f doing” whereas a true 
phenomenological approach “makes extraordinary demands on the phenomenological
442 SAKAMOTO, Hiroshi, “The Voicing o f the Way; Dogen’s Shobogenzo Dotoku,” Eastern Buddhist, 16:1, 
(1983), p. 95
443 Dulie, Robin, “Does Phenomenology Have a Future?” Radical Philosophy, 113 (May/June 2002), p. 37
4^ Durie, Robin, “Does Phenomenology Have a Future?” Radical Philosophy, 113 (May/June 2002), p. 37
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philosopher”'*'*'* by challenging the very being of tliat philosopher. Furthermore, what 
Heidegger prompts in his description o f the angst which acts as a wakening call to D a­
sein is a personal, active participation in the development and discovery of meaning such 
as not to be encountered outside an engagement in the world of beings. Heidegger’s 
thought, often characterised by the Kehre, tlie turnings early and late in his career, pexemplify partly Heidegger’s life-long phenomenological bent which allows this re- y
writing and re-visioning that defines living philosophy -  what Heidegger ultimately calls A-
thinking (Denkefi). Husserl, conversely, in the very execution of his method of 4
phenomenology puts into motion the mechanics by which his Lehensivelt loses life, 
ultimately abstracting from the phenomenal realm and retreating into a transcendent 
consciousness so that meaning, if it is to be understood as existing in the Lehenswelt\\s,CT 
and coming forth to meet the subject in some kind of genuine exchange, cannot express 
nor be expressed; meaning is rendered once again bodiless and voiceless. Fleidegger’s 
"in-der-Welf contains the action of “tlirowness” and demands a response from beings.
Husserl’s term "l^benswelf suggests more the existential participation of one in the 
world. That Heidegger ignores this term may be his desire to distance himself from 
Husserl’s work, or perhaps his desire to re-define his terms, including that of existent^ .
Question o f Religious and Philosophical Pursuit
Each of the Buddhist practitioners considered in this thesis, Nagarjuna, Asanga and 
Vasubandhu of the Yogâcâra school, and Dôgen, have written tlieir philosophical and 
religious treatises with the intention of leading their disciples closer to an experience of 
nirvana, or Buddha reality, through an experience of mnyatd. These practitioners wrote 
within the parameters of a particular Buddhist school or community, even when they 
were severely critical of tlie school or community. Although their methods can appear 
divergent, there is a similar active approach to tlie experience of profound reality which 
re-values all otlier (i.e. mundane) experience. The Buddhist practitioners considered here 
are singularly concerned witli a religious experience that ultimately cannot be named or 
described; it is mystical in its participation with tlie mundane reality tliat is seen through 
everyday perception. Theirs can be called a praxi-centric phenomenological approach to 
experience profound reality or authentic living.
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Comparing this searching for a clearly religious ultimate concern with the pursuit of 
Western philosophers brings in the question of what the Western phenomenologists 
were attempting to uncover through tlieir investigation. Is Husserl’s attempt to confront 
‘the things themselves’ infused widi the same type of ultimate concern as the Buddhist 
practitioner’s? As discussed above, Heidegger’s philosophical paths o f thinking clearly 
intersect to a certain degree with die kind of ultimate concern diat die Buddhist 
practioners were transparently attempting to identify: clearing away die clutter o f concern 
that obsucures from the eye/mind reality as it is; attuning oneself to the rythmn of 
authenticity. The Buddhist practitioner’s methods prepare one for diat land of 
engagement with reality that is transformative. Buddhist practitioners along with 
Heidegger allow the subject to remain in the tension that is experienced in practice and 
living which cannot be categorised. Accepting the tension and dissonance that pairs with 
experience is a readily accepted path for the Buddhist practioner in contrast with the 
Western phenomenologist. The Buddhist practitioner relates it to die authenticity of 
living/practicing while the Western phenomenologist is uneasy widi a tension diat 
cannot be explained.
When die Buddhist practitioners criticise the foundational tendencies in the religious j j
schools or doctrines of tiieir time, tiiey seek to set into motion once again the avenue of 
release through transformative experience. A reliance on transcendental truth is clearly 
as grounding as immanent reality and release cannot be found through one aspect alone, 
but dirough a dynamic intersection of them both. There is no question that the 
bodhisattva marga is an ethical path, widi behavioural expectations of the practitioners such 
as self-control, generosity, Itindness and patience. However, ultimately die religious 
experience is not restricted to an ethics, although it may or even must exhibit one.
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